effect. In this case the charter-party provides, "that, as this charter-party is entered into by the charterers for account of another party, their responsibility ceases as soon as the cargo is on board, the vessel holding a lien upon the cargo for freight and demurrage.' This clause clearly protects the defendants from any liability for demurrage at the port of discharge, the shipowner having expressly discharged them, reserving a lien on the cargo for his own protection. In Gray v. Carr (25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 215; 1 Mar. Law Cas. 115; L. Rep. 6 Q. B. 522) there was a cesser clause, "the owners to have an absolute lien for all freight, dead freight, demurrage, and average," and the bill of lading contained, as in the present case, the words, "and all other conditions as per charter-party," and there the court held that the shipowners had a right of lien against the consignees for demurrage, but not for damages for detention at the port of loading. It was not argued in that case that the shipowner would have been entitled to recover in an action against the consignees apart from his lien. In French v. Gerber (36 L. T. Rep. N. S. 350; 3 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 403; 1 C. P. Div. 737; 2 C. P. Div. 247) it was held that the cesser clause discharged the charterers from liability for giving orders for the ship to discharge at a port which was not a good and safe port (contrary to the stipulations of the charter-party), Mellish, L.J. saying, "the true construction of the charter appears to me to entirely exonerate the charterers in respect of subsequent breaches." Apart from the express words of the bill of lading there is no implied contract rendering the consignee liable to pay demurrage, since it is not stated in the case that more than a fair and reasonable time was occupied in discharging the ship:

Evans v. Forster, 1 B. & Ad. 118;
Horn v. Bensusan, 9 C. & P. 709.

Synnott, for French, in reply.-There is no force in the argument that, because a remedy by lien is given, therefore the remedy by action for breach of contract is gone. [POLLOCK, B.-As you have not alleged that there was unreasonable delay in discharging the ship, you must show a breach of contract on the part of the defendants. We cannot reject the words of the bill of lading, "all other conditions as per charter-party."] Those words incorporate the clauses of the charter-party existing at the time of the alleged breach. They incorporate, therefore, the conditions of the charter-party as to the mode of the discharge of the cargo, but do not incorporate the "cesser clause, which applies to the charterers in their character as charterers only, and does not apply to them in the character of consignees and dischargers of the cargo. In Gray v. Carr (1 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 115; 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 215; L. Rep. 6 Q. B. 534, 540) Brett, J. says, with respect to similar words in the bill of lading in that case, that they were "satisfied by making them applicable to damages in the nature of demurrage for any delay which may occur through the default of the consignee at the port of discharge." The words therefore only incorporate the conditions of the charter-party which are applicable. The cesser clause is not applicable, because it is a personal clause, the sole object of which is to protect the charterer from personal

[Q.B. Div.

liability at the port of loading. This is clear from the observations of Cleasby, B. in Gray v. Carr (ubi sup.). "It appears," he says, "clear to me that whether the demurrage days are occupied in the loading of the ship, or in the discharge of it, the charterer is equally discharged from personal liability as soon as a sufficient cargo is loaded." The clause therefore does not affect the liability of the defendants as consignees.

Edwyn Jones called the attention of the court to Sanguinetti v. The Pacific Steam Navigation Company (3 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 300; 35 L. T. Rep. N. S. 658; 2 Q. B. Div. 238).

POLLOCK, B.-This action is brought to recover the sum of 561. 138, 4d., claimed for demurrage upon the delay in discharging a ship called the Alette, which was chartered under a charter-party of the 13th Dec. 1881, entered into between the shipowners and the defendants to load from the defendants at Miramichi or Dalhousie a cargo of deals and battens to be carried at a certain rate of freight to a safe port on the west coast of Great Britain. In this charter-party there was the usual clause as to the time to be allowed for loading and discharging the cargo, which was: "Seventeen days, Sundays and holidays excepted, are to be allowed the merchant (if the ship be not sooner despatched) for loading, and for discharging cargo fifteen like days. Lay days to commence when ship is ready in a proper loading and discharging berth respectively; demurrage at the rate of fourpence per register ton per day to be paid to the ship if longer detained." The cargo was duly loaded and forwarded to this kingdom, and the bill of lading under which the cargo was actually shipped contained the words, "he and they (ie., the defendants or their assigns) paying freight and all other conditions as per charterparty." Now, this amount is not claimed against the defendants for undue delay in unloading the vessel, as in the old case of Randall v. Lynch (2 Camp. 352), because the plaintiff in his statement of claim does not put forward that as the ground of his claim. But the claim is for demurrage due under the bill of lading, which refers in the manner I have just mentioned to the charterparty.

