faithful. But the exceptional character cannot be ignored of the circumstances which determine us to demand that a modification be introduced into the delimitation of the frontier which was finally traced between France and Sardinia. The result of the war has been to make, by the cession of Lombardy to Piedmont, a primary change in the territorial limits of Italy; the annexation of other States to that kingdom constitutes a new change, the consequences of which have a special gravity for us, and it is not at variance with the respect accorded on every occasion by the Government of the Emperor to existing Treaties to demand that they should not be in reality altered to our detriment.

In a communication which addresses itself above all to the good faith of the Cabinets, and which testifies to that which animates the Government of the Emperor, should I hesitate to say that, in restoring Savoy to Piedmont, it was desired to constitute that country guardian of the Alps, in order that it might keep the passes open into France? Unpleasant as this situation was, we loyally 'resigned ourselves to it during half a century; much further, we again accepted it on our return from a campaign in Italy, which might easily have furnished us with the opportunity of changing it: but should we allow that the conditions which we have scrupulously respected in order to prevent any disturbance of our international relations should be aggravated? and can Europe, on her side, consider it just that, to the weight with which they already pressed on us should be added that of a State the strength

of which will have trebled in the course of a year? In claiming the modification of the Treaties on this point, we confine ourselves, as it were, to demanding that one of their stipulations should not acquire, against the intention even of the Powers which signed them, a graver bearing and a more disadvantageous interpretation.

I hasten to add that the Government of the Emperor has no wish to hold the guarantees which it demands except with the free assent of the King of Sardinia and of the popula tions. The cession, therefore, which will be made to it will remain exempt from all violence and from all constraint; it is, besides, our firm intention to arrange it, as far as concerns the territories of Savoy subject to eventual neutralization, in such a way as to injure no acquired right and to affect no legitimate interest.

In accord with our interests, and with the will of the King of Sardinia, and not in contradiction to the general interests of Europe, the cession of Savoy and the County of Nice to France, does not, Monsieur, raise any questions incompatible with the best established and most rigorous rules of public right. If the character, the language, and the habits of the populations destined to be united to France assure us that this cession is not contrary to their sentiments; if we think that the configuration of the soil has entwined their commercial interests, as well as their political interests, with ours; if, in fine, we say that the Alps constitute the barrier which ought eternally to separate Italy from France,

the Emperor, there was a negotiation on foot for the cession of Savoy to France, asserted that if such a scheme had ever been entertained, it had been then entirely abandoned.

Her Majesty's Government are led to infer from M. Thouvenel's despatch, that the hypothetical contingency to which he alludes was the conquest of Venetia by France, and its transfer to Piedmont, and that in such case it had been contemplated that Savoy should be demanded by France; but that the Agreement of Villafranca and the Treaty of Zurich having left to Austria the possession of Venetia, the idea of a cession of Savoy to France, which it now appears had been entertained, was given up, as stated by Count Walewski.

M. Thouvenel, however, goes on to say, that combinations in Central Italy, different from those which the French Government had fruitlessly laboured to bring about, compelled the French Government to consider the inquiry which new arrangements in Italy might carry with them to the interests of France; and he proceeds to argue, that when Sardinia, by acquisitions of territory in Central Italy, was about to increase her population from 4,000,000 to three times that amount, it became necessary, for the security of France, that Savoy should be ceded to her, in order that she might have in her own hands the northern slopes of the Alps. The new danger to which M. Thouvenel alleges that France would thus be exposed would be invasion from Sardinia alone, or from Sardinia acting as a member of a Confederation of hostile Powers.

But Her Majesty's Government would beg to observe that to imagine that Sardinia, even with a population of 12,000,000, would ever think of invading France with a population of 36,000,000, is to suppose that which amounts to a moral impossibility. Sardinia, so augmented, will become a respectable State, capable of attaining a great degree of internal prosperity, and sufficiently strong to defend herself against any other Italian Power; but that the French Empire, the first military Power of the Continent, with a vast, compact territory, full of natural resources, and with a population characteristically warlike, should be in danger of being attacked by her far weaker neighbour, is not in the nature of things. There are, besides, many political considerations which go to show that the tendency of Sardinia must always be towards maintaining the most friendly relations with France.

