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Alabama-and that the U. S. were to say they would only agree, provided the Commissioners were authorized to deal with the A. and all the other subjects as well as with a view to a comprehensive settlement;-might not the English Commissioners come out at once, and would it not be politic that General Schenck should be one of the American Commissioners (as were the U. S. Minister to France and England on the negotiations in 1814)?

"The other alternative (which, however, involves the risks attending delay and which would leave the proceedings without the advantage of General S.'s presence here) would seem to be that, if the plan now sketched out should be acceptable to the Government of the United States, the proposals might be made in England to General Schenck, instead of to the Government here by Sir E. Thornton, and that his, General Schenck's, instructions, prepared with special reference to the contingency, might authorize an immediate assent, so that the Commissioners could leave England at an early day, and the Senate might during the present session approve of those whom the President might be pleased to name here.

"If this course were adopted, it would be desirable to accompany it with some temporary arrangement whereby the risk of fresh difficulties from the Fishery question during the coming season should be prevented."

randum.

The negotiations had now reached a stage Mr. Sumner's Memo- at which it became necessary, in order that success might be assured, definitely to ascer tain the basis on which an agreement might be concluded with a certain prospect of its ratification by the Senate. With this view, Mr. Fish on the 15th of January called by appointment at Mr. Sumner's house and laid before him, as chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, to which any treaty would have to be referred, Sir John Rose's proposals. Mr. Sumner on that day gave no answer; but on the 17th of January he sent to Mr. Fish the following written response:

"MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FISH IN REPLY TO HIS INQUIRIES.

"(1) The idea of Sir John Rose is that all questions and sources of irritation between England and the United States should be removed absolutely and forever, that we may be at peace really, and good neighbors; and to this end all points of difference should be considered together. Nothing could be better than this initial idea. It should be the starting point. "(2) The greatest trouble, if not peril, being a constant source of anxiety and disturbance, is from Fenianism, which is excited by the proximity of the British flag in Canada. Therefore, the withdrawal of the British flag cannot be aban

doned as a condition or preliminary of such a settlement as is now proposed. To make the settlement complete the withdrawal should be from this hemisphere, including provinces and islands.

"(3) No proposition for a Joint Commission can be accepted unless the terms of submission are such as to leave no reasonable doubt of a favorable result. There must not be another failure.

"(4) A discrimination in favor of claims arising from the depredations of any particular ship will dishonor the claims arising from the depredations of other ships, which the American Government cannot afford to do; nor should the English Government expect it, if they would sincerely remove all occasions of difference.

"17th Jan. '71."

Memorandum of Mr.
Fish.

"C. S.

What would have been the effect of a demand for the withdrawal of the British flag from the western "hemisphere, including provinces and islands," as a "condition or preliminary" of such a settlement as was proposed, it is not difficult to conjecture'; and, after reading the foregoing memorandum, Mr. Fish determined to continue the negotiations on the lines on which he had begun them, relying on his ability to gather sufficient support to overcome any opposition which he might encounter in so doing. To this end he drew up a tentative memorandum of a reply to Sir John Rose's proposals, which was as follows:2

["Strictly confidential.]

"MEMORANDUM (FOR CONSIDERATION BY H. F.)

"The Commissioners, or Envoys, or Plenipotentiaries (however called) on either side should be authorized and empowered to treat of, settle and adjust all subjects of difference between the two governments, so as to remove all sources of irritation and to secure a substantial and lasting peace and friendship between the two countries.

"The precise language to be used in the Commissions, or Preambles, or preliminary correspondence, or proposals, cannot

The Hon. Geo. F. Edmunds, in his memorial address on Mr. Fish, before the legislature of New York, referring to this stage of the negotiations, says: "In doing this work Mr. Fish had to contend with some most astonishing and extravagant propositions, insisted upon by some gentlemen high in public life as a sine qua non of eutering into any negotiations at all. Some of them were such that there is good reason to believe that the mere statement of them would have put an end to all negotiations at once." (P. 47.)

Mr. Davis' MS. Journal.

be now determined; but, if the two governments desire a friendly settlement of all differences and of all probable or possible causes of difference, they will each naturally use language looking to that end.

"No copy of the Powers of the British Commissioners who negotiated the Treaty of Ghent is found in the Department of State. The form stated in Sir John Rose's Mem. does not appear objectionable; but, not having the words which pre-ceded the negotiations in 1814,' it is thought advisable not to refer to a paper of which we have no copy.

"The Government of the United States in all its branches is desirous of an early, friendly, full, and complete adjustment of all differences and of all questions of difference with Great Britain, and of the removal of all causes likely to give rise to differences or to irritation in the future.

"It is believed that the proposal by Great Britain to send Commissioners here would be regarded and accepted as a friendly advance in reference to past events.

"The idea that the High Commission should not adjudicate on the questions themselves, but arrange by Treaties modes or machinery of doing so,' is, perhaps, not fully understood. It is supposed that, upon the questions (for instance) of the Fisheries, San Juan, the Navigation of the St. Lawrence, the admission of liability of Great Britain for what are commonly known as the 'Alabama Claims,' in whole, or in part, the definition of Public Law or rule to be established between the two powers as to maritime neutrality, &c., the negotiators (by whatever name known) could and should themselves treat, adjudicate and determine.

