explanatory of the inability to distinguish colours, may be resolved into two classes:

1st, Those which place the cause of the defect in the apparatus of vision; and,

2d, Those which suppose it to be in the organ of perception. We are disposed to give preference to the latter; but we have nothing upon the subject to add to the excellent treatise of Dr Hays, further than to quote, without adopting its doctrines as the cause of the defect in question, the following extract from the Annales Medico-Psychologiques, for Jan. 1844. "M. Chevreuil has shewn that there is a harmony and a system of laws in colours as well as in sounds; that there are false colours, as there are false notes, which shock sensitive persons; and that there are some colours which, like certain notes, cannot accompany each other without proving exceedingly offensive." It is unnecessary, then, to regard the incapacity to distinguish colours as the result of an alteration of the retina, or of the optic nerve, but as often being the effect of a predisposition, natural or acquired.

VI. Materialism and Immaterialism, and their Moral and Religious Bearings.

[The following observations appear to us so rational and soberly expressed, and withal so well calculated to dispel the alarm of those who see nothing but danger and impiety in the doctrine of Materialism, that we cannot refrain from laying them before our readers. They form part of a notice of Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation, in The Prospective Review for March 1845. We regret to observe that the reviewer, who in general discusses candidly the opinions expressed in the Vestiges, has allowed himself to speak so unjustly of Phrenology, as to say that "the proofs to which it appeals, when proof of its truth is asked, are similar to those of Astrology, viz., specimens of remarkable predictions." -ED.]

The supposed tendency of modern physiology to Materialism has peculiarly alarmed Protestant divines. We are not concerned with the truth or falsehood of the opposite theories which have been advanced on this subject; but with their religious aspect. The Author of this volume is a decided Materialist; but he holds that this does not in the slightest degree affect the truths of Theism; since the development of

faculties whereby we surpass the brutes, is precisely that which puts us into contact with Deity. The whole subject of Materialism has been so involved in verbal controversy, that we desire here to try to clear off much that is extraneous.

First, let it be observed, that if (according to a current opinion) Materialism consists in supposing that the soul possesses weight, extension, visibility, and other properties of matter, all the ancients were materialists. Beyond a doubt, Job, Ezekiel, and John, equally with Plato, Cicero, and the Christian fathers, conceived of spirit as nothing but thin matter-vapour or gas; and the philosophic idea of spirit, now current in the regions of learning, is not older than the days of the European Schoolmen. It is at once evident that the recent philosophy cannot be of essential moment to religion. But such a view of Materialism is for many reasons unsatisfactory. Electricity, light, and heat, are regarded even by those moderns who hold the corpuscular theory concerning the two last, to be void of gravitation, and (we believe) of inertia. Yet it is evidently Materialism to teach that the substance of the soul is made of these ingredients.

Next; to those who will have it that nothing is Spirit which has a proper attachment to Space or Time, we think it may be fairly replied that our souls do not fulfil this condition. If we know anything about them at all, it is that they stand in most intimate relation to our bodies, and are susceptible of change, growth, and decay, with the progress of time.

But we believe the real question under debate may be fairly stated as follows:

The Immaterialist alleges that that entity or essence, a result or action of which is Consciousness, Thought, Feeling, Voluntary Motion, serves no other purpose than to produce these very phenomena; and does not act (within the sphere of our ordinary experience) except in organized bodies:The Materialist, on the contrary, alleges that the substance or force whereby we think, feel, and move, subserves not only these functions in the bodies which we call animated, but other functions likewise in un-organized bodies, popularly called inanimate. Which of the two doctrines is true, pears to be an intelligible and legitimate question of natural philosophy. There is no self-inconsistency in either assertion. Facts must decide between them, and dogmatism for or against appears to us equally out of place. The Immaterialists, however, are-we are disposed to say habituallyguilty of misrepresentation; as though their opponents said, or ought to say, that there was any "likeness between

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Thought and Matter. This would be about as absurd as to hold that Attraction was like Matter, or, indeed, the Soul like Thought. We know nothing of substance except by the phenomena displayed; and we infer similarity of substance only from similarity of phenomena. Motion of the limbs being one marked symptom of life, as soon as it was discovered that galvanism would move the limbs of a dead animal, a link was found between life and those forces which animate unorganized matter. Vastly more proof than such an isolated fact is needed to demonstrate their identity; but other facts of the same kind may (for aught we know) be hereafter elicited. Meanwhile, there is no absurdity in auguring that Materialism may in time be proved true, nor is it unprofitable to seek out experiments which may help to test it. The controversy must be decided by physiological and physical discoveries, not by internal speculation, nor by imagined religious necessities.

