In difcourfing upon which, the following method thall be observed:

First, the foundation of analogical reafoning fhall be inquired into,

Secondly, fome abuses which men have fallen in to by this kind of reafoning.

Thirdly, fome analogical reafoning that leads to ufeful knowledge.

First, of the foundation of analogical reafoning?

Analogy, as it is used in numbers, or mathema tical quantities, means no more, than a certain relation of quantity. to quantity, either as to equality, or excefs, or content. This is well known to those who are converfant in these ftudies, and is of excellent ufe, infomuch that without it no progress could be made in that kind of knowledge. From thence the word comes to be applied to moral and metaphyfical reafoning.For tho' moral notions, are not (and perhaps cannot) be treated with the fame precifion, and exactnefs, as mathematical quan tities; yet the respect of moral notions, to moral notions, may, in many cafes, be called analogy, The writers in morality, when they diftinguish Juftice into commutative and distributive, usually fay, the first must be according to arithmetic a nalogy or proportion, the latter according to geometric. All exchange of property, when it is honeftly made, fuppofes an exact equality, about which the first kind of juftice is converfant; but the ap pointment of rewards and punishments fuppofes a confideration of merit and demerit, in proportion to which diftributive juftice is exercifed: As, the

a

* Concerning the application of arithmetic proportion to uns juft dealings, fee Puffendorf Barbeyrac lib. 1. c. 7. § 12.

man

man who is twice as virtuous as another, is to have twice the reward.

a

This is clear from the parable of the nobleman giving ten pounds to ten fervants to trade with, and rewarding each in proportion to his diligence. He that with one pound had gained ten, was made ruler over ten cities; whereas he who with one pound had only gained five pounds, was made ruler only over five cities. Analogy therefore being common to mathematics and morals, its nature, as applicable to both, may be thus expreffed: It is that, which implieth a likeness between things, fo as to be a foundation of parity of reafoning in fome cafes, together with an unlikeness excluding it in others. When we fay 2 is to 4, as 8 is to 16, the likeness is in the relation between 2 to 4 and 8 to 16, and the unlikeness is between the first and the laft terms of the Analogies; for 2 is unlike 8, and 4 is unlike 16. So alfo there is a likenefs between the proportion which five pounds bear to ten pounds, and five cities to ten cities; but what likeness is there between a pound and a city?

An intire likeness, in all poffible refpects, would be almost an identity: fome diffimilitude therefore is neceffary to conftitute things; for otherwife there would be one intire fameness in nature. And some likeness between things is neceffary, that all things may not be totally difparate; in which cafe there will be no harmony, no fubfiftence of nature; an intire diverfity occafioning an intire oppofition, or war, or deftruction.

Things being thus conftituted, where ever the human mind perceives a likeness, it calls that Analogy, and infers from it fomething of fameness:

a Grotius de Jure Belli & Pacis, lib. 2. 20. § 33. ait, Harmonicam proportionem extruxit Bodinus (Lib. 6. de Rep. cap. alt.) cum tamen revera fimplex fit, & qualis in numeris æqualitas meriti ad pænam, ficut in contractibus mercis ad nummos. Vid. Hornii Eth. 12. 8.

`From

From like effects it prefumes the fame caufe; from likeness of caufes it prefumes the famenefs of effects.

Now if the whole fcale of beings, from the first active creating caufe, to the laft moft inert and infenfible creature, be brought under view, there will be found certain fimilitudes running through the whole, whereby fubordinate fpecies of creatures feem to be linked to one another.

To begin with man, as the first creature we have occafion to be acquainted with (for as to the fubordinate claffes of angels, though we have reafon to believe fuch, we do not know much of them) we are exprefly told, that man was made in the fimilitude or image of God:. And from thence it is, that we principally reason to conceive a proper notion of the fupreme Being, yet with great allow ances for diffimilitude and fuperiority; for we cannot be like him in our bodies, God having nothing. material in his nature: And although we refemble him in holiness and reafoning, yet muft our holinefs be very far fhort of the divine holinefs, and our reafoning must be very tedious and imperfect, in refpect to divine knowledge, which can be no other than immediate intuition. In this manner is human nature like, and unlike the divine nature.