Let us see, then, in what way the consignee is liable under the bill of lading. This appears from the case of Harman v. Gandolph (Holt. 35), where it is said that "the consignee by taking to the goods contracts with the owners of the vessel to perform the terms upon which they have undertaken to convey and deliver them." That is the way the contract arises. Now, in this case, the words of the bill of lading "paying freight and all other conditions as per charter-party," clearly incorporate into the bill of lading so much of the charter-party as has reference to the receipt of the cargo, and the loading of the ship. This, however is not a claim for demurrage at the port of loading, but at the port of discharge, a fact which becomes important when we come to consider how much of the charter-party is incorporated into the bill of lading. For there is in the charterparty a clause which is called the cesser clause, and which runs: "It is agreed that, as this charter-party is entered into by the charterers for account of another party, their responsibility ceases as soon as the cargo is on board, the vessel holding a lien upon the cargo for freight and

demurrage." Now, it is perfectly intelligible that that clause should have full effect in exonerating the charterers from all liability for anything occur. ing after the shipment of the cargo, because it is very reasonable that they should say that they, being agents for other parties, are not going to be liable for anything that occurs after shipment, the goods being always subject to the shipowner's lien. But it does not follow because the charterer is freed from liability at the port of discharge by that clause, that the shipowner's right to sue the consignee for freight and demurrage is displaced. In answer to this, the defendants contend that if you import the charter-party at all into the bill of lading you must import the whole of it, including the cesser clause. But in this case the shipowner is not suing the defendant as charterer, but as assignee of the bill of lading, and the only part of the charter-party which is important at the present time is that which has reference to the delivery of the cargo, and to my mind it seems unreasonable, as a matter of commercial usage, to say that into whosoever's hands the cargo might come they would not be responsible personally for demurrage under the charter-party.

I am of opinion, therefore, that the consignee is not less liable because he happens to be the charterer, the ground of his being released from liability as charterer being found in his being agent for other parties. But, apart from this consideration, we have the clear authority of Cotton and Thesiger, L.JJ. in Porteous v. Watney (39 L. T. Rep. N. S. 195; 4 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 34; 3 Q. B. Div. 534) for saying that a provision similar to that which is found in the bill of lading in the present case only incorporates into the bill of lading so much of the charter-party as is applicable. I think, therefore, that in this case there must be judgment for the plaintiffs with costs.

LOPES, J.-It is important in this case to remember that this is a claim for demurrage not at the port of loading, but at the port of discharge, and not against the defendants as charterers of the ship, but as consignees of the cargo; and the question for us to consider is what is the contract entered into by the bill of lading. That document contains the words "he and they paying freight and all other conditions as per charterparty. The charter-party, therefore, must be looked at, for it would be impossible for us not to give effect to the words "and all other conditions as per charter-party." Those words must be looked at with reference to what the charterparty contains. Now, it is clear from the judgments of Cotton and Thesiger, L,JJ. in Porteous v. Watney (ubi sup.), that these words only import into the bill of lading such of the provisions of the charter-party as are consistent with the circumstances of the case at the time when it becomes necessary to construe the bill of lading. We are bound, therefore, to incorporate the provisions of the charter-party as to demurrage, because those conditions are applicable to demurrage at the port of discharge such as has arisen in this case; but it is equally clear that we cannot import the earlier provisions of the charter-party, which run, "It is agreed that as this charter-party is entered into by the charterers for account of another party, their responsibility ceases as soon as the cargo is on board, the vessel holding a lien upon the cargo for freight and demurrage," for that provision has reference only to the time when "the cargo is on

[ADM.

board," and has no application to the state of things at the port of discharge. I think, therefore, that while the condition as to demurrage is applicable to the circumstances of this case, that which only relates to the time when "the cargo is on board" is not applicable, or, in other words, that the cesser clause has no application here, and I think that there should be judgment for the plaintiff for 561. 13s. 4d. with costs.

