CROWN--continued.

their servants, tore down and removed the same. In an action
by the plaintiff for damages the defence set up was that by
virtue of a mining grant held by defendant the property abut-
ting on the waters over which the erection had been placed was
their sole and exclusive property and that the plaintiff was a
trespasser.

The Court was of opinion that the defendants were liable for
the loss and damage sustained by the plaintiff by the pull-
ing down; that the title set up to the public waters was un-
tenable and in contravention of Imperial acts relative to the
occupation of our coasts for fishery purposes. The granting by
the Crown of such excessive right would be contrary to public
policy and in derogation of public rights secured by statute.
The shores and navigable waters of our harbors cannot be alie-
nated; such a grant would be ultra vires. Bransfield v. Beatty.

Prerogative of Crown-Petition of right - Tenure of office-
Servants of Crown-Dismissal.

Under "Claims against the Government Act," which act
supersedes the old practice of " Petition of Right," the petitioner
sued the Newfoundland Government for breach of an alleged
agreement in depriving him of an office which he had held
temporarily under an acting appointment, and which, it had
been agreed, he was to have permanently. The retainer by
the Government, that petitioner acted and performed the duties
for four years and was paid by legislative sanction, was ad-
mitted.

Held-That petitioner had no right of action; that a Colo-
nial Government is on the same footing as Her Majesty's
Government as to the employment and dismissal of servants
of the Crown, who, in the absence of special agreement, hold
their offices during the pleasure of the Crown. Skelton v. Gov-
ernment of Newfoundland

Prerogative-Treaties—Interference with private rights—Acts

of state.

Quere-Whether the Crown has th epower of compelling its
subjects to obey the provisions of a treaty, made either for the
purpose of putting an end to war or to preserve peace, or
whether interference with private rights can be authorized
other than by the legislature; where the government justified
certain acts in derogation of the private rights of the plaintiffs,
in regard to their lobster fishery, as acts and matters of state
arising out of political relations between Her Majesty the
Queen of England and the French Government, contending
that they involved the construction of treaties and of a tem-
porary modus vivendi for lobster fishing in Newfoundland, and
other acts of state, and that they were matters that could not
be enquired into by the courts.

Held-That this defence disclosed no answer to the action.
Baird v. Walker,

PAGE

813

243

490

Slander-Non-publication—Privileged communication-Malice

-Damages.

The plaintiffs and defendants were fishermen at Labrador.
The former accused the latter of feloniously stealing a salmon
net mooring and other gear. The plaintiffs denied having
taken the property. The defendant justified the charge and
set up non-publication and that the statement was a privileged
communication.

Held-That bruiting about reports to parties who had no
concern in the transaction could not be held to be privileged.
The charge without the inuendo of felonious taking is action-
able, for slanderous words are actionable when imputing mis-
conduct to a man in his business. Hearn v. Hawker

Slander of title--Marriage settlement Contract Considera-
tion.

A woman being possessed of certain lands, in contemplation
of her marriage assigned the same by deed to a trustee, to hold
(1) for her use till her marriage; (2) for her use for the term
of her natural life, and (3) after her decease, then for the use
of her children begotten by the contemplated marriage. A
child was born of the marriage. Both parents died. Some
time before her death the mother sold the property of the
cestui que trust to the plaintiff, who, upon endeavouring to sell,
was stopped by a public notice from the trustee under the deed
of trust. On a case stated for the opinion of the Court--

Held (1) That the trust deed was not voluntary and void
against the plaintiff purchaser; (2) The mother had no autho-
rity to sell, so as to deprive the cestui que trust of his right in
remainder after her life estate. Jerritt v. Scott

DEMURRAGE. See SHIPPING.

DEMURRER. See PRACTICE.

DETINUE

Debenture bonds-Assignment as cover for advances-Continu-
ing security-Non-registration-Non-delivery--Power of bank to
assign-Insolvency of bank.

In the year 1886 the Commercial Bank of Newfoundland by
deeds assigned to the London and Westminster Bank, London,

309

431

DETINUE-continued.

certain debenture bonds to the value of $144,100, as security
against advances to be made on current account, to be held so
long as any amount remained due to the London and West-
minster Bank. The bonds so assigned were held by the as-
signors for the purpose of collecting the annual interest due
on the same. In 1892 the indebtedness of the Commercial
Bank was completely paid off, but the bonds were not re-
assigned and further advances were made, and, on the suspen-
sion of the Commercial Bank in 1894, it was in debt to the
London and Westminster Bank in excess of the value of the
bonds assigned. In an action of detinue by the London and
Westminster Bank it was contended by the trustees of the
Commercial Bank, (a) That the assignnient of the bonds was
ultra vires; (b) That the assignment was incomplete as there
was no delivery of the bonds and the assignment was not regis-
tered; (c) That when the indebtedness for which the bonds
were assigned was paid off, the bonds passed to the assignors
by operation of law.

Held-That the manager and directors of the Commercial
Bank had acted within their powers in assigning the bonds;
that the registration law for deeds does not apply to such
securities or choses in action; that the bonds were assigned as
security for all future advances; that the manual delivery of
the bonds was not necessary to perfect their transfer. London
and Westminster Bank v. Trustees Commercial Bank

DEVIATION. See SHIPPING.

