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CHAPTER VI.

CHINA AND INDIA-Mr. B. Cochrane calls the attention of the House of Commons to the relations of this country with China in reference to the affair on the Peiho River-Speeches of Sir Michael Seymour, Lord J. Russell, Sir J. Pakington, and other Members-The Earl of Elgin offers explanations of his conduct in China in the House of LordsSir De Lacy Evans again brings on a discussion in the House of Commons respecting the intended Chinese Expedition-A debate arises, in which Lord J. Russell, Sir J. Elphinstone, Mr. Bright, Mr. Sidney Herbert, Sir J. Pakington, Lord Palmerston, Mr. Whiteside, and many other Members speak-Earl Grey moves in the Upper House for an estimate of the probable cost of the Expedition, and expresses his opinion on the transactions in China-He is followed by the Duke of Somerset, Lord Malmesbury, Lord Elgin, and Lord Ellenborough -The Chancellor of the Exchequer finds it necessary to make specialprovision for the expenses of the Chinese War-He makes a supplementary Financial Statement on the 16th of July-The money is to be provided without increase of taxation-FINANCES OF INDIA—— Mission of Mr. James Wilson to restore the equilibrium between Revenue and Expenditure-He states his plans of retrenchment and taxation in the Council at Calcutta-Sir C. Trevelyan, Governor of Madras, opposes Mr. Wilson's plans, and causes much embarrassment to the Government-He is promptly removed from office by the Cabinet -Lord Ellenborough, in the House of Lords, criticizes the financial proposals of Mr. Wilson-Answer of the Duke of Argyll—Mr. Danby Seymour adverts to Sir C. Trevelyan's recall, and eulogises his services -Sir C. Wood and Lord Palmerston justify the recall as a measure of inevitable necessity for the public good-Remarks of Mr. Bright THE INDIAN FINANCIAL STATEMENT-Sir C. Wood, on the 13th of August, explains to the House of Commons the state and prospects of the Indian Exchequer He defends the increased taxation proposed by Mr. Wilson-Mr. H. Danby Seymour severely criticizes the statement -After some discussion, Sir C. Wood's Resolutions are adopted-REORGANIZATION OF THE INDIAN ARMY-A Bill is brought in by Sir C. Wood to authorise the amalgamation of the Indian European Army with the Queen's Forces-The measure is firmly resisted by a section of the House of Commons-It is opposed in an able speech by Lord Stanley, but supported by General Peel-Sir E. Colebrooke, Sir De Lacy Evans, Mr. A. Mills, Mr. M. Milnes, Sir James Elphinstone, Mr. Horsman, Mr. Baxter, Mr. Danby Seymour, and Mr. Rich, take

a prominent part in opposing the Bill-It is supported by Mr. Sidney Herbert, Mr. Ayrton, Colonel Percy Herbert, Mr. Vansittart, Sir W. Russell, and Sir C. Wood-After protracted debates the Second Reading is carried by 282 to 53-Further opposition on going into Committee-Various hostile amendments are negatived by large majorities, and the Bill is passed-The Second Reading is moved in the House of Lords on the 10th of August by the Duke of Argyll-Lord Ellenborough expresses great objection to the Bill-The Earl of Derby also declares his distrust, but declines to move an amendment-The Duke of Cambridge speaks in favour of the Bill, and is followed on the same side by Lord Clyde and the Earl of Granville-The Bill is read a second time nem. con, and becomes law.

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N the 13th of February, Mr. B. Cochrane called the attention of the House of Commons to the existing state of our relations with China, taking a review of the recent proceedings in that country, and especially of the late disastrous occurrence at the Peiho river. Mr. Cochrane observed that our demands in 1857 were limited to the fulfilment of the treaty engagements and compensation for British losses; but, unfortunately, in February, 1858, Lord Elgin took a step further, and demanded from the Chinese Government the right to have a British Minister resident at the Court of Pekin. This demand, he contended, was the cause of all our present difficulties, inasmuch as it was admitted to be intolerable to the Chinese, and their assent was only extorted from their fears. In order to establish this position, Mr. Cochrane gave, from the papers laid before the House, a narrative of the transactions preceding the attempt to force the passage of the Peiho, commenting, as he proceeded, upon the conduct of the several agents, and especially Mr. Bruce, who had incurred, he said, a heavy responsibility, and had not acted in the spirit of a Minister going to ratify a treaty of peace. He took a lenient view of the proceedings of

the Chinese authorities, who looked upon our officials, not the British Government, as in fault, and he ridiculed the idea that the Russians had assisted the Chinese as absurd.