Judgment for the plaintiff.

Solicitors for the plaintiff, F. Venn and Co., for Collins, Robinson, and Co., Liverpool. Solicitors for the defendants, Kearsey, Son, and Haves.

PROBATE, DIVORCE, AND ADMIRALTY

DIVISION.

ADMIRALTY BUSINESS.
Tuesday, Jan. 30, 1883.

(Before Sir R. PHILLIMORE).
THE LIVIETTA. (a)

Salvage-Derelict-Amount of award-Apportion

ment.

A brig on a voyage from Norway to Cardiff, with a crew of nine hands, fell in with a derelict brig, in risk of imminent loss, between Heligoland and the Dogger Bank, and put a mate and two hands aboard her, who shortly after endeavoured to regain their own vessel, but their boat was swamped and one of the men drifted astern and was rescued by a fishing smack. After great difficulty and much hardship the two men navigated the derelict in safety to within a few miles of Dungeness, when she was taken in tow by a steamship and placed in Dover Basin.

In consolidated actions of salvage brought respectively by the owners, master, and crew of the brig, and by the owners, master, and crew of the steamship, the Court awarded one-half the value of the property salved, out of which three-fifths were apportioned to the salving brig.

THESE were consolidated actions of salvage brought respectively by the owners, master, and crew of the Norwegian brig Julie, and by the owners, master, and crew of the British steamship Walton, against the Italian brig Livietta, her cargo and freight.

The statement of claim on behalf of the owners, master, and crew of the Julie alleged their services to be substantially as follows:

The Julie, a brig of 257 tons register, was, on the 13th Nov. 1882 in the North Sea, bound on a voyage from Arendal to Cardiff, laden with a cargo of mining timbers and manned by a crew of nine hands all told. On the same day, at about 9 a.m., when between the Dogger Bank and Heligoland, those on board the Julie sighted brig (which proved to be the Livietta) lying to, there being a light easterly wind. The mate and two hands of the Julie having boarded the Livietta, it was found she was laden with wheat, derelict and in a very crippled condition, there being two and a half feet of water in the hold, the pumps choked, no pump gear and no anchors. The mate and the two hands set sail upon the Livietta and proceeded in company of the Julie. Meanwhile the wind had increased to a gale from the east with a high sea, and at 10 a.m. on the 14th of November, those on board the Livietta, fearing to lose sight of the Julie in the boisterous weather, and fearing the Livietta would founder as the water was increasing, determined to leave the Livietta. In attempting to do so, which involved (a) Reported by J. P. ASPINALL and F. W. RAIKES, Esqrs.,

Barristers-at-Law.

great risk to the Julie by reason of her approaching close to the Livietta, the boat was swamped, and the mate and one hand succeeded in getting on board the Livietta again, and the other hand drifted astern in the swamped boat and was ultimately rescued by means of a lifebuoy by a fishing smack. After several ineffectual attempts to send the Julie's lifeboat to the assistance of the two men on the Livietta, the Julie endeavoured to keep by the Livietta, but lost sight of her during the afternoon. The Livietta was then with much difficulty navigated up the English Channel. At 4.30 p.m. the North Hinder light was sighted, and at midnight the South Foreland light, the course being shaped for Dover and flareup lights being burned for a pilot or tug. By this time the water had increased to five feet, the wind had decreased, but the sea had got worse and was running very high. Towards morning on the 15th Nov., the wind having become more northerly, the Livietta drifted from the shore, and at 8 a.m. the Varne light was sighted. The Livietta was then tacked in towards the land, and at

noon Dungeness was sighted, when in answer to a signal of distress the steamship Walton came off and towed the Livietta off Dover, when she was taken by a tug into the harbour, having at this time five and a half feet of water in her hold amidships.

