The Japanese Navy.

This requires little description, as the navies of all countries are similarly organised, but it calls for some remarks. It is strange that Japan, an empire constituted solely of islands, with such an extensive seacoast and numerous maritime population should have such a relatively weak navy. While her army, so superior in discipline and military science, was also actually superior in numbers to the Chinese, her navy was inferior and possessed no vessels powerful enough to cope with the Chen-yuen and Ting-yuen, the two big ironclads of the Pei-yang squadron. Japan had several fast vessels; one of them, the Yoshino, the fastest in the world, but her victories were due to the skill and daring of her sailors and not to the ships which they manned.

Japan has three military ports, Yokosuka, Kure and Sasebo, to each of which a squadron is attached ; but during the war the fleet was divided into several small squadrons of four vessels (rarely of more), which acted as tactical units in their military operations.

The following table gives the most important particulars of the Japanese war-vessels :

(One 32-cm. Canet: eleven 12-cm.; five 6-pounder quick-firing; eleven 17-5 360

3-pounder Hotchkiss; six machine-guns

Three 17-cm. Krupp; six 15-cm. Krupp

Ten 12-cm. quick-firing; fourteen 47-cm. quick-firing; three machine-guns

Three 17-cm. Krupp; six 15-cm. Krupp

Two 17-cm. Krupp; five 12-cm. Krupp; eight machine-guns

Two 25-ton Armstrong; four 4-inch Armstrong; four machine-guns
One 17-cm. 6-ton Krupp; six 12-cm. Krupp

Four 15-cm. Krupp; two machine-guns.

615

700

One 24-cm. Krupp; one 12-cm. Krupp; two machine-guns

(One 32-cm. Canet; cleven 12-cm. Canet; five 6-pounder quick-firing; eleven)
3-pounder Hotchkiss; six machine-guns

12.0 104
12.0 126

17.5 360

Four 6-inch quick-firing; eight 4.7-inch quick-firing; twenty-two 3-pounder)
quick-firing

Two 26-cm. 28-ton Armstrong; six 15-cm. 5-ton Armstrong; twelve machine-guns 18.7 357
One 32-cm. Canet; twelve 12-cm. quick-firing; six machine-guns
Two 17-cm Krupp; five 12-cm. Krupp

One 7-inch M.L.R. Armstrong; five 12-cm. Krupp

One 15-cm. Krupp; two 12 cm. Krupp

One 21-cm. Krupp; one 12-cm. Krupp; two machine-guns
Four 12-cm. quick-firing; eight 47-mm. quick-firing

PART II.

THE COREAN CAMPAIGN.

CHAPTER I.

THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES.

The Attack on the King's Palace at Seoul.

It has been already shown that in the middle of July the Corean question became so complicated, that it was well-nigh impossible to resolve it by pacific means. The Japanese Government had proposed a programme of reforms, which China thought unnecessary, and had refused her co-operation; the Corean Government had consented at first, but afterwards procrastinated, urging that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops must precede any measures of reform. This tergiversation of Corea was attributed to the machinations of China, and the Japanese Government determined to deprive the Min party of that power which they used in the interests of China. Even if the Japanese Government had been unwilling, it would have been compelled to adopt this strong line of policy popular feeling throughout Japan was

very excited, and the whole nation was resolved to suffer no more humiliations in Corea. The pacific policy, which led to the first treaty with Corea in 1876, had been distasteful to a party in the country, and the consequent discontent caused, in 1877, the Satsuma Rebellion, which cost Japan thousands of lives and millions of money during the seven months of civil war. The two attacks on the Japanese Legation at Seoul had deeply hurt the proud susceptible character of the Japanese, who considered the apologies and indemnities of the Corean Government an insufficient atonement for the murders and outrages committed on their fellow-countrymen. On this occasion, Japan must assert itself, and with an energy which would render impossible any further trifling with her dignity.

On the other hand, the opportunity was so favourable that it must not be allowed to slip; the Japanese had been quicker and more clever. They had offered China a share in the re-organisation of the country, and she had refused; they had a strong force in the capital, and they could act without her assistance. The question could not be settled without a war, and in such a case rapidity would be the chief element of

success.

The march of events was very rapid. On the 18th of July the Corean Government informed Otori, the Japanese Minister, that the presence of such a large body of Japanese soldiers troubled the minds of the people, and that they could not undertake the

reforms until after the withdrawal of the Japanese troops. On the 19th, Yuan-Shi-kai, the Chinese Minister, who had been at Seoul since 1885, and who was suspected by the Japanese to be encouraging the Coreans in their resistance, left the capital, and, embarking on a Chinese man-of-war at Chemulpo, returned to China. On the 20th July, Otori sent an ultimatum to the Corean Government; he reminded

them that by the Convention of 1885, Corea had bound itself to build barracks for the Japanese soldiers (he thus insinuated that Japan had a perfect right vis-à-vis of Corea to send troops in the country); he added, that the presence of soldiers, who had publicly proclaimed their object of protecting a dependent state was incompatible with the independence of that

*He alluded to the proclamation of the Chinese generals.