Let us go now to lower claffes, to the brute and reptile creation: There we find a conduct regular and conftant; the individuals of each fpecies conforting with themselves, fearching with great skill for their proper food, and even providing with forefight for winter's receffity; ufing wonderful contrivances for their defence against annoyances; and doing many things that not only emulate hu man fkill, but also human virtues and vices, as gra titude and revenge. So far there appears a fimilitude in their natures, yet the diffimilitudes are alfo great; for their bodily fhapes are exceedingly different: that appearance of reafoning, upon a nearer view, is allowed to be only inftinet, and a C 4

method

method of acting, flowing neceffarily from appe-. tite, and much inferior to human acts, which are the refult of choice and judgment.

Let us go yet lower, to the vegetable world: Here we find an order of creatures in an increafing ftate, partaking of a fort of life, and nourifhed by a fort of food, taken in, partly in the earth, partly in the air; diftinguished into fexes, and propagiting themselves by feed; fo far they poffefs a common nature with animals: But the diffimilitudes are great: For they want a locomotive power, they are void of fenfe, and their bodily fhapes are exceedingly different.

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Let us go yet lower in the World, to mines, ftones, and fubterraneous creatures, which fo far partake of a vegetable ftate, that many of them grow, and must have a ftratum of earth peculiar to them; yet they differ in their texture and fituation, one belonging to the bowels of the earth, the other to the furface. But not to proceed unneceffarily in this argument, what has been faid may be fufficient to fhew, that all the works of the univerfe, and the whole fyftem of things, not excluding the first and glorious caufe, are closely allied by fimilitude of natures, as well as diftinguifhed by diffimilitudes. - -This is the foundation of all reafoning by analogy. But as this kind of rea foning must admit of fome reftrictions, and may

It may be difputed by naturalifts, whether minerals and ftones grow: But although it fhould be allowed, that many congeries of matter of each kind received their forms and confiftence at the time of the fubfidence of matter in the general deluge, according to the laws of gravity; yet it should also be allowed, that fome inftances of much later productions of ftones and minerals may be admitted.

En preffant trop les rapports analogiques que l'on croit être entre le monde corporel & intelligible, on peut facilement fe perdre dans des idées un peu creufes, fe croire peu à peu infpiré, & débiter fes vifions pour des revelations çéleftes. Le Clere Bibl. Anc. & Med. Tom. 4. p. 435.

indifferently lead to truth or error, without a fufficient judgment to confider the diffimilitudes of things, it will be proper to fhew both the abufe and ufe of it. Therefore,

In the fecond place, fhall be fhewn fome abuses: which men have fallen into by this reasoning.

An appitude to perceive the fimilitudes of things being almost a distinct faculty in the human mind, from that of perceiving their differences; at least one exercife of human ingenuity having obtained the name of wit, the other of judgment; and thefe being fo far incompatable, that they are rarely found together in the fame perfon; hence has it happened, that the fearchers after fimilitudes have fo entirely neglected the specifical differences, that they have confounded the nature of things, making a famenefs or identity, where there is an extraordinary difference; and, at laft, reducing all things to one identity.

? Maximum & veluti radicale difcrimen ingeniorum quoad philofophiam & fcientias illud eft; quod alia ingenia funt fortiora & aptiora ad notandas rerum differentias; alia ad notandas rerum fimilitudines. Ingenia enim conftantia & acuta figere contemplationes, & morari, & hærere in omni fubtilitate differentiarum poffunt. Ingenia autem fublimia & difcurfiva etiam tenuiffimas & catholicas rerum fimilitudines & agnofcunt, & componunt. Utrumque autem ingenium facile labitur in exceffum, prenfando aut gradus rerum, aut umbras. Bacon. Novum Organum, Lib. 1.

In Procemio de interpretatione Nature, idem de feipfo ait: Habere mentem & ad rerum fimilitudinem (quod maximum eft) agnofcendum, fatis mobilem, & ad differentiarum fubtilitates obfervandas fatis fixam & intentam, &c.

De Augmentis Scientiarum, cap. 4. ait: Neque enim credibile eft (fi fingula percurrantur & notentur) quantum agmen idolorum philofophiæ immiferit naturalium operationum ad fimilitudinem actionum humanarum reductio. Hoc ipfum, inquam, quod putatur talia naturam facere, qualia homo facit.

Thefe Quotations are taken from the Latin Edition of Lord Verulam's Works, printed at Leipfick, the reft, from the English edition by Shaw.