If this were not the cafe, why fhould it e ver be made a question whether matter can think? Whether the Soul be material? Whether there. be any fuch thing as Spirit, or a being of a contrary and fuperior nature to matter? Whether God be a being distinct from, and fuperior to, the univerfe? Or, whether the universe be not the Deity?

Thefe queftions muft arife only in the minds of those who are too much accustomed to think of the fimilitudes of things, and too little of fpecifical differences. A narrow-minded reafoner, confidering the fcale of beings, from the pureft spirit to the groffeft lump of matter, connected by a participation of qualities; the pureft fpirit to lefs pure; the lefs pure fpirit, endued with reafon, to those which are only guided by inftinct; thefe to vegetables, vege tables to minerals, minerals to inert clay; can easily, put a question, whether man be any thing more, than a more rational brute? and a brute any thing meaner than a lefs rational man? whether a brute be any thing more than a more active vegetable?

and

a The doctrine of the human foul has two parts, the one treat→ ing of the rational foul, which is divine: the other of the irrational foul, which we have in common with brutes. Two different emanations of fouls are manifest in the first creation, the one proceeding from the breath of God, the other from the elements: As to the primitive emanation of the rational foul; the fcripture fays, God formed man of the dust of the earth, and breathed into his noftrils the breath of life. But the generation of the ir rational or brutal foul was in these words, let the water bring forth, let the earth bring forth. And this irrational foul in man is only an inftrument to the rational one; and has the fame origin in us, as in brutes, viz. the duft of the earth. We will there fore ftyle the firft part of the general doctrine of the human foul; the doctrine of the infpired fubftance: And the other part,' the doctrine of the fenfitive or produced foul. But as we are here treating wholly of philofophy, we could not have borrowed this divifion ftom divinity, had it not alfo agreed with the princi ples of philofophy. For there are many excellencies of the human foul above the foul of brutes, manifeft even to thofe, who philofophife only according to sense. And wherever so many and fuch great excellencies are found, a fpecifical difference fhould always be made. Fran. Ba. human foul.

and a vegetable any thing lefs than a lefs active animal? Then, overlooking fome fteps of this fcale, at last seriously put a question, whether plants have not fouls as well as men? And at laft even search for human fhapes in vegetables, as fome have done, even to affign them medicinal qualities, fuitable to thofe parts of a human body, which they are fanfi-/ ed to represent.

And, to proceed farther, conceiving a Likeness between motion and thought, between very active subtle matter and a principle of cogitation; he is then difpofed to put a queftion, whether matter may not think? Or, whether the principle of cogitation be not matter highly fubtilized? And, having thus degraded human fouls, or rather human fpirits; the fupreme Spirit himself, by the fame uncautious fimilitudinary reafoning, may at lafst be reduced to the fame material clafs. The regular order of things fhall be called fate, and freedom directed by wisdom fhall be called neceffity. Such have been the opinions of fome metaphyfical men; and that which led them to thofe monftrous opinions was, in all probability, the argument of Analogy: The See Crollius de Similitudinibus.

The philofopher who contents himself with the appearan ces of the material univerfe only, and the mechanical laws of motion, neglects what is most excellent, and prefers what is im perfect, to what is fupremely perfect.

Such who attend not to manifeft indications of fupreme wifdom, and goodness, perpetually appearing before them, whereever they turn their views and enquiries, too much resemble those ancient philofophers, who made night, matter, and chaos, the original of all things.

They judge well who affirm that God himself can not make contradictions to be true at the fame time, and represent the certain part of our knowledge of the wisdom of the Deity, imparted

to us in the views of nature which he has laid before us.

The fublimity of the fubject is apt to exalt and transport the minds of men, beyond what their faculties can always bear; therefore to support them, allegorical and enigmatical reprefentations have been invented, which in process of time have produced the greatest abuses. Maclaurin on Newton.

like

like effect of which we find in moral reasoning, as rifing from an imperfect comparison between moral creatures, and creatures which are merely endued with fenfe.

4

The lower part of the animal world being obferved to act according to their appetites, and in all cafes to gratify them; fome narrow-minded philofophers have analogically concluded the fame of human nature. Why fhould one clafs of creatures, fay they, be prohibited the indulgence of their defires, and fo many be allowed it? And why fhould not a man grafp at all objects of ambition, of luft, of revenge; fince he has appetites prompting him to them; as well as the brute creation indulge the appetites of hunger and venery? Has the author of nature made any thing in vain : And are not appetites as proper a rule of behavi our to one as another?

