[Jebeles et al. v. The State.] tends to show that the Sunday designated was the last of August or the first of September, it is competent for a witness to testify that he saw the door of defendant's store open on the first Sunday in September, and that it was his recollection that said Sunday was the 2d of September. APPEAL from the City Court of Anniston. Tried before the Hon. THOS. W. COLEMAN, JR. The appellants in this case were tried and convicted under the following indictment: "The grand jury of said county charge that before the finding of this indictment that John Jebeles and Peter Jebeles, being merchants or shopkeepers, and not druggists, kept open store on Sunday, against the peace and dignity of the State of Alabama." To this indictment the defendants demurred upon the following grounds: "1st. Because said indictment does not charge a criminal offense, inasmuch as it fails to charge that these defendants unlawfully kept open store on Sunday. 2d. It fails to charge that these defendants kept open store on Sunday for the purpose of traffic or trade, or for the purpose of pursuing their daily avocation. 3d. It fails to charge that these defendants kept open store for buying and selling, or for buying or selling, or for receiving and storing, or for receiving or storing on Sunday. 4th. For that merely keeping the doors of a store open on Sunday is not a violation of law. 5th. Because it fails to charge that defendants either sold or offered to sell anything in the store on Sunday." This demurrer was overruled. On the trial of the cause the State introduced evidence tending to show that the defendants kept open their store in the city of Anniston on a Sunday and had a regular business on said day; that the Sunday designated was either the latter part of August or the first of September, 1901. There was no evidence introduced on the part of the defendant. R. A. Duncan, a witness for the State, testified that he saw the defendant's store open on the first Sunday in September, 1901, that his recollection was that it was the second day of September, 1901, in the morning; [Jebeles et al. v. The State.] that it was on Sunday, but that he was not positive as to the day of the month. The defendant moved to exclude the testimony of this witness, about the defendants keeping their place of business open on the 2d of September, 1901. The court overruled the motion, and the defendants duly excepted. The cause was tried by the court without the intervention of a jury, and judgment was rendered finding the defendants guilty as charged in the indictment. MATTHEWS & WHITESIDE, for appellants, cited Code, § 5542; Diron v. State, 76 Ala. 89; Anthony v. State, 29 Ala. 28. CHAS. G. BROWN, Attorney-General, for the State, cited Criminal Code, § 48943; Form 86, p. 336 and authorities. * * * MCCLELLAN, C. J.-Section 5542 of the Code provides: "Any person who, being a merchant or shopkeeper, keeps open store" on Sunday must be fined, etc. This statute in our opinion sufficiently describes the offense intended to be denounced. The keeping of "open store" implies something more than opening the door of a shop or store or keeping the door open. It involves the keeping open of the store as such, the opening up of the business carried on in the house, the exposition to sale of the wares stored there for sale. The words in and of themselves mean the opening up and keeping open the storehouse of goods, wares and merchandise for the purposes of traffic. Where this is done it need not be shown that any sale was actually made; and on the other hand a sale may be made in such storehouse on Sunday which would not involve keeping open store within the statute. Snider v. State, 59 Ala. 64; Dixon v. State, 76 Ala. 89. And as the statute itself thus defines the offense, an indictment, like that in this case, which pursues the statute in its averments is sufficient although it does not contain all the averments of the form prescribed for offenses under section 5542 of the Code; and the city court did not err in overruling the demurrer to it. 131 44 137 189 [Marks v. The State.] There is obviously no merit in defendant's exception to the ruling of the court as to the testimony of R. A. Duncan, nor in the exception reserved to the finding and conclusion of the court on the evidence. Marks v. The State. Indictment for Assault and Battery. 1. Trial and its incidents; sufficiency of judgment of conviction. To constitute a judgment in a criminal case, there must be some words used in the entry to show that there has been an adjudication of the case and a judgment has been pronounced; and, therefore, a minute entry in a prosecution for an assault and battery, reciting "thereupon the court proceeded to hear the cause without the intervention of a jury according to law. And after hearing the same finds the defendant guilty of assault and battery and assessed a fine of $5," is no more than a declaration or statement by the clerk of the action of the court, and is insufficient as a judgment of conviction, and will not support an appeal. APPEAL from the City Court of Bessemer. The appellant in this case was prosecuted and convicted in the city court of Bessemer for an assault and battery. The facts of the case are sufficiently stated in the opinion. TROTTER & ODELL, for appellant. CHAS. G. BROWN, Attorney-General, for the State. That the record proper in this case shows no judgment of conviction that will support an appeal to the Supreme Court.-Wright v. State, 103 Ala. 95; Ayers v. State, 71 Ala. 11. HARALSON, J.-There must be a judgment of conviction to support an appeal in a criminal case.-Ayers v. State, 71 Ala. 11. [Marks v. The State.] Here, the defendant pleaded not guilty. The minute entry recited, "Thereupon, the court proceeded to hear the evidence, without the intervention of a jury, according to law. And after hearing the same, finds the defendant guilty of assault and battery, and assessed a fine of $5.00." This entry partakes more of a statement by the clerk of the action of the court, than of an expression by the court itself of its own action. There must be some words, in an entry relied on as a judgment in a criminal case, to show that there has been a judgment rendered-certain and complete in itself; and while it is not necessary to adhere to the usual form, "It is therefore considered and adjudged that the defendant is guilty as charged in the indictment" (or not guilty according to the verdict)-yet, there must be some words employed to show that a judgment by the court has been pronounced on the verdict rendered.-Wright v. State, 103 Ala. 95; Driggers v. State, 123 Ala. 46. Here, the only word used to indicate a judgment, following the court's finding, is the word "finds," in the sentence, "And after hearing the evidence [the court] finds the defendant guilty," etc. This is no more than a declaration, that on hearing the evidence the court, trying the case without a jury, finds the defendant guilty. Finding him guilty is what the court did, in the place of a jury, if the case had been so tried. It was the verdict or finding of the court on the facts, which should have been followed by a judgment of conviction. Such finding did not constitute an adjudication of guilt, and is not sufficient to support the appeal taken. Let the appeal be dismissed. [Bray v. The State.] 131 46 135 23 135 35 131 46 143 55 Bray v. The State. Indictment for an Assault with Intent to Rape. 1. Assault wuh intent to rape; admissibility of evidence. On a trial under an indictment for an assault with intent to rape, it is competent for the State, after the woman assaulted has testified to the commission of the offense, to prove in corroboration of her testimony as to the main fact, that recently after the outrage she made complaint to those to whom complaint of such an occurrence would naturally be made; but on direct examination such testimony is confined to the bare fact of complaint, and details of the occurrence including the identity of the person accused, are not proper subjects of inquiry, and can not be proved. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Walker. The appellant in this case, Oliver Bray, was indicted and tried and convicted for an assault with intent to rape one Ida Andrews, and was sentenced to the penitentiary for five years. Upon the examination of prosecutrix, Ida Andrews, she testified to the details of the assault committed upon her and that said assault was made in the woods a short distance from the house of the defendant. The prosecutrix further testified that at the time of the assault she was living with the defendant and his wife. The State then asked the witness the following question : "State whether or not shortly after the alleged assault you told any one about it?" The defendant objected to this question upon the ground that it called for immaterial, irrelevant and inadmissible evidence. The court overruled the objection, and the defendant duly excepted. The witness testified that immediately upon her return she told Mrs. Bray about the assault committed upon her by Mr. Bray. The prosecutrix was then asked the following question: "Did you tell any one else what he had done?" The defendant objected to this question upon the ground that it called for irrele |