in advancing the army. The conference was fruitless of any results.

At this time, it was obvious to all intelligent minds that war was unavoidable. The crisis-to which the annexation of Texas clearly pointed-had come. Mr. Slidell had received his final rejection from Mr. Costillo Y. Lanzas, on the 12th of March. On the 8th, (four days before,) the army had marched from Corpus Christi to the Rio Grande. It had now arrived in front of Metamoras, where the forces of Mexico were arrayed, and where the declarations of officers, the armament of batteries, and all the paraphernalia of martial display, indicated an instant conflict. Notwithstanding all these plain indications of war, the movements of the administration at home exhibited no symptoms of any thing but unbroken and continued peace. The recommendations of General Scott for an increase of the army were disregarded. The President and Congress moved placidly on, as if neither arms or money, strength or blood were required to secure its easy victory over a weak and effeminate foe. Some preparations had heretofore been deemed necessary by statesmen to meet the exigencies of war, even with very inferior powers. In this instance, there was none. The official returns show that one-half the entire army of the United States was in the corps of General Taylor, while various military posts and forts in the northwest and on the Atlantic, were entirely deprived of their garrisons to make up the forces on the Rio Grande.1 Even this army was almost totally without the wagons, animals, and drivers necessary for common field transportation. They had to be

1 Report of General Scott. Public Documents of 1845.

procured in the heart of the country, at places near two thousand miles from the scene of operations. The march of the American army to the Rio Grande-the erection of batteries within gunshot of Metamoras-the appearance of Mexican parties on the Arroyo Colorado-the notice by them that the passage of that stream by the American. troops would be considered an act of war-and the concentration of large bodies of Mexican troops, known to have been marched to that vicinity-all announced, by no uncertain indications, that the conflict of war was about to commence, and the annexation of Texas to be followed by its natural and necessary consequences.

On the 24th of April, General Arista assumed the chief command of the army of Mexico. On the same day General Taylor detached a party of 63 dragoons to watch the course of the river above Metamoras. This party, under the command of Captain Thornton, were watched by the Mexicans, and at a point about thirty miles from the American camp, were surprised and attacked. After the loss of sixteen men killed and wounded, they were compelled to surrender to the superior forces of the Mexicans, who in large numbers had surrounded them in a fenced plantation field. This was the first actual fight of the war, and was received by the Mexicans as an augury favorable, but fallacious in the events which followed, to their success. General Arista, desirous of making a favorable impression, treated his prisoners with distinguished respect and kindness.

1 See the Letter of Colonel Cross, dated November 23d, 1845, detailing the fact, that the army had no means of field transportation whatever.Public Doc. 119, 29th Congress.

2 Captain Hardee's Report, April 26th, 1846.-Pub. Doc. 119.

2

Three days after this affair, the camp of Captain Walker's Texan Rangers was surprised, and several killed and wounded. This was between Point Isabel and Metamoras. In the mean while, it was ascertained that a large body of the Mexican army had crossed the river (Rio Grande) above, and that another corps was about to cross below. General Taylor was convinced that the object of attack was Point Isabel, which had been left in care of a small detachment, and where a large depot of provisions invited the enemy. Leaving an unfinished field-work, under the command of Major Brown, and garrisoned by the 7th infantry, with Lowd's and Bragg's companies of artillery, he marched for Point Isabel on the 1st of May, with his main force, and arrived on the next day.

The departure of General Taylor with his army, furnished the enemy in Metamoras with the opportunity for a safe attack on Fort Brown. At five in the morning of the 3d of May, a heavy bombardment was commenced from the batteries in Metamoras, and continued at intervals till the 10th, when the gallant defenders of the fort were relieved. In this defence, Major Brown, Captain Hawkins, and Captain Mansfield were greatly distinguished, both for skill and gallantry. The former was killed by a shell, and the defence was vigorously continued by Captain Hawkins. Captain Mansfield was an engineer officer, under whose direction the fort was built, and by whose skilful conduct the defences were increased and strengthened during the siege.3

The siege of Fort Brown was raised by the arrival of

1 General Taylor's Report, May 3d, 1846. Captain Walker was not present. 2 Same.-Pub. Doc. 119. Reports of Major Brown, Captain Hawkins, and General Taylor.

the victorious army of Taylor, which had just fought the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma. It appears that General Arista, who was now in command of the Mexican army, had assembled in all about eight thousand men at Metamoras, and being well advised of the strength of the American forces, thought the time had arrived for a decisive blow. The capture of Captain Thornton's party had also emboldened the Mexican troops. Arista saw that Point Isabel, the depot of large quantities of provisions and military munitions, was comparatively defenceless. To take this place would, therefore, both cut off the supplies of Taylor's army, and leave it isolated in the heart of the enemy's country. The plan of Arista was to cross the Rio Grande, get in the rear of General Taylor's army, capture Point Isabel, and then fall on the American army. The plan was judicious, and was only prevented from being carried out, by the accidental information brought to General Taylor by one of Thornton's party-sent in by the Mexican commander! The rapid return of the army to Point Isabel was a consequence of this information, and the additional fact that the enemy was preparing to cross below. Either the Mexican army was dilatory in its movement, or the body detailed to cross below was unable to form a junction, for the forces of Taylor reached the depot at Isabel without encountering the enemy.

Having obtained the object of his expedition, and garrisoned the depot with new troops, the American general

This is an inference from the facts stated by General Taylor.

General Taylor states in his letter of May 3d, that in consequence of the deficiency in light troops, he was "kept ignorant" of the enemy's

movements.

commenced his return to Fort Brown on the 7th of May, a week after his departure. The army was accompanied by a train of wagons, and encamped at night about seven miles from Isabel. The next day (the 8th) the march was resumed, and at noon the enemy was discovered drawn up in battle array upon a prairie three miles from the Palo Alto. The army was halted, and the men refreshed at a pool. The line was formed in two wings The right, commanded by Colonel Twiggs, was composed of the 5th Infantry, Colonel McIntosh; 3d Infantry, Captain Morris; 4th Infantry, Major Allen; Ringgold's Light Artillery; two eighteen-pounders under Lt. Churchill; and two squadrons of Dragoons under Captains Ker and May. The left wing, under the command of Lt. Colonel Belknap, was formed by a battalion of Artillery, Colonel Childs, Captain Duncan's Light Artillery, and the 8th Infantry, under Captain Montgomery. The train was left in the rear, protected by a guard.

At two P. M., the army advanced by heads of columns, till the Mexican cannon opened upon them, when they were deployed into line, and Ringgold's Light Artillery on the right, poured forth its rapid and deadly fire on the enemy. The Mexican cavalry, mostly Lancers, were on their left, and were forced back by the destructive discharges of artillery. To remedy this, General Arista ordered Torrejon, general of cavalry, to charge the American right. This he did, but was met by the Flying Artillery, under Lt. Ridgely, and by the 5th Infantry. The Lancers were again driven back. At this period the prairie grass was set on fire, and under cover of its smoke the Americans advanced to the position just occupied by the Mexican cavalry. Again a Mexican division of Lancers