[McDonnell & Co. et al. v. Finch.] suing out and levying of said writs, respectively, was in truth and in fact, the result of an agreement, arrangement, or understanding, express or implied, by and between the said Lewis Finch and the said bank, and the said Finch and the said Deming, that they should be so sued out and levied as aforesaid; and that the purpose of the suing out of the said writ by the said bank was in order that the entire property and effects of the said Finch might be placed beyond the reach of his other creditors; that it might be thereafter purchased by and for him, the said Finch, or for his benefit, or the proceeds thereof used by or for him in again establishing bim in business, and that he might thereby ultimately acquire the possession and control thereof." Paragraph 7 alleges that the effect of the suing out of the attachment by the said bank operated as a general assignment of all the property and effects of the said Finch, enuring to the equal benefit of complainants and all other creditors. Complainants then prayed, among other things, that the effect of the suing out of said attachment by the said bank be declared to operate as a general assignment of all the property and effects of the said Finch, enuring to the equal benefit of complainants and all others of his creditors; and "that if your orators shall have mistaken the relief to which they are, or may show themselves, entitled, they pray for such other and further relief to which they may be entitled." Respondents moved to dismiss this bill for want of equity, which motion was, on July 14, 1898, overruled and denied, and respondents were required to answer. Thereafter, on January 5, 1900, complainants filed, and asked to be allowed, an amendment to their original bill, in which they asked, among other things, not necessary to be here mentioned, that portion of the seventh paragraph of the original bill wherein it was alleged that the suing out of said attachments operated as a general assignment, be stricken out, and inserting in lien thereof, the following: "That the suing out and levying of said writs of attachment, respectively, was done for the purpose of hindering, delaying and defrauding your orators, and that the said attachments and the proceedings had thereunder, are fraudulent and void as [McDonnell & Co. et al. v. Finch.] to your orators." And by striking out of the prayer of said original bill that portion seeking to declare the effect of the suing out of the said attachments a general assignment and inserting in lieu thereof that the suing out of said attachments "be declared fraudulent, null and void as to your orators." The respondents filed objection to the allowance of the amendment, upon the ground that it was an entire departure from the cause of action set up in the original bill. Subsequently the cause was submitted on the motion of the plaintiffs to amend their bill, the objection of the defendants to the amendment and on the motion of the defendants to dismiss the bill for the want of equity. The chancellor sustained the objection of the defendants to the amendment and refused to allow the amendment to be made, and sustained the motion to dismiss the bill for want of equity, and ordered it dismissed. From this decree the plaintiffs appeal, and assign the rendition thereof as error. LOMAX, CRUM & WEIL, STALLWORTH & BURNETT, JAS. STALLWORTH, and G. R. FARNHAM, for appellants. - The amendment simply, in effect, sought to strike out that portion of the prayer asking that a general assignment be declared, and praying in lieu thereof that the transaction be declared a fraud in accordance with the case made by the bill, and is in no sense inconsistent therewith. Steiner v. Parker, 108 Ala. 357; Rice v. Eiseman, 122 Ala. 343; Berney Nat. Bank v. Guyon, 111 Ala. 491. The said amendment should have been allowed, and it was error for the court to refuse its allowance. Strickland v. Gay, 104 Ala. 378; Berney Nat. Bank v. Guyon, 111 Ala. 491. D. M. POWELL, contra. The motion was made and the decree was rendered in open court and the complainants, if an amendment was proper, should have offered it while the court was open. They cannot now complain and ask to be allowed to avail themselves of an opportunity which they should have taken advantage of in the court below.—Munchus v. Harris, 69 Ala. 506; Buford [McDonnell & Co. et al. v. Finch.] v. Ward, 108 Ala. 307; Mortgage Co. v. Dykes, 111 Ala. 178. The bill having been filed to declare the attachments a general assignment, and the special prayer for relief being to that effect, no relief can be obtained under the prayer for general relief which would be inconsistent with the special prayer, and no amendment can be allowed which would be inconsistent with the relief especially prayed for in the original bill.- City of Eufaula v. McNab, 67 Ala. 588; Micou v. Ashurst, 55 Ala. 607. TYSON, J.-Leaving out of view all conclusions of the pleader, and confining our consideration to the facts alleged in the bill, a clear case is made to have the writs of attachments declared fraudulent. -First Nat. Bank v. Acme White Lead & Color Co., 123 Ala. 344, and cases cited. Indeed, it is the only relief that could be granted upon proof of the facts averred. Clearly no case is made by it to have the attachments declared a general assignment. As a bill for that purpose with the conclusions of the pleader in or out of it and the special prayer in or eliminated, it would be without equity.