difference in form, they are, after all, but one word; and hence we should, in order to see if such be really the case, do with anim what we have done with be, that is, reduce it to its primitive state. The an in this word is equal to oin, that is, to "one," and im is equal to iv or double one, that is, to" two;" yet both words stand in apposition to one another, and there might be a proposition made of them thus, an is im; that is, "an is the same as im." Hence if an means one, so must im mean one; and if im means two or double one, so must an mean two or double one. As im is the same as iv, and as iv is the same as in, and as in is the same as one, we hence see that im means one. But we may also find this meaning, by remarking what we have already seen, namely, that im is equal to un. Hence, when we say that iv is equal to two, we should understand by this word two, double one, and which the analysis of its name (it-w-o) proves to be its exact meaning; so that two makes after all but one, named the double one. When we analyse an thus, o-iv, we see that it also means "the double one;" and this we can see still more clearly, by observing that iv is the same as w, so that o-iv may become o-w, of which the literal meaning is, "one double ;" and if we put both these letters thus, w-o (double one), we shall have them as they are to be found in two (it-w-o), so that the meaning between an and im is precisely equal. Hence we have in these two words only one, and in the beginning this one word filled the place which both fill now. Then when o-in (the analysis

of an) stood for an-im, it was the o which signified one, or the male kind, and in, which is the same as iv, that signified double one, or the female kind. In like manner iv, the analysis of im, is to be accounted for when it stood for an-im, it being the I in this word which signified one, or the male kind, and v which signified two, or the female kind. From thus seeing an and im to be exactly alike in meaning, we are led to suppose that they make but one word. When we consider their analysed forms (oin and iv), it is easy to perceive that this is a correct supposition. As iv is the same as in, this latter word does not differ from oin, but by its having no o. But this letter is in oin nothing more than a definition of in, to which it stands in apposition. Hence it can with great propriety be understood before the in, which is for iv, so that oin-iv, or rather oin-in, will become, when this o is supplied, oin, oin. But here still there is an ellipsis, as the o in oin has I understood before it, so that this oin is entirely io-in, these two words being still in exact apposition to each other. As the two words an-im make thus but one and the same word, namely, oin, we have now to compare this word with eb (be), in order to see if both these words correspond in form as they do in meaning.

Though eb is composed of two letters, we know that it has, when radically considered, only one, since the stands here in apposition to B, as we have The word oin is, we also know, equal to io in, in which two words we have only one, since io

seen.

stands in apposition to in; and here the equality becomes very apparent and evident, when we recollect that n is equal to these two parts cɔ, and consequently to an o, so that in and io are in every way but one word. As the B, to which eb or be has been reduced, is also, from its being composed of 13, equal to io, it follows, since the radical part of animal, that is an im, is equal to the same thing, that these two words, being and animal, must be equal to one another; by which we are to understand, since perfect equality cannot exist between any two things, that being and animal do, notwithstanding their apparent difference, make but one and the same thing.

The more an object is complicated in its form, the more it is difficult to have a clear idea of it: by seeing being and animal reduced to io, or to the single character B, and by knowing the nature of these letters, we can more easily account for these two words. That io or Be can mean two things may be easily conceived, when we recollect that both male and female are here signified; and that the same word should, when otherwise considered, mean only one, may be also easily understood, since one being or animal is signified by it. But that it should also, whilst thus signifying one and two, signify three also, is not so easy to conceive. This is, however, so evidently the case, that there is not, I am sure, a language in the world of which the word for three does not also mean being, and consequently all which being means. In order to render

this intelligible, let me observe, that as io is made frequently to appear, as we have seen, under the form of iv, which means the Divinity, it follows, that the word for three must, in all languages, mean also the Divinity, since, when radically considered, there is, I contend, no difference between it and this word which signifies being. And as this word iv is the radical part of iver (which is the same as ever) — because ever, when analysed, means the thing iv, that is, God-it follows that the word for three must also mean ever. And as iv-er does not differ from ip-er, and as this word is the same as père (father), it follows that the word for three must also mean père or father. And as iv-er is also the radical part of veritas (truth), the analysis of this word being ever-ita-is, meaning "ever that is, " it follows that the word for three must also in all languages mean truth. It may also be observed, that as iv means one, from its being the same as in, and as one is the same as son, it follows that the word for three, to which it is equal, must also mean one and son. Hence, without following up the word for being or three any farther, it is by this much apparent that either of these words, and it does not matter which, means God, eternity, truth, father, son, three, and one.

Let us now examine the word for three in Greek, Latin, French, and English, and see how far what is here advanced respecting it may be proved. Tpsis may be analysed thus, it-er-eb, in which instance it er is equal to être in French, and it conse

quently means, being or thing; and eb is the same as be in English; so that it er stands here in apposition to eb, since, like the latter, it means be. The whole analysis may be rendered intelligible, if we explain it by "the thing be," which is very correct; and thus we see that the word for three has, in Greek, the same meaning as the idea being. But it may be also analysed thus, it-vr-sis. Here, instead of e before r I have put v; because the Roman e, whether long or short, is equal to v, for the reason that it is the same as upsilon or epsilon. As these two letters vr require vowels, they consequently become iver, so that it vr means, "God ever," or "the eternal," and as as is, in Greek, one, hence τρεις means, "the eternal one," or "God ever one."

I have often had occasion to remark that, when examined, the words for being and ever are synonymous; hence, when we understand ever, in the analysis just given, as meaning "being," the three words it iver as will mean, "the being one," that is, "the thing one." But this meaning is also obtained from the first analysis of the two letters TP, which is it er, and evidently the same as être or est re. Thus we see that treis means also one; and as one and son are equal, as we have already seen, it follows that treis has also this meaning.

It must be still fresh on the reader's mind that when one and son were shown to be synonymous, they were also shown to be synonymous with sun; and even so, we may remark, is it in the present instance. Thus as which in tras means one, is the