In speaking to M. Thouvenel, I said that I did not desire to enter into any controversy with him, nor did I intend that my interpellations should bear any other than a friendly character; but I really wished to ascertain how matters stood whether there was any understanding between the French and Sardinian Governments, and whether he maintained the declarations of Count Walewski.

In order that his Excellency might know exactly what I asked, I read to him my despatches of the 4th and 8th of July last, to your Lordship.

M. Thouvenel replied, that not having had as yet an opportunity of speaking to the Emperor on this matter, he could only state his personal opinions, which he proceeded to do at great length; but as he promised to take the Emperor's orders without loss of time, after which he undertook to give me an official answer, and as he yesterday realised this promise, I need not trouble your Lordship with any details of this first conversation. I will merely state that I took care that M. Thouvenel should be under no illusion as to the opinions of Her Majesty's Government.

Yesterday, then, the official answer which I received from M. Thouvenel was to the following effect. He read it from a written paper:

It was true that among the possible arrangements discussed between the French and Sardinian Governments, when they found themselves likely to be engaged side by side in war with Austria, was the cession to France, under certain contingencies, of Savoy and the County of Nice. These

contingencies, however, did not occur when peace was made. The Emperor had thought that if the chances of war had given such a large accession of territory to Sardinia as would have altered the relative proportions of the military strength of the two countries, he might with justice have demanded such territorial concessions of Sardinia as would have preserved those relative proportions. But so long as the sole addition made to Sardinia was the province of Lombardy, there was no sufficient reason, in the Emperor's opinion, for asking of Sardinia the sacrifice of any part of her ancient territory, and therefore Count Walewski had made the declaration referred to by me.

The

The Preliminaries of Villafranca, and subsequently the Treaty of Zurich, left the territorial distribution of Italy, with the exception of Lombardy, as it had been before the war. different States were to form a Confederation of a purely defensive character. The French Government desires no better than that this plan should be realised, and there will be no motive for raising the question of any territorial concessions in regard to France.

But the aspect of the whole matter has completely changed, and Her Majesty's Government have themselves made proposals which must lead to one of two results. Either the people of the States of Central Italy will pronounce themselves in favour of a Central Kingdom, or they will persist in asking to be annexed to Sardinia. In the former case the French Government, considering that the solution

would partake of the nature of the arrangements made at Zurich, will not think it necessary to look to the more immediate safety of the French frontier. But the French Government could not consent to the formation of a kingdom of above ten millions of souls in the South of Europe without taking precautions for the future security of France. This would be done not in a spirit of conquest or aggrandisement, but simply as a measure of necessary precaution.

But while the French Government ask for guarantees for the safety of France, they have no intention of violating or infring

has thought necessary to take for her own safety. The annexation, therefore, of Savoy to France would not break the engage. ments entered into for the neutrality of the districts of Chablais and Faucigny; indeed, in the opinion of the French Government, it would be well that those districts should be united permanently to Switzerland.

No. 31-Earl Cowley to Lord J. Russell.-(Received February

11.)

Paris, February 10, 1860. My Lord, I had an opportunity of seeing the Emperor yesterday, and I had the honour of having some conversation with His Majesty on the subject of the annexation of Savoy to France.

His Majesty did not deny that, under certain eventualities, and on the grounds stated in my despatch of the 5th instant, he might think it right to claim a proper frontier for France; that

Cowley.

Foreign Office, February 13, 1860.

(Extract.)

I have laid before the Queen your Excellency's despatch of the 5th instant in respect to Savoy.

M. Thouvenel states, in substance, that the French Government have never concealed their opinions that if the territories of the King of Sardinia greatly increased, the addition of Savoy and Nice to France would be required for the security of the French Empire; that the Treaty of Zurich did not contemplate such an aggrandizement of Sardinia; and therefore the project of annexing Savoy was no longer entertained. But that, if the votes of Central Italy should enlarge the dominions of the King of Sardinia, and place him at the head of 11,000,000 of Italians, the security of France would require the annexation of Savoy and Nice to France.

I have to state, in reply, that

although the project of the annexation of Savoy to France has been sometimes mentioned to your Excellency, yet it was in contradiction to the language of the proclamations of the Emperor of the French before and during the war in Italy, and that it is only very lately this annexation has appeared in the light of a probable arrangement.

It is only of late, therefore, that it has been thought necessary by Her Majesty's Government to state their serious objections to the project of transferring Savoy and Nice to France.

Her Majesty's Government cannot conceive that the security of France, a country so rich, so populous, and so military, possessing 36,000,000 of inhabitants, without counting her colonies, can be endangered by the existence, on the other side of the Alps, of a State of 11,000,000 of people, lately joined by a cement not yet dry, threatened, on the side of Lombardy, by Austria, and not very certain of its own independence.

It is said the danger to France arises not from Sardinia alone, but from Sardinia as Member of a Confederation. But it is not at all evident that a Confederation of which Sardinia were a member, with only 5,000,000 of inhabitants, might not be quite as formidable to France as a Confederation with which Sardinia would enter with 11,000,000 of inhabitants. The danger, if any, to France would consist not in the small difference in the popu lation of Sardinia, but in the strength, whatever it might be, of the other Powers who might have so combined against France.

