this: whether it became necessary for the Beryl to stop and reverse at an earlier time than she did. According to the evidence, it seems to have been proved that she stopped and reversed at a distance of 300 yards from the Abeona. Ought she to have stopped and reversed at an earlier time than that? I observe that the rule says that the steamship is to slacken her speed or stop and reverse if necessary. Now, these two vessels were approaching so as to involve risk of collision. It was, therefore, the duty of the Beryl to slacken her speed. That she did. The risk of collision however continued, and the direction in art. 18 is a continuing direction, and therefore it was the duty of the officer in command of the Beryl to decide every moment whether it had become necessary to stop and reverse. Now, the Beryl slackened her speed at a distance between a quarter and half a mile off, and she continued at that speed until within 300 yards. From the answers given us by our assessors it appears to me to be plain that the Beryl continued at her slackened speed for a longer time than she ought to have done. It appears to me that, under the circumstances, the view taken by our assessors is well founded. It has been argued that the necessity to stop and reverse is a necessity which is to be determined by the event and not by the judgment of a seaman. It is not now necessary to decide that question, because, if it is to be judged by the event, the collision followed, and therefore it was necessary; if by the judgment of a sailor, then we have the opinion of our assessors that a sailor ought, under the circumstances, to have earlier seen the necessity of stopping and reversing. Whichever interpretation of these words is correct, it follows that in this case the Beryl was in fault, and must therefore be held to blame for the collision. Collision - Limitation of liability Defect in machinery" Improper navigation "-Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 63), 8, 54. Where a ship is held liable for a collision caused by a defect in her machinery, and such defect is due, not to her master and crew, but to the negligence or default of other persons employed by the shipowner to repair the machinery on shore before the commencement of the voyage, and for the purposes of the voyage, the collision is occasioned by improper navigation" within the meaning of sect. 54, sub-sect. 4, of the Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Act 1862, so as to entitle the owners to limit their liability under the provisions of that Act. Per Brett, M.R.: All damage wrongfully done by one ship to another whilst the ship which does the damage is being navigated, and where the wrong(b) Reported by J. P. ASPINALL and F. W. RAIKES, Esqrs. Barristers-at-Law. [CT. OF APP. ful act of the ship which does the damage is due to the negligence of any person for whose negli gence the owner is liable, is comprised within sect. 54 of the Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Act 1862, unless such negligence occurs with the privity of the owner. Decision of Butt, J. (5 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 194; 49 L. T. Rep. N.S. 715) confirmed. THIS was an appeal by the defendants from a decision of Butt, J., in an action for limitation of liability under the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Act 1862, s. 54, sub-s. 4. The action was brought by the owners of the steamship Warkworth to limit their liability in respect of a collision between the Warkworth and the vessel British Enterprise, caused by a defect in the steam steering gear of the Warkworth. At the damage action arising out of this collision. Sir James Hannen had found the Warkworth solely to blame, on the ground that the defect in the steering gear was due to the negligence of persons other than the master and crew, for whom the owner was responsible. Under these circumstances the defendants to the limitation of liability action pleaded that the collision had not been caused by the "improper navigation" of the Warkworth, and therefore denied the right of the plaintiffs to limit their liability. At the trial Butt, J. had held that the collision was caused by the "improper navigation" of the Warkworth, and had allowed her owners to limit their liability accordingly. The further facts of the case are fully set out in the report of the proceedings in the court below (5 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 194; 49 L. T. Rep. N. S. 715; 9 P. Div. 20). Webster, Q.C. and Dr. Phillimore, for the defendants, in support of the appeal. Finlay, Q.C. and Barnes, for the respondents, were not called upon. The arguments were substantially the same as those urged in the court below. The following authorities were cited in support of the appeal : Hayn v. Culliford, 4 Asp. Mar. Cas. 128; 40 L. T. Chapman v. Royal Netherlands Steam Navigation BRETT, M.R.-In this case the defendants' ship, at the time of the collision, was being navigated, she was making way through the water for the purpose of going from one place to another, and by reason of a defect in her steering gear she failed to avoid another vessel which was at anchor, and by her own motion in the water struck that other vessel and damaged her. The first question which arises, under these circumstances, is, was her owner liable for that collision? He could not be liable unless the act in question was the result of the negligence of some person for whose conduct he was liable. Supposing he had bought his ship from a firm of shipbuilders, and, by reason of a latent defect in her, this accident had happened, there would have been no negligence on the part of anyone for whom he was responsible; there would have been no liability, and he would have had no need to invoke the protection of this Act of Parliament. This Act is only necessary where there has been some accident caused by the negligence of persons for whom the owner is responsible. Therefore, it must be taken that this collision was the result of the negligence of someone for whose care and skill