-Builders & Painters Supply Co. v. Lucas & Co., 119 Ala. 202. If upon the facts alleged the bill is without equity, the conclusions of the pleader predicated upon those facts, whether in the charging part of the bill or in the special prayer or in both cannot import equity into it. And the converse of the proposition is equally true, if upon the facts alleged the bill has equity, conclusions of the pleader and the special prayer will not destroy that equity. The real character of a suit in equity is to be determined from a consideration of the matters of substance embodied in the pleadings.-Ex parte Smith, 34 Ala. 455; Sayre v. Elyton Land Co., 73 Ala. 86. In cases of the character of the one under consideration, the facts upon which the relief sought depends, and not the conclusion of the pleader, constitute the substance of the bill and must control in determining its equity. Strickland v. Gay, Hardie & Co., 104 Ala. 375. This principle has often been applied by this court in analogous cases which involved the question under consideration. It has been uniformly held, in consonance [McDonnell & Co. et al. v. Finch.] with this principle, that a mere general averment, without a statement of the facts, is insufficient upon which to pronounce judgment. And that a demurrer to such a bill confesses only the matters of fact which are well pleaded and not the conclusions of law or fact averred. Flewellen v. Crane, 58 Ala. 627; Pickett v. Pipkin, 64 Ala. 520; Penny v. Jackson, 85 Ala. 67; Jones r. Masscy, 79 Ala. 370; Chamberlain v. Dorrance, 69 Ala. 40. The bill under consideration is strikingly similar in averments and special prayer to the one passed upon by this court in Steiner & Lobman v. Parker & Co., 108 Ala. 357, in which the general averments or conclusions and the special prayer were disregarded and effect was given to the facts alleged in conjunction with the general prayer for relief. And the decision in that case is conclusive of the questions raised in this. It has never been supposed that a special prayer could be made the basis for relief inconsistent with the facts stated in a bill, or could impair its equity. Under it the court could only grant such relief as the cases stated will justify. If no case is made, no relief could be granted -and if a case is stated which is inconsistent with the special prayer, relief may be granted under the general prayer, but not under the special prayer.-Bailey v. Burton, 8 Wend. 339. For "a complainant can have no greater relief than the facts alleged in his bill warrant."-First Nat. Bank v. Acme White Lead & Color Co., supra; May r. Lewis, 22 Ala. 646; Betts v. Gunn, 31 Ala. 219; Munford r. Pearce, 70 Ala. 452; Rice v. Eiseman Bros., 122 Ala. 343. The learned chancellor in refusing to allow the amendments proposed by the complainant proceeded upon the theory that the purpose of the bill was that of declaring the attachment proceedings a general assignment, and that, therefore, the amendments offered were a departure; a conclusion reached by him, doubtless, upon consideration of the general averments and special prayer, ignoring the facts alleged and the general prayer. Perbaps it was upon this theory that he dismissed the bill for want of equity. The decree dismissing the bill will be reversed and the cause will be remanded in order that the bill may be amended, if the complainants so desire, in conformity with the views we have expressed. Reversed and remanded. [Taylor et al. v. Dwyer.] Taylor et al. v. Dwyer. Bill in Equity by Creditor to have Conveyance by Debtor set aside as Fraudulent and Void. 1. Fraudulent conveyance; equity of bill seeking to set aside conveyance for simulated and non-existent consideration. A bill in equity by a creditor, seeking to have a bill of sale made by the insolvent debtor of his property set aside and annulled, and the property subjected to the payment of the complainant's debt, which after averring the execution of said bill of sale from the debtor to his son, then avers that said sale was a mere pretense, was a fraud pure and simple, made and agreed upon between the debtor and his son, while the sheriff was proceeding to make a levy of the execution issued on the judgment recovered by the complainant against his debtor, that the entire consideration as expressed in said pretended bill of sale was fictitious, simulated and fraudulent, and that no money or other consideration of value was paid by the pretended purchaser, clearly presents a case of the conveyance of property by the debtor on a simulated consideration to hinder, delay and defraud his creditors, and is sufficient to give a court of equity jurisdiction. a 2. Same; equity of bill seeking to set aside a conveyance by debtor upon the ground of the sale being a mortgage, and reserving a benefit to the grantor. Where a bill is filed by a creditor seeking to set aside a bill of sale executed by his insolvent debtor, and facts are averred which show that there was no real sale of the property, but a mere pretense of sale to cover the transaction which in truth and in fact involved a mortgage given by the debtor to secure a preexisting debt alleged to be due from him to the grantee in the bill of sale, and that the bill of sale operated by secret agreement between the parties thereto as a mortgage only, there is shown by such averments to be a secret benefit reserved to the insolvent debtor, which opens the transaction to the successful assault of creditors and gives the bill equity. 3. Same; equity of bill to set aside conveyance executed in trust for the grantor. A bill filed by a creditor to set aside a bill of sale executed by his insolvent debtor, which avers "that |