DIRECTORS' LIABILITY. See COMPANY.

DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA--

Bank notes-Resumption of possession.

The deceased requested her son, with whom she resided, to
draw from the Savings' Bank, for her, $1,200, which he ac-
cordingly did, and having brought it home, she placed it in
her box. This was some six months previous to her death,
and some short time after the execution of her last will, in
which her properties and her monies had been bequeathed in
detail to her children. It was stated by the son that this sum
was afterwards, in the presence of witnesses, allocated by his
mother to various parties (including himself for the largest
amount), conditional in the event of her not living. Some
weeks before her death deceased gave her son the key of the
box, and requested him to take out the said sum, which he did,
and count it; she then directed him to replace it in her box,
confirming her previous directions with some additions. After
her death the son distributed the amount as directed. In an
action by the executor for the $1,200,-

Held-That the facts as deposed to did not constitute a
donatio mortis causa. Morris v. Murphy.

PAGE

854

295

DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA-continued.

Bank-book-Household furniture-Requisites to be valid.
The deceased, about a fortnight before her death, told plain-
tiff to go to the bank and get whatever money was in her name
put in plaintiff's name. Plaintiff took the bank-book out of
the box of the deceased at her request Deceased handed it to
plaintiff and told her to keep it. She kept it in her possession
up to time of deceased's death. At the same time deceased told
plaintiff "what was in the house was hers." The plaintiff was
a niece of the deceased, and had lived with her thirty-five
years and had not received any wages. The above facts were
corroborated by witnesses. In an action by the administrator
of the deceased for the bank-book and household furniture,-

Held-That the gift of the bank-book constituted a valid
donatio mortis causa, but that of the household furniture did
not. There must be a delivery of and a parting with posses-
sion and dominion over that which forms the subject matter of
the donatio mortis causa. Curtis v. Emerson

Deposit receipt.

The deceased requested his sister, with whom he lived, to
take from his trunk a bank deposit receipt for a large sum of
money, and then, in the presence of his sister and her husband,
said, "What money was in that note was his sister's and her
husband's"; deceased then handed his sister the note, which
she placed in her own trunk and retained possession of till de-
ceased's death. In an action by the next of kin for a distribu-
tion of the estate of intestate,-

Held-That the facts as deposed to did not constitute a
donatio mortis causa, and that the estate, including his deposit
receipt, should be distributed amongst the next of kin. Leahy
v. O'Keefe

EJECTMENT. See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

EMPLOYER-

Employer's liability-Negligence and incompetency of fellow-
servants-Common employment-Contributory negligence-Negli-
gence of employer-Damages.

A workman engaged on a steam scow had his foot taken off
whilst in the execution of his duty, through failure on the
part of his employer to select competent fellow-servants and
superintendents. In an action for damages a jury found a ver-
dict for $1,000. Cn motion to have verdict set aside on the
grounds that the accident arose from the act of a fellow-ser-
vant in the course of a common employment and non-culpa-
bility on part of employer-

Held-That where the employer retains incompetent and
unqualified servants and an accident occurs he is responsible
to his employee, though not so under ordinary circumstances,

E

PAGE

365

527

EMPLOYER-continued.

when the act is by his fellow-servant. When the employee
entered the service he did not undertake to run extraordinary
risks such as had led to the injury complained of. Bulger i.
Simpson

EQUITABLE MORTGAGE. See INSOLVENCY.

ESTATE-

Intestate estate-Moneys in Savings' Bank in accounts of various

names.

Where a party dies intestate having moneys deposited in
Savings' Bank in the names of different parties---

Held-That there was a clear gift to each of those named for
whom the deposit was made, and such amounts did not form
part of estate as assets for distribution. In re Estate of Joseph
Drover

ESTATE FOR LIFE. See WILL.

EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS TO PUBLIC WATERS. See CROWN.
EXECUTOR

Bill praying for account-Estate property-Sale of -Purchase
by executor-Collusion with other legatees.

Plaintiff filed a bill against the defendant executor praying
that an account might be had of estate property, and charging
defendant executor with fraud and collusion with other legatees
in the realization of certain assets of estate. It was admitted
that the defendant executor had employed, as did also his
daughter, parties to appear at the sale and bid the property
up, and to one of these it was ultimately knocked down, and
subsequently assigned to the defendant.

Held-There appeared to be nothing of a collusive or fraudu-
lent character in the sale or purchase to render it void. Collins
v. Collins

FISHERIES ACT-

Fisheries Act-Construction of-Setting net moorings-Appeal.
Where a party, in accordance with the provisions of the
Coast Fisheries' Act, set his moorings and cod-net, but fearing
injury from ice took in his net, leaving his moorings, which
were afterwards carried away by stress of weather. Shortly
after other moorings were set in the same place by another
party. The first party to occupy the ground claimed in an
action against the second party that he had the right to return
as he did and reset the trap so taken up.

Held-That under the case as stated the first party lost and
never after acquired his original place as against an intervener.
Doran v. Power