Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War Origins of Rational Choice LiberalismUniversity of Chicago Press, 15.10.2003 - 401 sivua In Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy, S. M. Amadae tells the remarkable story of how rational choice theory rose from obscurity to become the intellectual bulwark of capitalist democracy. Amadae roots Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy in the turbulent post-World War II era, showing how rational choice theory grew out of the RAND Corporation's efforts to develop a "science" of military and policy decisionmaking. But while the first generation of rational choice theorists—William Riker, Kenneth Arrow, and James Buchanan—were committed to constructing a "scientific" approach to social science research, they were also deeply committed to defending American democracy from its Marxist critics. Amadae reveals not only how the ideological battles of the Cold War shaped their ideas but also how those ideas may today be undermining the very notion of individual liberty they were created to defend. |
Sisältö
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
PROLOGUE Schumpeter Hayek and Popper | 15 |
Decision Technologies and Policy Science | 27 |
CHAPTER 2 Kenneth J Arrows Social Choice and Individual Values | 83 |
CHAPTER 3 James M Buchanan and Gordon Tullocks Public Choice Theory | 133 |
CHAPTER 4 William H Rikers Positive Political Theory | 156 |
CHAPTER 6 Adam Smiths System of Natural Liberty | 193 |
CHAPTER 7 Rational Mechanics Marginalist Economics and Rational Choice | 220 |
CHAPTER 8 Consolidating Rational Choice Liberalism 19702000 | 251 |
EPILOGUE From the Panopticon to the Prisoners Dilemma | 291 |
NOTES | 297 |
BIBLIOGRAPHY | 347 |
| 381 | |
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Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War Origins of Rational Choice ... S.M. Amadae Rajoitettu esikatselu - 2003 |
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