the owner was responsible. To say that this Act does not apply to negligence on shore is true, if the negligence has no result in what happens when the ship is being navigated. One must assume that the negligence if done on shore is carried on to the water and is effected on the ship when she is being navigated. The negligence in this case was the wrongful placing of a screw into a certain part of the steering gear. Therefore there was an act of negligence, and it was the act of a person for whose care and skill Sir James Hannen has held the owner responsible. Behind that finding we cannot go. If that had been all, and this defect had not been the causa causans of the collision, it would have been wholly immaterial; but Sir James Hannen has found it to have been the causa causans of the accident. It was not the causa proxima, which was the inability of the master to steer his ship so as to avoid this collision, and that inability was caused by the negligence of a servant of the owner. The question, then, is whether in such circumstances the defendant is entitled to limit his liability under the Act. Though the negligence occurred before the vessel started, its effect was continuous and operative whilst the ship was on her voyage. Now, the Act says that the owner of any ship, whether British or foreign, is to be entitled to limit his liability where any loss or damage is, by reason of the improper navigation of his ship, caused to any other ship or boat, &c. I think you must read it in this way, "by reason of the improper navigation caused by anyone for whom he is responsible." Is this accident caused by the improper navigation of the ship? Surely running into another ship at anchor is not proper navigation? But then it is urged that the words "improper navigation' mean the negligence of the master or crew. There is nothing in the section so to limit it. In my view the word, improper means wrongful. If a ship is being properly navigated she does not run into other vessels. Therefore I come to this, that the proposition I am going to read is certainly included in this statute. It is that all damage wrongfully done by a ship to another ship whilst the ship which does the damage is being navigated, and where the wrongful act of the ship which does damage is due to the negligence of any person for whom the owner is liable, is comprised within the Act. Here the negligence of the person for whose act the owner was liable was the causa causans, and, though not the causa proxima, yet in my view the accident was caused by improper or wrongful navigation. I therefore think that the decision of Butt, J. was correct, and that this appeal must be dismissed. BOWEN, L.J.-I am of the same opinion. Mr Webster and Dr. Phillimore have contended that "improper navigation" in the 54th section of the Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Act 1862, is confined to acts or omissions on the part of those on board the ship who are engaged in actually navigating her. It seems to me to be plain that the Legislature, in using the word improper, meant improper navigation by the owner of the ship. [CT. OF APP. In my view the owner does improperly navigate the ship in the eye of the law, and in this I am fortified by the form of words used in the old declarations, if, owing to the negligence of some one for whom he is responsible, damage is caused by his ship. It seems to me that in such a case the ship is improperly navigated within the meaning of the section, whether the damage be caused by the negligence of the master and crew or of same other person for whom the owner is responsible. I do not think it possible to limit the meaning of the words to unskilful navigation by those on board the ship, but I think it means wrongful navigation as where an owner uses his ship under conditions where it ought not to be used. For these reasons I am of opinion that the judgment of the learned judge below ought to be affirmed. FRY, L.J.-I am of the same opinion. Dr. Phillimore has referred us to the dictionary for the meaning of the word navigation. One of the definitions given there is that navigation is the science or art of conducting a ship from place to place through the water. If that be a true definition of the word navigation, it seems to me that it involves the supplying of proper materials to enable the ship to be properly conducted from place to place and also of skilful mariners capable of so conducting the ship. Skilful mariners, if the ship be not supplied with proper materials necessary for her locomotion, cannot, in the absence of such materials, efficiently and properly conduct her from place to place; so also, all necessary and proper materials are useless without skilful mariners. In my opinion, therefore, proper navigation includes two things-the supply of all necessary parts of a ship, and of mariners with skill and knowledge of their duties. If either of these are wanting, and a collision ensues, which is occasioned by the absence of both or either of these two, then we have a case of improper navigation. The words "improper navigation may include other cases, but they certainly include the present. In conclusion I may add that I think the following remarks of Butt, J. were well founded, and carry out my observations on this subject. They are as follows: "Primâ facie I do not see why the amount of relief should be limited to a case in which damage has occurred through the negligence of the master and crew, and why the Act should not apply to the negligence of persons other than the master and crew, who are enployed by the shipowner to attend to the ship in preparation for the voyage, as, for example, a marine engineer employed, while the ship is in port, to overhaul the machinery." For these considerations, I therefore think this appeal must Nov. 25 and 26, 1884. (Before BRETT, M.R., COTTON and LINDLEY, L.JJ., assisted by NAUTICAL ASSESSORS.) THE DORDOGNE. (a) ON APPEAL FROM BUTT, J. Collision-Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1880, arts. 13 and 18-Moderate speedDense