After the Julie lost sight of the Livietta she experienced very bad and adverse weather, and in conse quence of her being short-handed, by reason of the absence of the mate and two hands, the master and crew underwent much extra fatigue and exertion. She was three times driven back off the Lizard, and on the 23rd Nov. put into Falmouth as a harbour of refuge, having lost her lower foretopsail. She did not arrive at Cardiff till Dec. 16, having lost about 24 days, and being put to considerable expense at Falmouth. Those on board the Livietta when attempting to get back to the Julie lost their coats, boots, oilskins, and changes of clothing. In consequence they were constantly exposed to the weather and had no change, and their feet being uncovered suffered considerably. Except on one occasion they were unable to light a fire on board the Livietta or to cook their food. They had very little to eat or drink, were unable to go to sleep during the whole time they were on board the Livietta, and were in constant fear of foundering. In rendering the said services the Julie incurred expenses to the amount of 631. 8s. 2d. The value of the Julie was about 20001.

The statement of claim on behalf of the owners, master, and crew of the Walton alleged their services to be as follows:

The Walton, a steamship of 688 tons register, with engines of 99 horse power nominal, was, on the 15th Nov. 1882 about noon off Dungeness, on a voyage from Algiers to Leith and Newcastle, with a cargo of esparto grass and a crew of nineteen hands all told. At such time those on board the Walton sighted the Livietta, which was distant about six miles, bearing about S.S.E. and flying signals of distress. The sails were observed to be flying about in great confusion, and she was driving towards the French coast with her head to the westward. The chief mate and four men from the Walton boarded the Livietta and found her in charge of two men from the Julie, who were much exhausted and in want of assistance. After some difficulty, and without assistance from the two men from the Julie, the Walton was made fast ahead of the Livietta, three men from the Walton remaining on board the Livietta to stow the sails and make her ready for harbour. After about one hour's towing two more hands were put on board the Livietta to assist, and at 4.30 p.m. the Walton arrived off Dover pier with the Livietta in tow, and the Livietta was taken into the basin by a tug for 101. At the time of receiving the services, the Livietta and the two men on board of her were in a position of extreme danger. The men were too exhausted and had not strength enough to set her sails, which were in a state of confusion, she had no anchors, and her pumps were choked and useless. She had from six to seven feet of water in her hold, and her cargo of grain was wet and deteriorating rapidly.

By the consent of the cargo owners, the cargo was sold by the Marshal of the court for the sum of 13441., which was paid into court. An appearance was entered by tbe owners of the Livietta

[ADM.

and of her cargo, and 500l. was tendered by the cargo owners, but refused as insufficient. The owners of the Livietta did not deliver a statement of defence.

The ship had not been sold and the value had not been ascertained.

In the statement of defence delivered on behalf of the owners of cargo, the allegations in the statement of claim on behalf of the Julie were admitted, save that the Julie by reason of being short-handed was in any way inconvenienced or put to expense, and that but for the services of the Julie the Livietta must have been lost; or that by reason of the services, the Livietta and her cargo were rescued and brought into a place of safety. With respect to the services of the Walton, they were also admitted, except the allegation that at the time of the Walton's ser

vices the Livietta and the two men on board her were in a position of extreme danger.

Jan. 30.-The case came on before the judge on the pleadings, no witnesses being called.

G. Bruce for the owners, master, and crew of the Julie.-The services of those from the Julie were in the highest degree meritorious. The property salved was saved from certain destruction, and in rendering the services the salvors greatly imperilled their lives, and underwent most unusual exertions. The owners of the Julie have been put to great expense by loss of time and damage to property. Under these circumstances 500l. is insufficient.