"If the idea be only that the High Commissioners are not to adjudicate upon the amounts or validity of claims, but are 'to arrange by Treaties modes or machinery of doing so,' it is approved.

Possibly the High Commissioners (this designation is used throughout to indicate the Commissioners or Negotiators of both and of each Power by whatever name commissioned) may agree upon a gross or lumping' sum to be paid to the United States in satisfaction for what are known as the 'Alabama Claims, and for the expense to which the Government of the United States was put in the pursuit and capture of the vessel or vessels which inflicted the damage. If not, but if they settle the question of liability, the amount of liability would seem a proper subject for reference to a mixed commission with judicial functions, and the composition or mode of forming such mixed commission should be a subject of consideration and agreement by the High Commission.'

"On the subject of the Alabama Claims,' a reference, in case one be agreed upon in any event, of the facts as they appear in the Diplomatic Correspondence, might operate unjustly. Such facts as could be agreed upon by the High Commission' might be submitted, as well as those which appear in the

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Diplomatic Correspondence, and each party should be left at liberty to prove other pertinent facts, and to present such arguments in support of, or in opposition to each claim, as it may desire.

"The great importance of arranging the Fisheries question before the commencement of another season is fully appreciated-indeed that importance can not be exaggerated or overstated.

"If, therefore, the negotiations can be brought to such a point as to secure the assent of the Senate of the United States (and it cannot be too strongly enforced that without such assent no Treaty or Negotiations can under the Constitution of the United States become operative or binding upon the United States) before its adjournment, it is greatly to be desired. Every effort of the Executive department of the Government may be relied upon to meet any corresponding effort of the Government of Great Britain to arrive at the earliest possible, friendly, honorable, satisfactory solution of the questions which exist between them.

"It is necessary and due to candor to note that unless Great Britain is willing to have the High Commission' declare her liability for the depredations of the 'Alabama,' including the expense of the Government of the United States in her pursuit and capture, and to express some kind words of regret for past occurrences, it were better to take no steps-failure would leave things worse than they are.

"It would be expected also that the principles on which the liability for the 'Alabama' may be admitted or declared, should be applicable, so far as the facts may justify or apply, to the other cruisers.

"It is also due to candor to note that the Mem.' of Sir John Rose has been submitted to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (to which Committee all Treaties or Conventions are referred by the Senate before their advice upon them), and that Senator has expressed the opinion that the withdrawal of the British flag cannot be abandoned as a condition or preliminary of such a settlement as is now proposed. To make the settlement complete the withdrawal should be from this hemisphere, including provinces and islands;' he seems to think this necessary, in order that we may be at peace and good neighbors.'

"General Schenck's departure will be delayed for a short time to ascertain whether the plan suggested by Sir John Rose will be carried into effect.

"The proposed mode of introducing the proposition is acceptable.

"The session of the Senate will probably not continue beyond the latter part of March-it might possibly be continued if the proceedings of the High Commissioners give promise of a satisfactory conclusion.

This body will not again convene after its adjournment in

the spring, until December next-in the meantime there will be another Fishing season with its complications, if not its perils. No Convention or arrangement can receive the sanction of that body until December, unless entered into before the middle or end of March."

Conference of January 24, 1871.

After preparing this memorandum, Mr. Fish held consultations with leading Senators. Nor did he confine himself to representatives of his own party. He took counsel with Mr. Bayard and Mr. Thurman, and perhaps with others on the Democratic side of the chamber, and received assurances of support in his efforts to bring about an amicable settlement. After a week wisely and busily spent in thus making sure of his ground, he met Sir John Rose again, and held with him a conversation, of which Mr. Bancroft Davis, the only other person present, made at the time the following record:1

"MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN MR. FISH AND SIR JOHN ROSE, AT MR. FISH'S HOUSE, JANUARY 24, 1871.

"Mr. Fish stated that Sir John Rose's memorandum had been carefully considered by himself; that there had been delay in answering it, in consequence of difficulties and embarrassments with which Sir John Rose was familiar; that each branch of the Government of the United States was anxious to meet any friendly advance by Great Britain in such a cordial way as to secure the establishment of permanent friendly relations between the two countries, and to put a stop to all sources of irritation; that he, Mr. Fish, had prepared what he had thought might be a reply to Sir John Rose's Mem., but, on reflection, and on consultation with some leading Senators and others, it was thought best not to insist on certain matters specifically therein referred to. Mr. Fish then read his memorandum, commenting as he read. On the general subject of the matters to be postponed for the consideration of the judicial mixed commission, explanations took place so that it appeared that the understanding of Mr. Fish and Sir John was alike on that point.

"With regard to the admission of the liability on the Alabama claims, Mr. Fish said that on consultation he had concluded that it was not best to make that specific statement; but, instead, to say that it would be essential that some important concessions should be made as to that class of claims, and some expression of regret at what had occurred; that it had been suggested that, if the Alabama claims were separated

5627-34

1 MS. Journal.

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