battle lasted an hour longer the two ironclads must have been taken. At sunset the Flying Squadron was recalled from her pursuit of the Chinese vessels. Diagram VI. shows the last phase of the battle when the two squadrons are turning back to surround

the Chinese again; the places where the Chih-yuen [8] and King-yuen [7] sank are also marked.

At sunset, as the torpedo-boats had joined the Chen-yuen [5] and Ting-yuen [6], the Japanese feared to risk a night engagement, and followed the Chinese at a distance, but next morning they lost sight of

them. It is probable that both fleets were exhausted by the long fight. The losses of the Chinese were very heavy; four vessels, the Yang-wei [1] Chaoyung [2] King-yuen [7] and Chih-yuen [8], besides one which ran aground in the retreat near Talien Bay, and was blown up by her crew lest she should fall into the hands of the Japanese. The Japanese did not lose any vessels, but the Matsushima [5] and

Hiyei [9] were badly damaged; their loss in men was also very slight, only 115 killed and 103* wounded for the whole fleet, but to this total the flagship contributed fifty-one killed and forty-one woundedninety-two out of 360 on board. The Chinese loss of life was far more considerable; they lost about 600

*These are only those who were attended to in hospital; some more remained on board.

men by the sinking of three vessels, but on the other vessels there were only about 100 killed and 200 or 300 wounded.

The naval battle of Hai-yang Island was the only considerable one of the war, and is one of the most remarkable of modern times. It is the first naval engagement between two fleets provided with modern improvements in the art of war, and it was carried out on an entirely original plan; the beautiful evolutions of the Japanese fleet were totally different from ancient tactics, but they are the only ones adapted to the high speed and heavy armament in quick-firing guns of modern navies. Rapid concentration and a crushing fire on the enemy's weak point can now be easily effected by a skilful admiral, and the ancient line of battle, with its series of single engagements between vessels battering away at each other until one struck its flag, is to be completely discarded. Some critics have contemptuously remarked that a naval battle between two European fleets could never have lasted nearly five hours without the complete destruction of one or both of the fleets. This is a false conclusion drawn from a confusion of modern vessels with ancient tactics. They imagine two fleets running alongside of each other in the good oldfashion and discharging their quick-firing guns incessantly until one side surrenders or is destroyed. They do not understand that the introduction of quick-firing guns has modified naval warfare like breech-loading rifles transformed infantry tactics; as

in land warfare, infantry has to advance in open order and profit by every shelter the ground may offer to escape the shower of bullets that greets its approach, so in naval warfare ships will have to trust to their speed to avoid being crushed by a rapid fire, and by

skilful evolutions choose the time and the distance of the engagement.

Admiral Ito has also been blamed for not having destroyed the whole Chinese fleet, but it must be remembered that history offers few instances of the

destruction of an entire fleet, and in such cases, like the battle of the Nile, the fleet was at anchor or had its movements cramped by the land; but even in such cases, as at Salamis and Lepanto, a large number of vessels often succeeded in escaping.

In the present instance the Chinese lost four vesels, nearly a third of their fighting force, and when we consider that most of the naval battles of the last century were decided by the loss of only a small part of one of the fleets, we shall not hesitate to recognise that the Chinese had a crushing defeat. It must also be remembered that Admiral Ito had three weak vessels which hampered his movements, and that he succeeded in not losing one of them, though one was a merchant steamer that could have been disabled by a single lucky shot in the engines, and another a gun-boat of about 600 tons. We cannot tell what the Japanese might have done without these vessels. They also had no torpedo-boats, and considering the way the Japanese handled these craft a few months later at Wei-hai-wei, it may be logically inferred that had any of them been present at Hai-yang Island, very few of the Chinese vessels would have escaped during the night.

We must feel a deep admiration for Admiral Ito when we consider how, surmounting all these difficulties, he was able to win the battle by a series of beautiful evolutions, which, guarding the weak vessels, always had for their ultimate aim the destruction of the enemy. As he did not expect to meet the Chinese,