The Rasche, L. Rep. 4 A. & E. 127.

W. G. F. Phillimore for the owners, master, and crew of the Walton.-The Walton completed the service and so saved the Livietta and the lives of the original salvors. Without her assistance the Livietta would have been lost. Seeing that the values are small and the claimants many, a large proportion should be given.

Buckmill for the owners of cargo on the Livietta.-The tender is over one-third. The services of the two men from the Julia were no doubt meritorious, but not efficacious. The Walton only towed in calm weather for about two hours.

J. P. Aspinall, for the owners of the Livietta, stated that the owners of the ship would pay as salvage a sum bearing the same proportion to the value of the ship us that awarded against the cargo bore to the value of the cargo.

Sir ROBERT PHILLIMORE.-I pronounce against the sufficiency of the tender made by the owners of the cargo of the Livietta in this case, and I award a moiety of the value of the property proceeded against as salvage remuneration for the services rendered by the plaintiffs. Of this award I apportion three-fifths to the owners, master, and crew of the Julie. The owners, master, and crew of the Walton will receive the remainder of the moiety, and I allot two-thirds of this remainder to the owners of the Walton.

Solicitors for the owners, master, and crew of the Julie, Waddilove and Nutt.

Solicitors for the owners, master, and crew of the Walton, Ingledew and Ince.

Solicitors for the owners of the cargo of the Livietta, Waltons, Bubb, and Walton.

Solicitors for the owners of the Livietta, Stokes, Saunders, and Stokes.

ADM.]

Friday, April 27, 1883. (Before BUTT, J.)

THE STEAMSHIP BENTINCK COMPANY LIMITED V W. H. POTTER & SON; THE GEORGE ROPER. (a) Collision-Launch-Necessary precautions-River

Mersey.

The duty of persons in charge of a launch, to take reasonable precautions to warn other vessels navigating the river before the vessel is launched, is to be construed as meaning that they are bound to take the utmost possible precautions.

Tugs in attendance on a launch in the river Mersey should be dressed with flags and should give warning to approaching vessels that the launch is about to take place.

THIS was a damage action in personam instituted by the owners of the screw steamship Bentinck against the owners of the launch George Roper to recover damages arising out of a collision between the two vessels in the river Mersey

on the 10th Feb. 1883. The defendants counterclaimed.

The facts alleged on behalf of the plaintiffs were as follows: The screw-steamship Bentinck, belonging to the port of Whitehaven, of 555 tons register, and manned by a crew of seventeen hands all told, was, shortly before 1 p.m. on the 10th Feb., proceeding down the river Mersey on the Cheshire side of mid-channel, bound on a voyage from Garston to Belfast with a cargo of coals. The wind was S., the weather fine and clear, and the tide last quarter flood, and a good look-out was being kept on board the Bentinck, which was being navigated at slow speed, stopping when necessary to avoid the craft in the river. As the Bentinck came down towards Brunswick Dock, her engines were stopped to allow a steamer, the Merchant, coming out of Brunswick Dock to straighten down the river. The helm of the Bentinck was put to starboard, so as to keep clear of the Merchant. The Merchant, however, starboarded also, and thereupon these on board the Bentinck observed the launch George Roper coming across the river stern first, about 300 yards off, and broad on the starboard bow. Previously to the launch being seen an order had been given to go slow ahead, but it was at once countermanded, and the engines of the Bentinck were immediately put full speed astern, but the George Roper's starboard side came into collision with the stem of the Bentinck and the Bentinck received considerable damage. The plaintiffs charged against the defendants (1) that the George Roper was improperly launched at a time when the river was not clear, and without a proper look-out being had, or proper precautions being taken to see that the river was clear; (2) that a proper, sufficient, and usual notice or warning of the launch was not given before the launch, and proper steps were not taken to apprise those navigating the river that the launch was coming away; (3) that the George Roper was not furnished with a proper anchor, or with one ready for letting go, or if there was any such anchor ready, those on board and in charge of her improperly neglected to use it; (4) that the George Roper when she got into the river was

(a) Reported by J. P. ASPINALL, and F. W. RAIKES, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law.

not properly navigated or towed so as to avoid collision with the Bentinck; (5) that the defendants were the builders of the George Roper, from whose yard she was launched, and they or their servants had the management of the launching operations; and lastly, that the collision and the damage to the Bentinck was caused by the negligence of the defendants and their servants.