I understand, however, from

Turin, February 10, 1860. Such being the case, I conceived it my duty to bring under Count Cavour's consideration, without loss of time, your Lordship's despatch of the 6th instant, received yesterday by messenger Vyner, and I therefore called upon his Excellency this morning, and placed that despatch in his hands.

The Count said that he could only repeat to me what he had already stated, that Sardinia was under no engagement to cede, sell, or exchange Savoy, or any other part of her dominions. He was not aware that Savoy had anything to complain of: there was no political or military pressure applied to her; on the contrary, she had demanded troops to assist in the maintenance of order at the approaching elections, in order to relieve the National Guard, which had been doing continued military and police duty for the last ten months. The question, then, is a question for Savoy, and not for the rest of

the kingdom. His Excellency did not speak of French pressure, neither did he appear to fear it.

(ITALIAN PAPERS, PART IV.) No. 1.-M. Thouvenel to Count Per. signy.-(Communicated to Lord J. Russell by Count Persigny, March 15.)

Paris, March 13, 1860.

(Translation.)

M. Le Comte, The Emperor, in his Speech to the Great Bodies of the State, at the opening of the Legislative Session, made known his opinion in anticipation of a re-adjustment of a considerable territory on the other side of the Alps, and announced the intention of submitting to the wisdom and equity of Europe a question which is not raised by the ambition of France, but put, as it were, by events themselves. His Majesty has decided that the moment is come to fulfil this engagement, and I hasten, in conformity with his orders, to put you in a position to communicate our explanations to the Cabinet of London. Solemn acts, freely subscribed to at the end of a campaign fortunate for our arms, have established in the most irrefraga ble fashion, that we had not for our object a territorial aggrandizement when the force of circumstances induced us to interfere in the affairs of Italy. If the Imperial Government has been able to discern, in the cases in which disinterestedness should not entirely banish prudence, a situ ation analogous to that which now presents itself, it flatters itself not only that it has not sought to produce this situation, but that it has, on the contrary,

endeavoured in all conjunctures to follow the courses best suited to withdraw it from the chances of the future. The stipulations of Zurich, and those of Villafranca, entirely excluded it. Although the possession of Lombardy fortified Piedmont on the Alps, we, without any hesitation, silenced our own interest, and, far from favouring the development of a state of things which might furnish us with legitimate and pressing reasons for demanding guarantees, we employed, as Europe knows, all our influence to realize, in their literal tenour, the dispositions of the Treaties which reserved the maintenance of the territorial limits in the centre of Italy.

I need not now recur to the circumstances which prevented the success of our efforts. The Government of Her Britannie Majesty was the first to appreciate the character of them. It will suffice to recall the fact that the necessity of occupying ourselves above all, and in the general interest, with the establishment of a definite state of things in the Peninsula, was alone able to determine us to seek in dif ferent combinations from that of which we had vainly essayed to effect the triumph, the means of settling the pending questions.

A new situation then pressed on our attention; and without putting ourselves in antagonism with the policy which has constantly inspired the acts, as well as the language, of the Emperor, we had nevertheless to consider the prejudice which new arrange. ments in Italy might be capable of causing to our own interests.

It is impossible to deny that the formation of a considerable

State, possessing at once both slopes of the Alps, is an event of deep gravity from the point of view of the security of our frontiers. The geographical situation of Sardinia acquires an importance which it could not have when that kingdom comprised scarcely 4,000,000 souls, and found itself beaten back, as it were, by a mass of Conventions outside the Peninsula. With a development which must almost treble her population and her material resources, the possession of all the passes of the Alps would permit her, in case of her alliances making her at any time our adversary, to open to a foreign army the access to our territory, or to disturb, with her forces alone, the security of an important part of the Empire, by intercepting our principal line of commercial and military communication. To demand guarantees against an eventuality, the peril of which is not lessened by the remoteness of its occurrence, which we have, doubtless, the right to except, is simply to obey the most legitimate considerations, as well as the most ordinary maxims of international policy, which has at no epoch taken gratitude and sentiment as the sole basis of the relations of States.

Besides, are these guarantees calculated to give umbrage to any Power? Are they not, on the contrary, agreeable to the conditions of an equal balance of power, and indicated, moreover, by the nature of things, which has placed our system of defence at the foot of the western slope of the Alps?

At various periods of history during two centuries, especially

when the question arose of settling eventually the Spanish succession, and later when the question of the Austrian succession was opened, combinations were discussed which extended the possessions of Piedmont in Italy and granted her the acquisition either of Lombardy or of other contiguous territories. In these concessions, much less vast assuredly than that of which there is now question, the annexation of Savoy and the County of Nice was always considered by several of the principal Powers of Europe as a necessary compensation to France. Certain that my meaning cannot be open to false interpretations, I experience no embarassment in citing a precedent of a more recent date. May it not be permitted to seek examples from the history of our age also, without evoking irritating recollections which present generations repudiate? I will, then, recall the fact that at a moment when Europe was certainly little disposed to use moderation with regard to France, she recognized the necessities of our geographical situation on the side of the Alps, and unanimously considered it just to leave us a portion of the territory become now much more indispensable to our security. It was only under the impression of the events of the succeeding year that this clause was annulled. The Emperor, on his accession to the Throne, spontaneously declared that he took as the rule of his relations with Europe respect for the Treaties concluded by the preceding Governments, and this is a principle of conduct to which His Majesty will always impose it on himself as a law to remain