Thus does this reafoning tend to the debafing of human nature, the deftruction of fociety, and the ruin of mankind: when the attending to the fpecifical differences of things would ever prevent the putting fuch questions, much more their being embraced as opinions by any men. For reafon and religion do fo evidently diftinguifh men from brutes, and the moral from the inftinctive race of beings, that human appetites must be subject to those fupe rior principles of reafon and religion, otherwife the nobleft part of human nature was given in vain: And it was to little purpose to create man in the image of God, if he is to live the life of a brute.

To fuch mischievous errors does Analogy lead, when the likeneffes of things are only confidered, and not the differences. And when the mind is accustomed to conceive things according to likeneffes, a rich imagination may fanfy it between any things. So far as it is ufed only to adorn fubjects, as poets do, it is allowable and agreeable; and the more

oppofite

oppofite the natures of the things are, between which the likenefs is conceived, the prettier the Fanfy is reckoned. Joy, which is a human paffion, does not at all belong to mountains; nor is there any real fimilitude between the growth of corn and finging: Yet there is no one, who is not pleafed with the Pfalmift's fanfy, when he says, The little bills rejoice on every fide; the valleys are covered over with corn, they fhout for joy, they also fing: But, confidered in any other refpect, it is exceedingly improper: Though poetically beautiful, it is philofophically untrue.

*

So that Analogy, which may lead to Beauties in Poetry, may alfo lead to great Errors in Philofophy, fome of which have been fhewn; but if used with a good Judgment, it may be made the Foun dation of useful knowledge: which is the last Head to be difcourfed upon.

• Lætus ager

Et ipfa fuos mirantur Gargara messes. VIRG. Georg.

When a favourite of the mufes is in this happy difpofition, Nature appears in her gayeft drefs; the nobleft Objects come in view; they turn out their beauteous fides; he fees their various pofitions, and stays for nothing but refemblance to join them to gether. The torrent of the poetic paffion is too rapid to fuffer confideration, and the drawing of confequences: If the images are but ftrong, and have a happy collufion, the mind joins them togetherwith inconceivable avidity.-But, at the fame time, this force and collufion of imagery is fufceptible of very different meanings, and may be viewed in various and even oppofite lights. It often takes its rife from a likeness, which hardly occurs to a cool imagination, and which we are apt to take for downright nonfenfe, when we are able to find no connexion between what went before, and the ftrange comparison which follows. Life of Homer, p. 152. 1735, London."

C

C

Poetry is a kind of learning generally confined to the measure of words, but otherwife, extremely licentious, and truly belonging to the imagination; which being unreftrained by laws, may make what unnatural mixture or feparations it pleafes. Francis Bacon. Inftauration, part. 1. fect. 2. published by Shaw.

We'

We find in all human Works of the fame Hand, a certain Similitude, whereby a critical Obferver may, in most cafes, determine the Author, without any other information. The lines and colour ing of a picture fhall have fuch peculiar Characteriftics, as to perpetuate the name and credit of the Artift, without any written elogy: And pieces feen in different countries fhall very juftly be attributed to the fame Author. The proportions of a building fhall tell who is the architect, with more truth and praise, than a name graved in ftone. A ftile in writing fhall be as diftinguishable a mark to afcertain the works of the Ingenious, as the characters in which they record their works, or their bodily Features, which diftinguish them living.

This Obfervation extends alfo to moral conduct; Mankind, notwithstanding the great variety of modes of action, being conftant as to national principles, confidered in collective bodies; and alfo each man to his own principle, confidered as individuals. Hence arifes that opinion which one man forms of another, from a mode of action, which fhall inable him to judge with great probability, whether any particular action be justly attributed to any particular perfon. If a man who has acquired the character of being ambitious, fhould do any act which may be differently confidered, his principle of action being known fhall determine the Judgments of men to believe that, to be an act of ambition,

In like manner the libidinous, revengeful, Avaritious; and, on the other hand, the chafte, the merciful, the generous, having all peculiar principles and modes of action, of which they are very tenacious, shall seldom deceive mankind by declar ing what they with should be thought their defigus, if their real principles be contrary to what they declare. This analogy of Judgment in moral conduct. is of great ufe to mankind, being the support of equity and order in the world: For virtuous men

are