The facts alleged on behalf of the defendants were as follows:-On the 10th Feb., the defendants, intending to launch the ship George Roper from their building yard, situated on the Liverpool side of the river Mersey, had taken all reasonable steps to indicate to vessels navigating the river that a launch was about to take place. Flags were displayed from poles on board the launch, and a large red flag, a usual and well-known signal on the Mersey that a launch is about to take place, was flying at the end of the building yard. Two steam tugs were also in the river opposite the yard, each flying a large burgee, which is also a well-known signal that they were in attendance upon a ship about to be launched. It was high water about 1.10 p.m., and it is a well-known rule that the launching of vessels takes place at slack tide (high water), and it was notorious on that day that the launch would take place at that time. In these circumstances, at about two minutes to 1 p.m., the river being clear of craft, the defendants launched the vessel, and, whilst she was crossing the river stern first from the Liverpool to the Cheshire side, those on board her observed the Bentinck (which

they had previously seen nearly a mile distant) coming down the river. There was then plenty of room and time for the Bentinck to have avoided the launch, either by going ahead of her, or by easing or stopping and reversing; but the Bentinck, coming on apparently under a starboard helm, and without taking any steps to avoid the launch, struck her with considerable violence on the starboard side, doing her considerable injury. Before the collision the Bentinck was loudly hailed to go

astern.

The defendants charged the plaintiffs with (1) failing to keep a good look-out; (2) failing to ease or stop and reverse in time; (3) and with improperly and negligently omitting to keep out of the way of the launch.

By way of counter-claim the defendants said:

1. They repeat the several allegations herein before made.

2. The defendants have suffered great damage by reason of the collision, and have thereby made themselves responsible, and have become liable to the owners of the launch for a large sum of money in respect of a breach of their (the defendants') contract with the owners, caused solely by the matters herein complained of.

The plaintiffs replied joining issue on the defence, and denying that the defendants had suffered great damage by reason of the collision, or that they had made themselves responsible or had become liable to the owners of the launch for a large sum of money in respect of a breach of their contract with the owners; and upon this reply issue was joined by the defendants.

April 27.-The action came on for hearing, when viva voce evidence was given on both sides. The allegations in the statement of claim were substantially proved by the evidence for the plaintiffs. The defendants proved that they had

conducted a very large percentage of the launches in the river Mersey for upwards of twenty-three years, and had hitherto never met with an accident, and that the mode of conducting a launch as alleged by them was their usual method.

Russell Q.C. (with him W. G. F. Phillimore) for the plaintiffs. It is laid down in The Blenheim (2 W. Rob. 421) and The Andalusian (2 P. Div. 231) what is the duty of those in charge of a launch to take reasonable precautions. Reasonable precautions in the river Mersey can only be the utmost possible precautions. The precautions in the present case are manifestly insufficient, and the fact that the defendants have never before had an accident is immaterial.

Myburgh QC. (with him Bucknill) for the defendants. It is unreasonable to cast upon shipbuilders the wide duty of taking the utmost possible precautions. It cannot be said that those precautions must be taken which the highest ingenuity can suggest. In The Blenheim (ubi sup.) all that is required is reasonable notice, and in that case, where the circumstances were very similar to the present, those in charge of the launch were held free from blame. The defendants have conducted a very large number of launches for upwards of twenty-three years, and this is their first accident, which shows that hitherto their precautions have been sufficient.

Russell, Q.C. in reply.

