nal at Paris Sequel to the effay on spirit, with fome obfervations on the Athanafian and Nicene creeds 327 Serious thoughts in regard to the public diforders, & 150 Sermons, fingle, a catalogue of 319, feq. Servants, a propofal for their ainendment and encourage. ment 396 Shakespear's beauties felected 316 in Elyfium, a poetical epiltle from, to mr. Garrick 397 Small pox, dr. Adam Thompson's difcourfe on 307 dr. T. Thempfon's difcourfe 484 Smallet, dr. his effay on the external ufe of water, &c. 400 Sparks: or, fmall poems morally turned Spirit. See Sequel to Stroad's genuine memoirs 145 Sterne's charge to the clergy of the archdeaconry of the east on 155 Virtue and happiness, a treatise 69 riding of the diocefe of Fort W Arburton, mr. his argu York 80 Subfidy treaties, new ballad on, 155 Sugar, an effay on the virtues .of. 236 the art of making of 235 Supplement to lord Anfon's voyage round the world 233 to the memoirs of Bran.. 312 denburg Suppuration, a differtation on 157 Surgery, the fate of 399 Surveyor, qualifications and duties of a, explained Swift's appeal to the earl of Oxy 238 dr. a fupplement to the works of Sykes. See Middleton 76 394 ments relating to the fiery eruption which defeated the emperor Julian's attempt to rebuild the temple in Je 312 rufalem, confidered Watson's history of Gods, &c. 482 Wefey's predeftination calmly 312 confidered Whytt's effay on the vital and other involuntary motions of animals 182, 449 146 Worldly compliances Winftanly's new form of felfexamination 314 Writers of the prefent age, obfervations o 395 THE ART. I. An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. By David Hume, Efq; 12mo. 3s. Millar, T HE reputation this ingenious author has acquir'd as a fine and elegant writer, renders it unneceffary for us to fay any thing in his praife. We fhall only obferve in general, that clearness and precision of ideas oft abftracted and metaphysical subjects, and at the fame time propriety, elegance and fpirit, are feldom found united in any writings in a more eminent degree than in those of Mr. Hume. The work now before us will, as far as we are able to judge, confiderably raise his reputation; and, being free from that fceptical turn which appears in his other pieces, will be more agreeable to the generality of Readers. His fubject is important and interesting, and the manner of treating it easy and natural: His defign is to fix the juft origin of morals, in the execution of which he has fhewn a great deal of judgment as well as ingenuity, as every candid reader muft needs allow, whatever fentence he may pafs upon his fcheme in general, or how much foever he may differ from him in regard to what he has advanced on the subject of justice. In the first fection of this performance, our author treats of the general principles of morals; he introduces it with fome general reflections, after which he gives a fhort but clear view of the principal arguments that are urged to prove that morals are derived from reafon, and of those which VOL. VI. B are 6 We are adduced to fhew that they are derived from fentiment. The arguments on both fides he thinks are fo plaufible, that he is apt to fufpect they may, both of them, be folid and fatisfactory, and that reafon and fentiment concur in almost all moral determinations and conclufions. But tho' this queftion, fays he, concerning the general principle of morals, be extremely curious and important; 'tis needlefs for us, at prefent, to employ farther care in our enquiries concerning it. For if we can be fo happy, in the course of this enquiry, as to fix the juft origin of morals, 'twill then eafily appear how far fentiment or reafon enters into all determinations of this nature. Mean while, it will fcarce be poffible for us, e're this controverfy is fully decided, to proceed in that accurate manner required in the fciences; by beginning with exact definitions of VIRTUE and VICE, which are the objects of our prefent enquiry. But we shall do what may be juftly efteem'd as fatisfactory. fhall confider the matter as an object of experience. We fhall call every quality or action of the mind, virtuous, which is attended with the general approbation of mankind: and we fhall denominate vicious, every quality, which is the object of general blame or cenfure. Thefe qualities we shall endeavour to collect; and after examining, on both fides, the feveral circumftances, in which they agree, 'tis hoped, we may, at last, reach the foundation of ethics, and find thofe univerfal principles, from which all moral blame or approbation is ultimately derived. As this is a queftion of fact, not of abstract science, we can only expect fuccefs, by following this experimental method, and deducing general maxims, from a comparifon of particular inftances. The other scientifical method, when a general abftract principle is fuft cftablished, and is afterwards branched out into a varity of inferences and conclufions, may be more perfect in itfelf, but fuits lefs the imperfection of human nature, and is a common fource of illution and mistake, in this as well as in other fubjects. Men are now cured of their paffion for Hypothefes and fyftems in natural philofophy, and will hearken to no arguments but thofe derived from experience. 'Tis full time they should begin a like reformation in all moral difquifitions; and reject every fyftem of ethics, however fubtile or ingenious, that is not founded on fact and obfervation.' Having laid down the method he intends to profecute, our Author proceeds in the fecond fection to treat of benevolence; and fhews how ill-founded that fyftem of morals is, |