First, Of the relation between the moral and the natural government of the world.

TH

HE fupreme Author of all things governs his creatures in two methods, which correfpond very properly to their natures: For, fince all creatures may be diftinguished into two claffes, fuch as are capable of apprehending the fitness of an action to a rule, and are free to act according to it, or to tranfgrefs it; or fuch as are intirely incapable of judging of a rule, and aft neceffarily according to laws affixed to their natures; hence is the Governor of the universe to be confidered in two refpects: As a moral Governor, and a natural Governor.

This diftinction is not fo much a real difference, in the character of the fupreme Governor, as a me thod of conceiving things, neceffary to our speaking properly concerning him: For it is one wifdom exercifed in two refpects; and all the laws of GOD, whether to men or matter, are alike good, and all require obedience, and tend to a noble end. Indeed the natural and moral conftitution and government of the world are fo connected, as to make up together but one fcheme: And it is highly probable, that the firft is formed and carried on, merely in fubferviency to the latter.

When a planet moves regularly round the centre of its motion, and thereby occafions variety of seafons, and all pleasurable things, to its inhabitants, it acts ftrictly according to the law of its nature; but it does fo neceffarily, and, being infenfible of the divine approbation, it is alfo incapable of a reward; yet the wifdom of the Being who confines it to its regularity, is to be admired. Suppofe it confcious of its motion, and free to move otherwife, then it would be a moral being, and its periodic revolutions would be called ftrict virtue; but

if

if it fhould break from its Orbit, and become vitious, it would deserve chastifement; yet would not the wisdom of its maker be thereby leffened. Suppofe a man, on the other hand, doing acts of virtue, not out of choice, but neceffity, fo framed as never to commit intemperance and injury, or to omit doing juftice and charity; his behaviour, in that cafe, would be intirely agreeable to the divine law, but not praife worthy; and the wisdom of GoD would be no lefs confpicuous, although human defert would be nothing in that cafe.

But the true ftate of things is, the planet moves neceffarily, and man acts freely; and, in both cafes, regularity of motion, which one cannot but obferve, and regularity of behaviour, which the other ought to obferve, are alike divine wifdom: But inafmuch as GOD rules one by a fupreme irrefiftible power, and the other by rewards and punishments; hence one is a creature of his natural government, and the other of his moral. And fince it is one wifdom, which directs, and rules all the creatures of both forts, it is plain, there fhould be a great analogy between them. Wherein that confifteth, has been already partly fhewn, fo far as there is a likeness between the laws of inert matter, and those of moral beings.

But inafmuch as human nature may be confidered as confifting of fpirit, foul, and body; by the laft allyed to material beings, by the second to the brutal nature, by the third to the divine; by one, acting naturally and neceffarily, or rather not acting at all; only yielding a neceffary obedience, as the ftone to the hand that throws it; by another acting inftinctively, according to appetite, as brutes act, which is a phyfical freedom, without judgment; by the last acting intirely free, with regard to rewards and punishments: And as the fpiritual nature is more or lefs improved, man becomes more or lefs like the Divinity. In fome per

fons

fons it is almoft drowned, in the animal nature, in others it afpires only to the profpect of temporal rewards, in a third fort it thirsts after the happiness of another Life, and acts upon the profpect of an eternal reward.

Although this diftinction of three principles of human nature be the ftrict truth, yet not being the common fentiment, we may perhaps fometimes not ufe each term, exactly in its proper sense; but, in compliance, fuppofe human nature, by one princi ple, doing many things without confcioufnefs, (as breathing without willing, and growing in ftature without defigning it;) by the other two, improving in virtue, and obedience to rules of behaviour, with a consciousness of its acts, and a defire of a reward.

Hence arifes the analogy between the natural and moral man, taking natural in a more reftrained fenfe than St. Paul, who ufes it for the fum of a man's religion, who has not had the last revelation, or one unregenerate; as, the natural man receiveth not the thingsof the fpirit of GOD. Under the cha

racter of natural, he fhall, in this difcourfe, be confidered as part of the material or instinctive world; that is, as acting according to the neceffity of matter or appetite; which perhaps amounts to the fame with what St. Paul fays: For, why does not the natural man receive the things of the fpirit of GOD? Because, not confidering his moral nature, he fuffers himself intirely to be governed by will and appetite.

Now because the moral man may either act folely upon the motive of rewards and punishments in this life, or principally upon the profpect of rewards and punishments in another; the latter of which may be called religious or fpiritual conduct, to diftinguish it from the former, which is merely moral; hence arifes the analogy alfo between the moral and spiritual man.

Having

Having thus cleared the way to the main defign of this difcourfe, by fhewing, how GOD is to be confidered both as a natural and moral Governor ; or, to fpeak more correctly, alfo as a spiritual Governor; inasmuch as all government here is in order at laft to establish an univerfal fpiritual government, to be continued to perpetuity, of which this temporal state is an imperfect beginning; and that human nature may be confidered as acting naturally, morally, and fpiritually. It is now time to fhew the analogy between the natural and moral man; and also between the moral, and fpiritual. But it is to be obferved, that the fame thing may fometimes ftand as one term in two analogies, both to the moral, and spiritual man, as fhall appear particularly in the natural birth.

Firft, concerning the analogy between the natural and moral man.

THE beginning of human nature is a mystery, and

alfo its itate of fubfiftence before it comes to breath the atmosphere of the world: Thou knoweft not bow the bones do grow, in the womb of her that is with child: Yet thus much we know, that it is a state of growth, from an atom of matter to the ftature of a child; from the loweft degree of life, to a condi. tion of fenfe and perception. Such alfo is the state of man, after he breaks from the prifon of his nativity, and becomes a free agent in the world. His body, by daily nourishment, increases from fmalnefs and weakness, to ftature and strength; his mind, in proportion alfo, improves from mere fenfation to reafoning, from ignorance to knowledge, from acting by appetite, and natural inftigation; to act by reafon, and moral rules. In one ftate, that which was but a Speck of entity, becomes a well-formed creature; in the other, he who could not move himself, becomes an active being; and, he who was almost weaker than the meaneft creature, acquires

that

that ftrength of limbs, and fagacity of mind, which gives him a right to a lordship over his kindred animals.

There is also a relation between this natural birth, and the spiritual birth of a man; which has been already mentioned.

The moment a human creature breatheth air, there is almoft a total change in its nature; it enjoys a new world, and a new fet of fenfes; and, though it had life and growth before, yet that life was but death in refpect to this. So, when a man relinquishes the prejudices, and vitious customs, and turpitudes of this life, and devotes himself fincerely to the truth and holiness of a spiritual state, there is as intire a change wrought; and the former corrupt ftate is, in refpect to this regenerate one, no other than death; and the Scriptures fpeak of it as fuch, calling the works of that ftate, dead works.

Now, fuppofe human nature capable of reasoning during the time of its existence between concepti on and birth; let us fee, whether its reasoning, in refpect to this life, would not be analogous to the reafoning of an adult man, in respect to the life, which is to come..

We argue very juftly, from our ftate of growth, and continual increase of natural Powers, and moral improvements, that human nature is defigned for a longer continuance in being, than the ufual time allotted for it here. From its ftrong appetites, in refpect to life, and knowledge, and holinefs, in fuch whofe nature is not vitiated by immoral habits, we reasonably infer, that there must be a time and place for their gratification, and confequently, a ftate after this.

In the other cafe, the imperfect man fhould reafon in a fimilar manner. Confidering the narrow. nefs of his sphere, and the greatnefs of his defires, the fewness of his objects, and the capacity of his nature, he must conclude, that he was made to enjoy a better life, and that such a narrow confinement

could