BUTT, J.-This case does not to my mind present. much difficulty, and the Elder Brethren take the same view as myself. Now the first question is, What is the duty of those in charge of a launch in the river Mersey? and this has been laid down in the case of The Andalusian (ubi sup.). It seems to me that I am bound by that case. I may say I entertain a view quite in accordance with the law as laid down there, and I have no hesitation in stating that that is the law. It is given in these words: "The law throws upon those who launch a vessel the obligation of doing so with the utmost precaution, and giving such a notice as is reasonable and sufficient to prevent any injury happening from the launch; and, moreover, the burden of showing that every reasonable precaution has been taken, and every reasonable notice given, lies upon her and those managing the launch.' Mr. Myburgh said that this comes to a question of reasonable precautions as no one is bound to do more than take reasonable precautions, but this is really no more than a change of terms. For what is a reasonable precaution in launching a vessel is in fact the utmost precautions under the circumstances. So, when you set a vessel going, without engines or helm, and with only a tug to manage her, off the ways at the speed of seven knots an hour across the fairway of the river Mersey, the utmost precautions are certainly only reasonable. What, then, are the usual precautions? Now, I venture to say that a usual precaution is to have one tug decorated with a show of flags. This is well known, certainly to all seamen, usually to mean that a launch is taking place. Why this precaution should not have taken place in this instance, I am at a loss to conceive. I am of opinion that they should be taken in all cases of a launch in the Mersey. The defendants chose to trust to something else. Properly enough, no doubt, there were two tugs

[ADM.

in attendance, one at the yard, and one out in the middle of the Mersey. Now, as to the decoration of the tugs. When I refer to the evidence of Mr. Potter, one of the defendants, I find he himself says that he thinks it is the custom to have more flags than one to show that the tugs are not engaged in the ordinary way, and that something unusual is going to happen; and if that precaution had been taken it is clear the collision would not have taken place. In The Andalusian it was held that it was the duty of one or other of the tugs to give warning to approaching vessels. What, then, is the state of things here? The United Service, the tug lying out in the river, sees three vessels coming down a mile off; she knows the launch is likely to come across their course, but, as they get nearer, takes no steps to warn them of the launch. This appears to me to be a clear neglect of duty, for this tug might have steamed up and given warning to the approaching vessels. It further appears that Mr. Potter went to a place where he could see if the river was clear in the vicinity, then descended to the platform and within two minutes, the launch, a vessel of great length and tonnage, was in the water. Mr. Potter was in ignorance that three vessels were coming down the river towards the place where the launch must go, and, not knowing this, he gives the order for the launch to be set off. Both the tug masters, however, were aware that three vessels were under way down the river, but they give no warning, which, as I have said, is a neglect of duty. I cannot help thinking that it is negligence on the part of those in charge of a launch to set her going on the ways without taking all steps to be certain that nothing is approaching the place of the launch at the time. [The learned Judge then considered the evidence with regard to the navigation of the Bentinck, and finally pronounced those in charge of the launch alone to blame.]

Solicitors for the plaintiffs, Hill, Dickinson, Lightbound and Co.

Solicitors for the defendants, Bateson, Bright, and Warr.

May 25 and June 26, 1883. (Before Sir JAMES HANNEN, assisted by TRINITY MASTERS.)

THE YAN YEAN. (a)

Salvage Misconduct of salvors - Forfeiture of award-Counter-claim.

Where salvors, having taken possession of a derelict vessel, whose crew had taken refuge on board the salvors' vessel, improperly refused to put back the crew or take the proffered assistance of a tug, although they themselves had no local knowledge, and then brought the derelict to anchor in an improper place, in consequence of which she was lost, the Court, although the ship and cargo were subsequently raised, and realised 30751., refused to give any salvage remuneration, and condemned the plaintiffs in costs, but dismissed the counter-claim for damages.

THIS was a salvage action instituted by the owners, master, and crew of the steamship Kirkstall against the owners of the steamship Yan Yean, her cargo and freight.

The plaintiffs alleged that on the 3rd April the (a) Reported by J. P. ASPINALL and F. W. RAIKES, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law.