We may, then, at once dismiss the notion that France can require any other guarantee than her own inherent strength affords her, against any attack from Sardinia acting alone.

But M. Thouvenel conceives that Sardinia might be a member of a Confederacy arrayed against France, and by having both sides of the Alps she might open the road for other Powers to make an invasion of the territory of France.

Now, on this Her Majesty's Government would observe that there never can be a Confederacy organized against France unless it be for common defence against aggressions on the part of France, and that, therefore, France has it at all times in

her own power to prevent the formation of any such Confederacy. There is no Power in Europe that does not wish to maintain friendly relations with France, and there is none that could hope to reap any advantage from a voluntary and unprovoked rupture with so powerful a State.

But the chances of Sardinia becoming an instrument of such a confederacy have been diminished by the events of late years, and by the new arrangements of Northern and Central Italy.

Till within the last fifteen years the Government of Sardinia was swayed by the influence of Austria, and might have been supposed to be likely, in the event of a war between Austria and France, to give passage through Savoy to any Austrian force which might have wished to enter France in that direction; but of late years Sardinia has broken away from her connection with Austria, and has looked to France, and not in vain, for friendship and support. Sardinia, therefore, is less likely than ever willingly to give passage to a hostile force wishing to enter France, and it is obvious that Sardinia, increased in strength, while the Austrian frontier is thrown back to the Mincio, is less likely than when she was much weaker, and when the Austrian frontier was on the Ticino, to yield on compulsion that passage to Austrian troops which she would not concede of her own free-will.

We may consider, therefore, as groundless the apprehension that Sardinia, retaining possession of Savoy, might open a passage VOL. CII.

through that Province into France to the troops of a hostile Confederacy.

It seems, then, to Her Majesty's Government, that the argument in favour of the annexation of Savoy to France, founded on the assumed insecurity of the French territory bordering upon Savoy, falls to the ground when it comes to be fairly examined.

M. Thouvenel says that this demand for the cession of Savoy to France ought not to give umbrage to any Power; that it is founded on a just balance of forces, and is especially pointed out by the nature of things, which has placed the French system of defence at the foot of the western slopes of the Alps.

But Her Majesty's Government must be allowed to remark, that a demand for cession of a neighbour's territory made by a State so powerful as France, and whose former and not very remote policy of territorial aggrandizement brought countless calamities upon Europe, cannot well fail to give umbrage to every State interested in the balance of power and in the maintenance of the general peace. Nor can that umbrage be diminished by the grounds on which the claim is founded; because, if a great military Power like France is to demand the territory of a neighbour upon its own theory of what constitutes geographically its proper system of defence, it is evident that no State could be secure from the aggressions of a more powerful neighbour; that might and not right would henceforward be the rule to determine territorial pos session; and that the integrity and independence of the smaller

States of Europe would be placed in perpetual jeopardy.

But M. Thouvenel appeals to historical precedents in support of the claim now made.

Her Majesty's Government will not enter into an examination of what took place in regard to the succession to the Throne of Spain, or in regard to the succession to the Throne of Austria, because the transactions of those periods have no practical applicability to the present state of European affairs; but with regard to the later transaction to which M. Thouvenel adverts, namely, the arrangements of the Treaty of 1814, Her Majesty's Government would beg to observe that the arrangements of that Treaty by no means bear out the claim now made by France, and that it cannot be with reference to the stipulations of the Treaty of 1814, that the demand for the cession of Savoy and of the County of Nice can be termed by France a "revendication." It is to be observed with regard to the term "revendication," that it is stated la revendication a lieu lorsqu'on réclame une chose à laquelle on prétend avoir droit."

