IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF CHIN-CHOW.

attention of the forts, and contributing to the fall of the fortress, but no such incident is mentioned in the Japanese war publications, and it is unlikely they would have omitted such an heroic exploit so congenial to the daring character of the Japanese people.

While the Japanese army was taking Port Arthur, the small garrison which had been left at Chin-chow to guard the isthmus was exposed to a dangerous attack from the Chinese, who suspected that the place was insufficiently defended, and might be taken by a coup de main. The garrison, though far inferior in numbers, made a most gallant resistance. A few marines from the fleet taught the infantry to handle the fortress guns captured at Chin-chow, and even the transport coolies volunteered to fight, and on one occasion made a desperate sortie, armed only with cudgels against a body of Chinese fugitives. Chinchow was for some time exposed to danger on both sides. While the Chinese troops were advancing south by the Fuchou road, bodies of fugitives from Port Arthur were advancing north-their only way of escape. The Japanese, with coolness and boldness, succeeded, however, in warding off the danger from both sides.

The fall of Port Arthur caused an immense sensation. The foreigners in the Far East had been inclined to discount the Japanese victories. These had been won in obscure corners of Corea and the Chinese frontier, and they suspected exaggeration in

the Japanese accounts.

They also considered that China had not had time to put forth her whole strength, and imagined that with a few months of preparation the Chinese could repulse any Japanese attack on such a formidable fortress as Port Arthur. All these surmises were refuted by a day's fighting, and it caused great sensation.

At Peking, for the first time, serious alarm was felt and acknowledged. The despised enemy now seemed to be at the gates. An attempt was hurriedly made to avert the imminent danger, and a peace mission was projected. But Chinese love of subterfuge was not yet crushed, and instead of sending well-known statesmen with full powers, a few irresponsible Europeans with inadequate credentials were forwarded to Japan. Mr. Detring, the Commissioner of Customs at Tientsin, and the trusted adviser of the Viceroy Li-Hung-Chang, was sent, bearing a letter from the Viceroy to Count Ito, the Japanese minister, in which there was some reference to an Imperial edict about the peace. The Japanese Government naturally refused to open negotiations with such an envoy, and politely sent him back. The people were indignant,

and considered the mission as an insult to the national dignity.

CHAPTER IV.

THE FIRST ARMY IN MANCHURIA.

IT has been already shown that up to about the middle of November the operations of the two divisions of this army had been confined to two objectives. General Tachimi, with the van of the fifth division, had pushed out numerous reconnaissances to clear the roads north and east, and keep in touch with the Chinese, who might descend south and threaten the Japanese line of communications. General Oseko, with the advanced guard of the third division, had pushed west and captured Hsin-yen on the 18th of November, as a preliminary step to an important strategical movement which would be carried out as soon as the second army, having captured Port Arthur, was free to march north. We must now consider the further operations of the two divisions.

Fifth Division, or Right Wing of the First Army. To understand the operations in this part of Manchuria it is necessary to cast a glance on the roads which intersect the country. There is, first, the main road which, from Chiu-lien-ch'eng and Fenghuang, leads to Liao-yang and Mukden.

The

celebrated Mo-tien (Heaven-touching) Pass lies on this road, and we have seen that the Japanese, after a reconnaissance, renounced attacking it, and withdrew their outposts first to Lien-shan-kuan and then to Tsao-ho-kou. Then there is another road which from Chiu-lien-ch'eng takes a circular sweep east and north, and by Chang-tien, Tuan-tien, Kuan-tien, Aiyang-pien-men, and Sai-ma-chi joins the main road at Tsao-ho-kou. Between these two roads there are three cross-roads, two of which form a loop between Feng-huang and Ai-yang-pien-men; there is, besides, a road at Sai-ma-chi which leads to northern Manchuria. We need not notice the roads from Chiulien-ch'eng to Tai-ku-shan, and from Feng-huang to Hsin-yen, as they lead to that part of the country where the third division intended to intended to operate. Towards the end of November two reconnaissances were made by the fifth division: one by the circular road from Chiu-lien-ch'eng to Sai-ma-chi, in which the Japanese met only a slight resistance from a few Chinese soldiers supported by peasants armed with matchlocks; the other, led by Tachimi himself, had a far more important object. The Japanese were informed that a body of well-trained Tartar troops from the Amur province, led by General I-ko-teng-a, were marching south by the road which abuts at Sai-ma-chi on the circular road just mentioned. The object of the Chinese general was to retake Fenghuang, and at the same time cut off the Japanese outposts at Lien-shan-kuan. As the Japanese had