Sir M. Seymour expressed regret at the absence of some documents which, he said, would have enabled the House more completely and impartially to the subject.

To show what China really was, he adverted to the case of the lorcha Arrow, vindicating his own share in that transaction, and to the operations which followed, up to the capture of the Taku forts in May, 1858. He then proceeded to touch upon his official intercourse with Lord Elgin, observing that he had refrained from noticing instances in which his conduct and character as a naval officer had been in some measure unjustly assailed, indicating in an unmistakable manner one publication, some alleged misstatements in which he pointed out. He deprecated severe measures towards China, which was, he said, a weak State. He believed that it had never recovered from the effects of the first war, and if hostilities were now carried beyond the necessity of the case there would be reason to deplore it, since a shock

might be the result that would cause desolation and ruin to that empire.

Lord J. Russell observed that he doubted whether this was an opportunity upon which the House could conveniently discuss the whole matter; but he could not refrain from making some reply to the attacks of Mr. Cochrane. He accordingly proceeded to justify the conduct of Mr. Bruce, who had acted, he said, exactly according to his instructions. He had no reason to believe, up to the moment of attack, that the Emperor of China had any objection to his proceeding to the capital; and supposing the Emperor to have been willing to ratify the treaty, there was really no reason whatever why he should have objected to Mr. Bruce's proceeding by the shortest route. Mr. Bruce had, without special orders or instructions, to decide the question whether he should pass the river by force, or desire the British Admiral to retire from a fort which had been taken with ease the year before, and thereby afford to China and Europe the spectacle of an Eng lish fleet shrinking before a fort so easily taken. This was an alternative of great embarrassment, and, without deciding which course was best, there were infinite difficulties on both sides, and Her Majesty's Government felt it their duty to tell Mr. Bruce that their confidence in him was undiminished. He agreed with Sir M. Seymour that it would be wrong to press too severely upon China, and that our business there is commerce. At the same time, everybody he had consulted was of opinion that we should show that we were treating on equal terms with the Chinese, and were able to vindicate our

honour. After the arrival of the next mail, which was shortly expected, he should be prepared to state the exact course which the Government proposed to pursue towards China.

Sir John Pakington observed that for several reasons this was not a convenient time for discussing our relations with China, and the assurance given by Lord J. Russell was an additional reason for refraining from the subject. He hoped the course taken by the Government would be one of moderation.

Lord Palmerston recommended that the discussion should be postponed until the arrival of further accounts from China.

Sir C. Napier, Sir J. Elphinstone, Admiral Walcott and Lord C. Paget, added some remarks, which terminated the discussion. A few days afterwards, in the House of Lords,

The Earl of Elgin took the opportunity afforded by a motion for papers relating to his late mission to China to make a personal statement. He had been accused of harshly pressing demands on the Chinese which other Powers did not urge. Those who made that accusation forgot that he acted on instructions. But he would not rest a justification of the demand for a resident at Pekin on instructions. He rested it on its merits. If we are to have pacific relations with China, we must have direct intercourse with the Government at Pekin. Another point urged against him was, that he did not go to Pekin and ratify the treaty. He did not go, because he was never charged with the ratification; he had no option. Then Sir Michael Seymour, in another place, had defended his

conduct in China, and said he had a verdict from the late Government in his favour. To give a verdict of that kind in favour of one party without informing the other either of the result or the grounds of the decision, was an unusual proceeding. He (Lord Elgin), in April, 1858, desired to act promptly in the neighbourhood of Pekin. It was understood that the Admiral should supply gun-boats of light draught to ascend the Peiho. At the appointed time, the Admiral arrived without the gun-boats, and thus Lord Elgin's plan of striking a blow and following it up by a visit to Pekin, there to present his credentials and ratify the treaty, was frustrated. The consequence was, that the force and the ambassador had to return hastily to Canton, where new hostilities were breaking out, in obedience to instigations of the Emperor.

