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"intellects purer, their reason better, they may be “much properer instruments of Divine providence "with respect to us, than we can be with respect one "to another, or to the animals below us. I cannot “think indeed, that the power of these beings is so large, as to alter or suspend the general laws of the “world; or that the world is like a bungling piece of “clock-work, which requires to be oft set backward or "forward by them: or that they can at pleasure change "their condition to ape us, or inferior beings; and "consequently am not apt hastily to credit stories of "portents, &c. such as cannot be true, unless the "nature of things and their manner of being be quite "renversed: yet (I will repeat it again) as men may be "so placed as to become, even by the free exercise of "their own powers, instruments of God's particular

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providence to other men (or animals); so may we "well suppose, that these higher beings may be so “ distributed through the universe and subject to such "an economy (though I pretend not to tell what that ❝is), as may render them also instruments of the same “providence; and that they may, in proportion to "their greater abilities, be capable, consistently with "the laws of nature, some way or other, though not "in our way, of influencing human affairs in proper places.

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"Lastly, what I have ventured to lay before you I "would not have to be so understood, as if I pe"remptorily asserted things to be just in this manner, "or pretended to impose my thoughts upon any body "else: my design is only to show, how I endeavour

"to help my own narrow conceptions. There must be "other ways above my understanding, by which such "a Being as God is may take care of private cases "without interrupting the order of the universe, or "putting any of the parts of it out of their channels. "We may be sure he regards every thing as being what "it is; and that therefore his laws must be accommo"dated to the true geniuses and capacities of those "things which are affected by them. The purely ma"terial part of the world is governed by such, as are "suited to the state of a being, which is insensible,

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passive only, and every where and always the same: "and these seem to be simple and few, and to carry "natural agents into one constant road. But intelli"gent, active, free beings must be under a govern"ment of another form. They must, truth requiring "it, be considered as beings, who may behave them"selves as they ought or not; as beings susceptive “of pleasure and pain; as beings who not only owe "to God all that they are to have, but are (or may be) "sensible of this, and to whom therefore it must be "natural upon many occasions to supplicate Him for "mercy, defence, direction, assistance; lastly, as “beings, whose cases admit great variety and there"fore that influence, by which he is present to them, "must be different from that, by which gravitation "and common phenomena are produced in matter. "This seems to be as it were a public influence, the "other private, answering private cases and prayers; "this to operate directly upon the body, the other "more especially upon the mind, and upon the body

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"by it, &c. But I forbear, lest I should go too far "out of my depth: only adding in general, that God "cannot put things so far out of his own power; as "that he should not for ever govern transactions and " events in his own world; nor can perfect knowledge "and power ever want proper means to achieve what "is fit to be done. So that, though what I have "advanced should stand for nothing, there may still "be a particular providence, notwithstanding the "forementioned difficulty. And then, if there may "be one, it will unavoidably follow, that there is one; "because in the description of providence nothing is

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supposed with respect to particular cases, but that "they should be provided for in such a manner as will "at last agree best with reason; and to allow that "this may be done, and yet say that it is not done, implies a blasphemy that creates horror: it is to charge the Perfect Being with one of the greatest imperfections, and to make Him not so much as a "reasonable being.

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"I conclude, then, that it is as certain that there is a particular providence, as that God is a Being of perfect reason. For if men are treated according "to reason, they must be treated according to what "they are: the virtuous, the just, the compassionate, "&c. as such, and the vicious, unjust, cruel, &c. ac66 cording to what they are: and their several cases must "be taken and considered as they are: which cannot "be done without such a providence."

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I make no apology for the length of this quotation. The subject is so important, and has notwithstanding

been so much misunderstood and misrepresented, that every ingenious attempt to illustrate it deserves attention; and the view of it taken by Mr. Wollaston is so clear, philosophical, and satisfactory, that no man who is free from prejudice can read it without benefit, nor, I conceive, without complete conviction.

Before I entirely quit this subject, allow me to remind you, that we have not been contemplating a mere speculation, but have been pursuing a train of reasoning which is practical and highly moral in its tendency. Let the notion once fully occupy the mind of a vicious man, that God is too exalted or too remote from us to watch the progress of individual guilt, to notice and record its propensities, to counteract its designs,—and with what ardour will he run the career of iniquity? While, on the other hand, the conviction that "all things are naked and open" to the piercing eye of God,—that when transgressors say,

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surely the darkness shall cover us,” behold " even "the night shall be light about them," "the darkness "and the light being both alike to God," (g)—that no being is too insignificant or too obscure to escape the notice of God,-that none can hide himself in gloom so thick as to be impenetrable to the glance of omniscience, tends to appal the guilty, and check the luxuriant growth of crimes. And in a world of trial, sin, and difficulty, what can be so consoling to the good as the firm persuasion that God is the God of individuals, and the "Father of the faithful," the "refuge and strength" of all who trust in him; that (g) Psalm cxxxix. 11, 12.

He hears the cry of the suppliant, yes, of every sincere suppliant, and, wherever it is needed and duly estimated, "giveth power to the faint; "—that he, who when he promises will perform, has declared that "they "who wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength : they shall mount up with wings as eagles: they shall run and not be weary, shall walk and not faint!" (h)

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(h) Is. xl. 29, 31. An objecting correspondent has called upon me to reconcile the doctrine of Providence with the existence of moral evil. I entreat his attention to the following often quoted passage from Simplicius, a pagan writer before mentioned in this letter. Simplicius asks, "Whether God may be called the author of sin, because he per"mits the soul to use her liberty?" and answers the question thus:

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"He who says that God should not permit the exercise of its freedom to the soul, must affirm one of these two things; either that the soul, "though by nature capable of indifferently choosing good or evil, should 66 yet be constantly prevented from choosing evil; or else that it should "have been made of such a nature as to have no power of choosing evil.

"The former assertion (continues he) is irrational and absurd; for "what kind of liberty would that be, in which there should be no free"dom of choice? and what choice could there be, if the mind were con❝stantly restrained to one side of every alternative? With respect to the "second assertion, it is to be observed (says he) that no evil is in itself "desirable, or can be chosen as evil. But if this power of determining "itself either way in any given case must be taken from the soul, it "must either be as something not good, or as some great evil. But "whoever saith so, does not consider how many things there are “which, though accounted good and desirable, are yet never put in "competition with this freedom of will: for without it we should be on "a level with the brutes; and there is no person who would rather be a "brute than a man. If God then shows his goodness in giving to in"ferior beings such perfections as are far below this, is it incongruous "to the Divine nature and goodness to give man a self-determining power 66 over his actions, and to permit him the free exercise of that power? "Had God, to prevent man's sin, taken away the liberty of his will, "he would likewise have destroyed the foundation of all virtue, and "the very nature of man; for there could be no virtue were there not a "possibility of vice; and man's nature, had it continued rational, would

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