But we cannot stop short here. We further assert, that the doctrine of Materialism, if it be ever so true, ought not to affect any doctrine of morality or of religion, rightly so called. To put this in a strong light, let us be allowed to make an extravagant supposition, which will give every advantage to the opposite argument. Suppose that a future Mr Crosse should succeed in constructing a living dog out of inorganic matter, by a series of galvanic operations, and that this dog should display all the sagacity and affections of other dogs: this would be the most decisive imaginable proof of the identity of that substance by which brutes think, feel, and live, with electric and other forces which act on unorganized matter. Yet such an experiment would not have the most remote tendency to undo our experience and our internal perceptions that truth, justice, disinterestedness, humility, compassion, purity, are better than their opposites; it could not justly lower our reverence and admiration for the great Power who presides over the universe which we behold, or alter in any point the posture of our hearts and spirits towards Him. The sphere of religion is the inner and moral world; and as no external discoveries of philosophy change the moral and spiritual nature of man, fear of any permanent harm to religion from this quarter is vain. Unwillingly, however, we must confess that such fears do temporarily verify themselves. For if the professors of religion proclaim that certain doctrines of philosophy are subversive of religion, too many are found to take them at their word.

No doubt it is a prevailing idea, that the doctrine of Immaterialism is essential as a foundation for that of Future Re

tribution. Rightly to discuss this question might need half a volume. Here it may suffice broadly to protest against basing such a doctrine on physical subtleties. The experience of the old Platonists and other schools which committed this error, might sufficiently warn us against it. A man who believed his soul to be immortal, because it was an unchangeable atom in which his self consisted, was irresistibly carried to believe his past as well as his future immortality; and therefore lost all idea of "person" in connection with his soul. As Archbishop Whately well states it:-" They believed, not their souls, but the substance of their souls, to be immortal:" and personality being dropped, Pantheism crept in, which was nothing but veiled Materialism in its most objectionable form. Equally clear is it, that the immortality of the lowest brutes,-a limpet or a fly,-perhaps even that of the souls of vegetables, follows from the same reasoning; as may be seen indeed in Butler's Analogy: and all moral import in a future existence becomes more than problematical. But the very basis of the theory is in direct collision with notorious fact. It is pretended that the soul is unchangeable; when we have all the proof possible that it changes from day to day, and nothing but hardy denial on the other side. And if it be ever so immaterial, it still remains, that what had its beginning at birth, may have its end at death. In short, no arguments on this subject are worth listening to, but such as touch the conscience and turn on moral feeling, on our hopes and fears,-remorse or aspirations. The doctrine of a life to come is worthless for religious purposes, except so far as the argument is religious, not physiological or metaphysical.

One other ground of fear from Materialism derives too much countenance from a prevailing doctrine of phrenologists. It is supposed that a Materialist must of course be a Necessarian, and must deny that men can be justly praised or blamed, rewarded or punished. We know that a necessarian may with logical consistency hold that it is right to punish a man, as we would whip a dog, merely because experience shews the efficacy of the motive; but although this satisfies the lower demands of economics, it no by means meets what we believe spiritual religion and sound morality to require. To hold that self-reproach and penitence is self-delusion, does appear to us a grievous and immoral error; and we regret that the Author of the Vestiges of Creation does not express himself more decidedly against it, when he approaches the topic. He distinctly recognises the reality of Self-Control; and therefore we hope, that if he had the opportunity of further

explanation, we should be satisfied with his view. Having said thus much, we must add, that we cannot ourselves see any proper connection between Materialism and the doctrine of Necessity. The latter controversy is notoriously an entangling one. Spiritual Fatalists are not at all rare among contemplative and even devout persons; and as far as we can see, the difficulties in the way of believing in human Free Agency are equally great, and need to be met by the very same considerations, in the immaterialist as in the materialist theory. No materialist has any right to argue, that as a planet moves without power of self-control, so also must the human brain act, if its forces are merely material ones. For the pretended analogy would quite as well prove that it cannot hope and desire, meditate and reflect, as that it cannot act freely upon itself. Into such false analogies those are perhaps peculiarly apt to fall, who have studied inanimate, more than animate or rational nature: and it is hardly fair to charge on materialism, as such, the errors which arise out of an undue encroachment of physiology on the domain of morals. The writer before us certainly is not chargeable with the least taint of scepticism concerning the reality of ethical laws. As he emphatically says (p. 383), "An individual, a party, a people, can no more act unjustly with safety, than I could with safety place my leg in the track of a coming wain, or attempt to fast thirty days.'

Let what we have already stated be distinctly remembered, that we are not advocating Materialism, but simply keeping the path of inquiry open, by protecting this theory against the charge of a necessary alliance with scepticism and irreligion.

VII. On Merit and Demerit as affected by the Doctrine of Moral Necessity.

It has been stated as an objection to the doctrine of the Necessity of the human will, that Merit and Demerit are in direct opposition to it, and that it is only on the supposition of Free Will that these words can have any meaning, and the corresponding sentiments a legitimate existence. In point of fact, however, merit and demerit, duly analysed, themselves are found to be a part of that very system of responsibility which rests so firmly on the basis of Necessity. To shew this, let us examine in what circumstances the feeling of merit and of demerit first begins to be experienced.