The relations of this country with China were brought before Parliament in a more formal manner by Sir De Lacy Evans on the 17th March. The gallant officer had given notice of a series of Resolutions on the subject of the intended expedition to China, but substituted for them a Resolution based on the hope expressed in the Queen's Speech at the beginning of the Session, when Her Majesty said" It will be very gratifying to me if the perfect acquiescence of the Emperor of China in the moderate demands which will be made by the Plenipotentiaries shall obviate the necessity for the employment of force." He observed that the expedition must cost an enormous expense, with little chance of repayment from the Imperial Government. He thought it would not be advisable for our roops to march upon Pekin, and

he hoped Lord J. Russell would be able to state to the House that strict instructions would be given for the conduct of the expedition.

Lord J. Russell said, with respect to the military operations, it would be very inconvenient and unwise to prescribe such strict instructions that the commanding officers would find themselves bound thereby, so that whatever circumstances might occur they would be compelled to obey them. As to marching upon Pekin, there would be no need of it unless all fair and reasonable terms should be refused; but it would be wrong to give particular instructions not to march thither. No one could regret more than he did the necessity of this expedition, but the persons and property of our traders must be secured, and he thought that our Minister in China should have the power not only of going to but of residing at the capital. It might be more convenient that he should permanently reside at Shanghai, but he should be at liberty to proceed, if necessary, to Pekin. He considered that we were entitled to an indemnity, but he was convinced that no man was more anxious to maintain peaceful relations with China than Lord Elgin.

Sir J. Elphinstone was of opinion that it would be a fatal mistake to march upon Pekin, and a far better policy to occupy the city. of Nankin, with a force of gunboats on the river. He warned the House of the expense that would attend these hostilities, and expressed his belief, founded upon local knowledge and experience, that we should not get out of this China war for less than 10,000,000l.

Mr. Bright said he was a good

deal disappointed at the statement of Lord J. Russell. He thought that on occasions of this nature it was the duty of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to be a little more explicit. He traced the progress of the transactions in China from the war which was commenced, he said, by the indiscretion of Sir J. Bowring; and after blaming the stipulations of the last treaty, he contended that, in the proceedings for the ratification of that treaty, we were as much in the wrong as we were at Canton, under the management of Sir J. Bowring. He denied that the Chinese were open to the charge of treachery; he insisted that the collision at the mouth of the Peiho was attributable to the folly and imbecility of our own Minister and the indiscretion of the Admiral, and he censured the Government for allowing a person so utterly unfit to conduct the negotiations as Mr. Bruce to continue to be our Minister in China. He could see no advantage to this country in requiring that our Minister should reside at Pekin, which would inflict a grievous insult upon the Emperor of China, and be an ungenerous act on our part. He warned the Government against a partnership with another Power, and against making demands upon the Government of China which, being based only upon a disaster occasioned by the folly of our own Minister, we ought not, in the sight of God or man, to make.

Mr. S. Herbert, after replying to some suggestions made by Sir J. Elphinstone, observed that it might be true that the Treaty of Tien-tsin imposed upon the Chinese conditions that were unacceptable to them; but, at the same time, as the treaty has been

adopted by both the late and the present Governments, it was a fait accompli, and its ratification must be insisted upon. Nothing was sought at the Peiho but the ratification of the treaty, and after what occurred there one course only remained; it would be most unwise to approach the Chinese authorities without a sufficient force to show that we were able to insist upon its ratification, and he had great hopes that, by this demonstration of force, and by the wisdom and conciliation of Lord Elgin, our relations with China would be placed upon a friendly footing.

Sir J. Pakington could not remove from his mind a feeling of disappointment at the speech of Lord J. Russell, who had promised to state what was the policy the Government intended to pursue. After the unhappy affair of the Peiho, it was the duty of the Government to see that our power and prestige should not be impair ed, and he thought them right in making a demonstration of force; but, looking to the whole conduct of Mr. Bruce, he thought we were not entitled to demand an apology from the Government of China. This involved two questions-did the circumstances, as they occurred, justify the demand of an apology; and, if the apology was refused, what was the alternative? He thought that, at the bar of the Peiho, Mr. Bruce had committed an error in judgment; that he was wrong in his interpretation of the law of nations, and in ordering an attack. If we were not justified, in these doubtful circumstances, in commencing hostilities, were we justified in asking for an apology? Then, if the apology was demanded and refused, was the

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