frequent infringements upon the laws of nature, and the freedom of intelligent agents? This question may safely be answered in the affirmative; and I cannot do better than lay before you some of the reasons for so answering it, as they have been stated by the ingenious author of “The Religion of Nature Delineated.”

"1. It seems to me not impossible, that God should "know what is to come: on the contrary, it is highly "reasonable to think that He does and must know

things future. Whatever happens in the world, "which does not come immediately from Him, must "either be the effect of mechanical causes, or of "the motions of living beings and free agents. For « chance, we have seen already, is no cause.

Now as

to the former, it cannot be impossible for Him, upon "whom the being and nature of every thing depends, and who therefore must intimately know all their powers, and what effects they will have, to see "through the whole train of causes and effects, and "whatever will come to pass in that way: nay, it is 66 impossible that He should not do it. We ourselves, "if we are satisfied of the goodness of the materials of "which a machine is made, and understand the force "and determination of those powers by which it is "moved, can tell what it will do, or what will be the "effect of it. And as to those things which depend "upon the voluntary motions of free agents, it is well "known, that men (by whom learn how to judge of "the rest) can only be free with respect to such things "as are within their sphere; not great, God knows; " and their freedom with respect to these can only con

"sist in a liberty either to act, without any incumbent "necessity, as their own reason and judgment shall "determine them; or to neglect their rational faculties, "and not use them at all, but suffer themselves to be "carried away by the tendencies and inclinations of "the body, which left thus to itself acts in a manner "mechanically. Now He, who knows what is in "men's power, what not; knows the make of their "bodies, and all the mechanism and propensions of "them; knows the nature and extent of their "understandings, and what will determine them this

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or that way; knows all the process of natural "(or second) causes, and consequently how these may work upon them: He, I say, who knows "all this, may know what men will do, if he can "but know this one thing more, vix. whether they "will use their rational faculties or not. And since 66 even we ourselves, mean and defective as we are, can in some measure conceive, how so much as this may be done, and seem to want but one step to finish "the account, can we with any show of reason deny "to a Perfect Being this one article more, or think "that He cannot do that too; especially if we call to "mind, that this very power of using our own faculties " is held of Him?

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"Future, or what to us is future, may as truly be "the object of Divine knowledge as present is of ours : "nor can we tell, what respect past, present, to come, "have to the Divine mind, or wherein they differ. To "deaf men there is no such thing as sound, to blind "no such thing as light or colour: nor, when these "things are defined and explained to them irthe best

"manner which their circumstances admit, are they

capable of knowing how they are apprehended. So "here, we cannot tell how future things are known "perhaps, any more than deaf or blind people what "sounds or colours are, and how they are perceived; "but yet there may be a way of knowing those, aš "well as there is of perceiving these. As they want "a fifth sense to perceive sounds or colours, of which they have no notion: so perhaps we may want á "sixth sense, or some faculty, of which future events may be the proper objects. Nor have we any more reason to deny, that there is in nature such a sense or faculty, than the deaf or blind have to deny there ❝is such a sense as that of hearing or seeing.

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"In the last place, this knowledge is not only not “impossible, but that which has been already proved concerning the Deity and His perfection doth neces

sarily infer that nothing can be hid from Him. "For if ignorance be an imperfection, the ignorance "of future acts and events must be so: and then if "all imperfections are to be denied of Him, this "must.

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"There is indeed a common prejudice against the prescience (as it is usually called) of God; which suggests, that if God foreknows things, He fore"knows them infallibly or certainly and if so, then they are certain; and if certain, then they are no "longer matter of freedom. And thus prescience and "freedom are inconsistent. But sure the nature of a

"thing is not changed by being known, or known "beforehand. For if it is known truly, it is known to "be what it is; and therefore is not altered by this.

"The truth is, God foresees, or rather sees the actions "of free agents, because they will be; not that they "will be, because He foresees them.

"In a word, it involves no contradiction to assert, "that God certainly knows what any man will choose " and therefore that he should do this cannot be said "to be impossible.

"It is not impossible, that such laws of nature, "and such a series of causes and effects may be 66 originally designed, that not only general provisions

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may be made for the several species of beings; but "even particular cases, at least many of them, may "also be provided for without innovations or altera"tions in the course of nature. It is true this "amounts to a prodigious scheme, in which all things "to come are as it were comprehended under one "view, estimated, and laid together; but when I "consider what a mass of wonders the universe is in "other regards; what a Being God is, incomprehen"sibly great and perfect; that he cannot be ignorant "of any thing, no, not of the future wants and "deportments of particular men; and that all things, "which derive from Him as the First cause, must do "this so as to be consistent one with another, and in "such a manner, as to make one compact system, befit"ting so great an Author: I say, when I consider this, "I cannot deny such an adjustment of things to be "within His power. The order of events proceeding "from the settlement of nature, may be as compatible "with the due and reasonable success of my endea"yours and prayers (as inconsiderable a part of the

"world as I am,) as with any thing or phenomenon "how great soever.

"Perhaps my meaning may be made more intelligible thus. Suppose M (some man) certainly to "foreknow some way or other that when he should

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come to be upon his death-bed, L would petition "for some particular legacy, in a manner so earnest "and humble, and with such a good disposition, as "would render it proper to grant his request: and upon "this M makes his last will, by which he devises to "L that which was to be asked, and then locks up the "will; and all this many years before the death of M, "and whilst I had yet no expectation or thought of 66 any such thing. When the time comes, the petition ❝is made, and granted; not by making any new will, "but by the old one already made, and without altera"tion: which legacy had, notwithstanding that, never "been left had the petition never been preferred. "The grant may be called an effect of a future act, "and depends as much upon it, as if it had been "made after the act. So if it had been foreseen, that "L would not so much as ask, and had therefore been ❝ left out of the will, this preterition would have been "caused by his carriage, though much later than the "date of the will. In all this is nothing hard to be "admitted, if M be allowed to foreknow the case. "And thus the prayers, which good men offer to the "All-knowing God, and the neglects of others, may "find fitting effects already forecasted in the course "of nature. Which possibility may be extended to "the labours of men, and their behaviour in general.