Latin, by means of their terminations. Other languages differ from each other, chiefly in these respects.

Difficulties in the Classification of Language.

There is no science, upon which there have been a greater variety of opinions, nor more abstruse discussions, than that of Grammar. Some causes may be pointed out, which have occasioned many difficulties.

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The first has been, a want of such definitions as point out the peculiarity, which is the foundation for classification. an example may be mentioned, the definition of the verb. It has been defined as a word signifying "to be, or to do, or to suffer," or "being, doing, and suffering," or "being, action, and passion." These definitions point to no peculiarity, which distinguishes the verb, from the noun and participle. For the words love, loves, loving, and to love, all are alike in expressing action, though classed as four different parts of speech.

Another difficulty has been caused by attempts to form classes, where there was no foundation for a distinction from other classes. The English passive verb is an example, where nothing serves to distinguish it from the neuter verb. The neuter verb affirms being, or a state of being. The words, I am injured, express being and a state of being, just as much as any neuter verb. There is no difference between I am injured, I am asleep, and I am cold. In each case, the verb affirms existence, and the following word, a circumstance of existence.

Another difficulty has arisen from a want of definitions. This may be again illustrated by the case of the verb. This has always been defined as a word, and yet several words have been joined together, and called a verb. If grammarians had decided what is a word, and how many words are necessary to constitute a verb, all the discussion respecting the number of moods and tenses, that belong to the English verb, would have been saved.

Another cause of difficulty has been occasioned by the want of a recognition of a class called compound words. This was indirectly done, when the Imperative mood, and the various moods and tenses, were called verbs. But no sepa

rate class was formed, embracing all expressions in which individual words could not be classified.

Another difficulty in English grammar, has been occasioned by attempts to conform the philosophy.of the language to that of the Latin and Greek, which, in reference to the interfixes and terminations of verbs, are so dissimilar. Instead of conforming the Latin Grammar, to the peculiarities of the English, which would have lessened the labour of learning the Grammar of both tongues, the English was conformed to the Latin. All the various forms of the Latin verb are formed of interfixes and terminations joined to the root of the verb. These can be resolved into their elements, and the English signification attached to each part. In this way, by learning the meaning of the terminations, and the interfixes, and the mode of combination, all the regular parts of the verb are soon learned, and the irregularities are very few in number. The imperative, infinitives, gerunds, participles, and supines, are more readily learned on the same plan; and this method facilitates, on the same principle as when we first learn letters, and then the mode of combination, instead of learning the particular form of every word in a language.

After language has been arranged in classes, the grammarian forms rules for the use and position of words, and these are called rules of Syntax. Those languages require the most rules, where many terminations and interfixes are used, to express the additional ideas indicated by nouns and verbs. The English language requires but few rules of Syntax. Position of words has so much to do in determining the meaning, that rules are chiefly needed for this purpose; but this, to a great extent, has ordinarily been consigned to the department of Rhetoric.

CHAPTER XVI.

SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE.

All the knowledge gained by mankind may be resolved into that of experience.. All the knowledge acquired by the senses, and consciousness, is strictly our own experience. The knowledge communicated to us by other beings, is founded on the belief that "things will be in agreement with past experience," and therefore that human testimony can be trusted. All knowledge gained by any process of reasoning, is founded on the experience of ourselves or of others; and all the knowledge imparted to us by revelations from the Creator, we gain by means of the recorded experience, and testimony of other men; so that experience is at the foundation of all.

Yet still the sources of human knowledge may properly be resolved into these four :

1. Knowledge gained by our own personal experience. 2. Knowledge of the experience of others, gained by human testimony.

3. Knowledge obtained by processes of reasoning, founded on the experience of ourselves, or others.

4. Knowledge by revelations from the Creator, gained through the experience and testimony of others.

The amount of knowledge gained by personal experience, is very small, compared with that obtained from other sources. If a man had no other sources of information respecting the world, and the nature of objects, except his senses, little would be known of any material things, except those immediately within reach. For the eye, without the aid of the other senses, is of little use in teaching us the nature of objects. As an illustration of this, to a person who had never seen the ocean, the first distant view of it,

would lead him to suppose it another sky, laid down upon the earth, while the nature, both of sea and sky, would be entirely unknown. A child who should grow up in a forest, without any intelligent being to communicate knowledge, would probably very little surpass the animals in the amount of his acquisitions, while, in point of instinctive sagacity, he would be very much below some of the brutes.

All kinds of knowledge not secured by the evidence of our own senses, or by the process of reasoning, founded upon our own experience, rests solely upon the testimony of mankind, either verbal or written. There is scarcely an action in every day life, or any act of reasoning, or any awakened desire, or any operation of mind, that is not, either directly or indirectly, founded on knowledge which we gain by the testimony of others. So that confidence in human testimony, is at the foundation of all our duties and happiness, and of all our dignity as rational beings.

This confidence rests on the principle of reason, that "things will be in agreement with past experience, where there is no reason to the contrary." It has been the uniform experience of mankind, that where no object of selfish good was to be gained, and no evil to be avoided by falsehood, men always speak the truth. Our confidence in human testimony, therefore, is always proportioned to the evidence we have, that there is no reason to suppose any selfish motive operating to prevent the natural expression of the thoughts and feelings of men. And our confidence in human testimony is always weakened, exactly in proportion as we find evidence of some reason why a man would be tempted to practise falsehood. Where there is no reason to be found why a witness should tell a falsehood, no good to be gained either to himself, or to others, in whom he feels an interest, men cannot believe, that human testimony is false. Much more difficult is it to believe testimony false, when telling the truth, brings evil upon the witness; for here no motive could operate in

leading him to violate the natural principles of the mind, in speaking falsehood, instead of truth, where this act brings suffering, and no benefit.

Both from our own personal experience, from the observation of the actions of others, and from universally recorded testimony, mankind have established this as the axiom of belief in regard to all the duties, enjoyments, and business of life. "Mankind speak the truth, except when habit, or some selfish interest, would make falsehood more easy and desirable."

That habits of falsehood are formed, so that from no motive of benefit men will speak falsehoods, seems to be sometimes a fact. But where no such habit can be proved to exist, and no motive of interest can be found to operate, human testimony is considered as infallible. The strongest belief which is ever accorded to human testimony, is in cases, where that testimony is against the personal interest of the witness who gives it, and against the interests of those for whose happiness he feels the most regard. In such a case, it is impossible to disbelieve the testimony of persons without supposing them deranged in intellect. It is impossible not to suppose they are testifying what they believe to be the truth.

In cases where human testimony is contradictory, men invariably yield the strongest belief to the testimony of those who are the most intelligent, and thus least likely to be deceived; the most conscientious, and thus least likely to be in habits of falsehood; the least interested, and thus most likely to be freed from prejudice and selfish considerations.

It has been shown, in the article on Belief, that different degrees of belief exist, according to the amount of experience, either of ourselves, or others, and also according to the amount of contradictory evidence. If experience has been limited, belief is not strong as in cases where it is repeated. If evidence is met by contradictory evidence, belief is exactly proportioned to the amount of positive evidence, compared with that which is contradictory.