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Now, the arrangements of the Treaty of 1814 were of short duration, and having been superseded by those of the Treaty of 1815, they cannot be appealed to as the foundation of any right to be claimed by France.

But the Treaty of 1814 did not give either Savoy or the County of Nice to France.

Article III. of the Treaty of 1814 did, indeed, leave to France a very small portion of Savoy; but that portion was immediately contiguous to the French fron

tier, and was at a distance from the slopes of the Alps. The words of Article III. on this point were as follows:

"In the Department of Mont Blanc, France acquires the subPrefecture of Chambery, with the exception of the Cantons of L'Hôpital, St. Pierre d'Albigny, la Rocette, and Montmelian; and also the sub-Prefecture of Annecy, with the exception of the portion of the Canton of Faverges situated to the east of a line passing between Ourechaise and Marlens on the side of France, and Marthod and Ugine on the opposite side, and which afterwards follows the crest of the mountains as far as the frontier of the Canton of Thones. This line, together with the limit of the Cantons before mentioned, shall, on this side, form the new frontier."

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It follows, therefore, from what is thus stated, that if France claims Savoy and Nice on the principle of a vendication," that is to say, on the principle of claiming that which she has at any time had a right to, her claim cannot be founded on the Treaty of 1814, but must go back to the time of the first French Empire; and it is needless to point out what just alarm the whole of Europe must feel at a claim which, however limited in its present application, is susceptible of being extended to such vast and dangerous dimensions.

M. Thouvenel, indeed, records the declaration spontaneously made by His Imperial Majesty on ascending the Throne, that the governing rule of his relations with Europe would be re

spect for Treaties concluded by preceding Governments of France, and M. Thouvenel declares that this is a principle of conduct to which His Imperial Majesty will always make it to himself a law to remain faithful. The declaration referred to by M. Thouvenel was no more than might have been expected from the just and enlightened Sovereign by whom it was made; and the assurance given by M. Thouvenel that it will be strictly and inviolably observed must be gratifying to the allies of France, and satisfactory to the whole of Europe. But M. Thouvenel alleges that the present is an exceptional case, that changes which have taken place, and which are about to take place, in Italy, involve changes in the territorial arrangements established by existing Treaties, and that those Treaty arrangements ought not to be altered to the detriment of France.

Her Majesty's Government think they have shown that no detriment or danger to France would be the result of the changes now in progress in Italy; but there is a State in whose integrity and independence all Europe takes a deep interest, and whose integrity and independence France, among other Powers, has pledged her self by Treaty to respect and maintain, and that State would suffer the most serious detriment, and would be exposed to the most serious danger by the proposed transfer of Savoy from Sardinia to France. It is needless to say that this State is Switzerland.

By the Treaties of Vienna, of 1915, the Powers of Europe, France included, acknowledged

and guaranteed the integrity and the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland, and as a security for that integrity and that neutrality, it was stipulated that the provinces of Chablais and of Faucigny, and all that portion of Savoy which is north of Ugine, shall form part of the neutrality of Switzerland, as acknowledged and guaranteed by the Contracting Powers; and it was further stipulated that, in consequence thereof, whenever the Powers, neighbours of Switzerland, should be actually at war, or whenever there should be an imminent danger of war, between them, the troops of the King of Sardinia, the Sovereign of Savoy, which may happen to be in those provinces, shall retire therefrom, passing, if necessary, through the Valais, and that no armed troops of any other Power shall either traverse or be stationed in those provinces and territories, except such troops as the Swiss Confederation shall think proper to place therein.

It is plain that these engagements about Savoy, to which France is a party, were intended as a security for Switzerland against danger coming from France; but what would become of that security if Savoy were annexed to France, and if the very Power against which this access to Switzerland has been barred, should become the owner of the barrier thus erected for the protection of the Confederation? It is, indeed, implied in the despatch of M. Thouvenel, that France, in taking Savoy, would accept also the engagements by which the King of Sardinia is bound, in regard to the neutralized portion of that country; but it is no disparagement to France to say that