THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR.

INTRODUCTION.

THE China-Japan War cannot be considered as one of those distant struggles between outlandish nations, only interesting to the curious reader, who seeks to satisfy his craving for the strange and the littleknown. It is an event which has already produced great results, and it bids fair to produce even greater ones and to rank as one of the great events of the century. Indeed, for the magnitude, nature and duration of its results we think it will rank as the great war of the century. Even in a few months, after the first battles, we find that it produced a most rapid and startling change of public opinion. Japan. which it was fashionable to deride as a country of ridiculous little beings, who aped everything though with such inconsistent levity that no permanent results could be expected from their childlike imitations; the country which was supposed to possess but a "vencer" of civilisation was found by the

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astonished world to possess an army and a navy which could rank with the same institutions of Europe and America. Her victories were the more conspicuous, because so unexpected; none of the grave writers who had formed western opinion of the Far East had ever given a thought to the military power of Japan; all serious consideration was given to China, and she was supposed to be carefully nursed to become the ally of Great Britain, as the only nation sufficiently powerful to arrest the eastern expansion of Russia. All wrote about the undeveloped latent military power of the Chinese Colossus, and Japan was relegated to the domain of art and prettiness.

People who had imbibed their opinion from these sources considered the war at first as a ludicrous one; they were irresistibly moved to laughter by the idea of little Japan (forgetting that most nations of Europe are inferior to her in population and territory) daring to grapple with the Chinese Empire. These popular errors seemed moreover plausible on account of the numerical disparity of the two powers; quantity is more easily appreciated than quality: it requires less mental exertion. Those who had studied Japanese history, had travelled over the country with an attentive eye, even for a short time, or who had known educated Japanese, formed a far different opinion about the prospects of the war. They reflected that the Japanese had always been a warlike nation, that they had stopped even the

conquests of the Mongols when they were in the because height of their glory, that the progress achieved by of weather

Japan in the last twenty years was not fictitious but spread through the whole people and their institutions; on the other hand China had never been fond of war, and in her encounter with European troops in the present century had always cut a poor figure. At the same time, the warmest admirers of Japan, probably even her own statesmen, did not expect such a brilliant series of extraordinary successes.

Nobody doubted the valour of her soldiers, but the war was a revelation to the world of the strategical ability and coolness of her generals and admirals. To appreciate justly the merit of Japan, and the rapidity of her assimilation of foreign civilisation, it is necessary to bear in mind that the present war is the first foreign war that Japan has waged for the last three centuries, and that it was her first experiment with the new weapons and tactics which she has so lately adopted from the West. Notwithstanding this, everything passed smoothly, as if general manoeuvres were being carried on. It is but fair to add one more remark; the war being carried on in Corea and Manchuria required that soldiers, ammunition, stores, etc., should all be transported by sea, thus causing an immense increase of difficulty to the Japanese transport department. These difficulties were faced with coolness and overcome without effort. European officers who had an opportunity of witnessing the landing of considerable bodies of Japanese troops

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confessed that the operation could not have been performed better by well-trained Western troops provided with an efficient transport service.

The secret of these unexpected successes is revealed by an attentive consideration of the ancient and recent history of Japan; the many centuries of insular isolation and the feudal system had trained the mass of the Japanese people to sentiments of loyalty, of unswerving devotion to their chieftains, and developed a spirit of heroic fortitude and love of war. The last quarter of a century had initiated the higher classes to all the science and progress of the West. When, therefore, Japan resolved to put forth her strength in a foreign war, she found herself possessed with an army composed of soldiers who were ready to advance joyfully to death at the bidding of the emperor and for the glory of their country, and of officers and generals who had profited by the experience of centuries of Western wars, and who had taken up the study of military science just as it had reached perfection at the hands of Napoleon and Moltke.

Japan had also great advantages in her vicinity and long intercourse with China, from whom she has received her early civilisation, and her writing. The peculiar nature of the Chinese characters-which express ideas rather than sounds, resembling thus our Arabic numerals, which have the same meaning from Finland to Portugal, though with such different sounds-enables the educated Japanese to understand

Chinese books and writing even when they cannot speak a word of the language. This common written medium not only facilitates the preparatory study of the enemy's country and forces, but is an incalculable benefit in the course of a campaign. All information which can be conveyed by writing can be obtained casily, without fear of mistakes, and needs no interpreters, which are only necessary in communicating with the illiterate and ignorant. This prompt means. of information is a great advantage in modern warfare, where knowledge of every kind is the principal element of success. To such a cause must be attributed the relatively greater success of the Japanese as compared with the French and English in the China campaigns.

While we note the brilliant qualities of the Japanese army, we must not overlook that they are set off by corresponding defects on the part of China. That country, throughout her long history, has seldom been remarkable for military success: she has often been conquered by smaller nations, and for the last two centuries and a half has been governed by a handful of Manchus, a hardy northern race. The education of the Chinese people and public opinion all tend to discourage any latent warlike tendency of the nation. The military profession is looked down upon; mandarins of that class always ranking below civil mandarins; and a soldier is considered as the lowest of the people, as a person who cares for no decent calling and is unfit for it. Under such conditions, it