CHAPTER VI.

THE WEI-HAI-WEI CAMPAIGN.

THE forces at Hai-cheng and Kaiping had decided to act on the defensive until their proper time of action should come; but those at the latter place represented only a small part of the second army. Only one brigade under General Nogi had been advanced, thus leaving two in the Regent's Sword Peninsula. One was required to guard the important fortresses of Ta-lien and Port Arthur; but the other, the Kumamoto Brigade, could be employed in a naval expedition during the remainder of the winter, while operations were arrested in Manchuria. The second (Sendai) division was now mobilised and sent to Ta-lien, which had become the Japanese naval base of operations since the capture of Port Arthur. Marshal Oyama, with his staff, took command of this new army, composed, like his former one, of a brigade and a division.

The Japanese, when they wisely judged that a rapid prosecution of the Manchurian campaign was unadvisable, sought some other object which should employ their troops and contribute to the general ends of the war. Wei-hai-wei answered all these views. It was conveniently situated near Ta-lien Bay; it was the second naval stronghold of China, or,

to use the picturesque language of the Emperor of Japan, it was one of the leaves of the gate of China, the other being Port Arthur; it also sheltered the Pei-yang squadron. That fleet, though severely handled at Hai-yuan Island, was still a formidable collection of vessels, and the Japanese could never feel entirely secure until it was destroyed. That factor eliminated from the campaign, the Japanese could prosecute the war at their pleasure, and advance their armies by land or sea, or by both ways. Taken in such a light, the capture of Wei-hai-wei would be more important than was the fall of Port Arthur, as in all probability the Chinese fleet would be either taken or destroyed.

The Japanese, as usual, commenced by a feigned attack. On the 18th of January a squadron of three vessels, the Yoshino, Akitsushima, and Naniwa, left Ta-lien and proceeded towards Teng-chou, a city of 10,000 inhabitants, about 100 miles west of the Shantung promontory. Owing to a snow-storm the Japanese could not commence the attack until 4 P.M., when they fired blank cartridges at a Chinese fort; they soon employed shells, as the enemy answered vigorously with a battery of eight guns, amongst which was one of 12 centimetres. On the following morning it snowed again, but as soon as it cleared up the Japanese recommenced firing, and were briskly answered by the forts. During this bombardment one of the most comic incidents of the war occurred: in this out-of-the-way town some missionaries lived

the kind of life the Spaniards lived in California, so inimitably described by Bret Harte in his 'Eye of the Comandante;' they were ruthlessly awakened from their dreamy existence by the sound of the Japanese artillery, and flattering themselves that the seat of war was being transferred to their neighbourhood, one of them, with visions of the Pope stopping Attila in his mind, embarked in a small boat with a white flag and an American flag. His object was to go and " try and induce the ships to refrain from cruel and wanton destruction of innocent lives and property." The Japanese naturally imagined that he had come out to enjoy the fight, and left him to his devices. What rendered the situation still more comical is, that the whole operation was a diversion; while the three men-of-war were firing at Teng-chou, the real expedition was starting in a different direction, and the missionary with his small boat contributed to the realistic mise-en-scène of the Japanese feigned attack. The Chinese had been fearing an attack on Teng-chou, as there are excellent landingplaces in the neighbourhood, and the news of the bombardment sent all the disposable Chinese forces. in Shantung in the direction of Teng-chou.

The real expedition started from Ta-lien Bay on the 19th of January. It was composed of fifty transports, and reached the coast of Shantung in three squadrons on the 20th, 21st, and 23rd respectively; it was protected by almost the whole Japanese fleet of twenty vessels, some escorting and others watching

the Chinese fleet in Wei-hai-wei. The place chosen for the landing was a convenient beach near the city of Yung-cheng, sheltered from the northerly winds. The Chinese had made some slight preparations for resistance, and there were about 200 or 300 soldiers. with four guns, who opened fire on the Japanese boats as they attempted to land. The Yaeyama, on perceiving this, signalled to the boats to come back, and opened fire with shell on the Chinese battery. A few rounds were sufficient to disperse the defending force, and the Japanese landed and captured the guns. Arrangements were made at once for the landing of the troops; to avoid confusion, the naval officers divided the beach into sections, allotting one to each regiment or battalion, and though there was a heavy fall of snow, all proceeded with order and rapidity.

The landing of such a large force required several days; it was not until the 26th of January that the Japanese army, divided into two columns, marched by the two roads which lead from Yung-cheng to Weihai-wei. The inland route was taken by the second (Sendai) division, and the sea-route by the Kumamoto brigade. The roads were found to be wretched, impassable even for field-pieces, so that the army had to advance only with mountain guns. The city of Yung-cheng had been occupied shortly after the landing, and though five battalions of 350 men were supposed to defend it, the Chinese offered hardly any resistance; six Japanese soldiers scaled one of the gates and threw it open to their comrades. There

were a few skirmishes on the way to Wei-hai-wei, but nothing worth recording happened until the Japanese were in the neighbourhood of that fortress.

The fleet had been, all this time, very active, watching Wei-hai-wei and the Chinese fleet. On the 21st of January, a squadron of eleven vessels steamed near that port, and when it retired, a man-of-war was left to keep constant watch; this duty was undertaken by several vessels who relieved each other by turns. On the 25th the British man-of-war Severn carried to Wei-hai-wei a letter from Admiral Ito to Ting, the Chinese admiral, advising him to surrender. This step was not a new one on the part of the Japanese; before the attack on Port Arthur, a Japanese officer, who had resided long in China, addressed a letter to the Chinese generals advising surrender, as resistance was useless. When the Japanese took Port Arthur they found the draft of a contemptuous answer which was, however, never sent. The present letter from Ito to Ting will be alluded to again when the whole correspondence about the surrender of Wei-hai-wei is mentioned; it is contained in an appendix, and is worth reading, as it is a remarkable document, showing great breadth of views and historical knowledge.

This letter, written in English, was publishel in the Japan Mail, but without any date, and no mention of its having been delivered by a British man-of-war. The latter statement is derived from a Japanese war publication; if it is correct, it would explain why Admiral Ting proposed that the British admiral should be guarantor of the surrender of Wei-hai-wei.

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