fog-Steamship-Sailing ship. Where those in charge of a steamship in a dense fog hear a whistle and then others following it and getting nearer, even though the whistles get broader on their ship's bow, it is their duty on hearing the first whistle to reduce their speed, and as the vessels get nearer to bring their ship to as complete a standstill as is possible without putting her out of command, and when the other vessel has come close to, even though not in sight, to stop and reverse their engines. Art. 13 of the Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, which provides that every ship shall go at a "moderate speed" in a fog, requires the speed to become more moderate as the two vessels get closer together. Semble, that it is the duty of those in charge of a sailing ship, when in a dense fog they hear a succession of whistles approaching closer and closer, to reduce her speed by taking off sail so as to bring her to as near a standstill as possible while retaining command over her. THIS was an appeal by the defendants in a damage action from a decision of Butt, J., finding the steamships Edith and Dordogne both to blame for a collision off Ushant. The plaintiffs admitted that the Edith was to blame. The collision occurred about 5.30 a.m. on Aug. 26, 1883. At the time of the collision the wind was light from the north-east, and there was a dense fog. The steamship Edith was of 448 tons register, and was bound on a voyage from Swansea to Clarente in France. The Dordogne was a screw steamship of 463 tons register, and was bound on a voyage from Bordeaux to Cardiff. The facts alleged on behalf of the plaintiff were as follows: While the Edith was proceeding at half speed, her whistle being constantly sounded, and heading about S. by W., half W., the whistle of the Dordogne was heard on the port bow of the Edith. The engines of the Edith was thereupon put to dead slow and her helm was ported. The Dordogne was, however, heard to be rapidly approaching, and the helm of the Edith was put hard-a-port, but the Dordogne was immediately sighted at about a ship's length off and bearing about four or five points on the port. bow, approaching at a high rate of speed. An order was given to set the Edith's engines full speed ahead, but before the order could be executed the Dordogne with her stem struck the Edith on the port side. The plaintiffs charged the defendants (inter alia) with navigating at too great a rate of speed and with failing to ease and stop and reverse their engines. The facts alleged on behalf of the defendants were as follows:-About 5.30 a.m. on the 26th Aug. 1883 the Dordogne was about ten miles S. W. by S. off Ushant. There was a light air from the N. E. and a dense fog. The Dordogne with her engines at dead slow was heading N. half E., and was (a) Reported by J. P. ASPINALL, and F. W. RAIKES, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law. [CT. OF APP. making about one knot or one and a half knots an hour. Her regulation lights were duly exhibited and burning, the whistle was being duly sounded, and a good look-out was being kept on board her. In these circumstances those on board the Dordogne heard the whistle of the Edith on the starboard bow. The engines of the Dordogne were stopped and her own whistle was blown; the engines of the Dordogne were then moved on slowly. The whistle of the Edith was again heard broader on the starboard bow, the engines were again stopped, and the whistle was again blown. The whistle of the Edith was heard a third time. It was answered by the whistle of the Dordogne and the engines were stopped. The Edith was almost directly afterwards seen and the engines were reversed full speed and the helm pnt harda-port, but the Edith coming on at a considerable speed and at a considerable angle to the course of the Dordogne, struck with her port side, near the engine-room, the starboard bow of the Dordogne, doing much damage to herself and the Dordogne. The defendants' evidence was that at the time the Edith was seen their engines were stopped, and had been stopped some two or three minutes. At the trial Butt, J. found that the Edith was "to blame for not having at least stopped her engines not perhaps when she heard the whistle the first, or second, or third, or fourth time, but at some time or other before the vessels got so close that they sighted each other, and the collision became inevitable." With regard to the Dordogne he found that she was going faster than alleged at the moment of collision, and that her engines were going ahead when the Edith came into sight. Arts. 13 and 18 of the Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea are as follows: 13. Every ship, whether a sailing ship or a steamship, shall in a fog, mist, or falling snow go at a moderate speed. 18. Every steamship when approaching another ship so as to involve risk of collision, shall slacker her speed or stop and reverse if necessary. Cohen, Q.C. and Dr. Phillimore for the defendants in support of the appeal.—According to the evidence the engines of the Dordogne were stopped at the time the Edith came into sight. If so she had brought herself practically to a standstill in the water: The Frankland and The Kestrel, 1 Asp. Mar. Law The Kirby Hall, 5 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 90; 48 L. T. It has never been laid down that a vessel on hearing a whistle, or even a succession of whistles, is to take all way off, which would have the effect of throwing herself out of command and so increase the dangers of navigation: The Beta, 5 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 276; L. Rep. 8 P. The John McIntyre, 5 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 278; L. Rep. 8 P. Div. 135; 51 L. T. Rep. N. S. 185. According to the decision in The Beryl (51 L. T. Rep. N. S. 554; ante, p. 321; 9 P. D. 137) art. 18 is only obligatory when the circumstances are such as would lead an officer of reasonable care and skill to the conclusion that there was risk of collision. Here, although the whistles were coming closer, yet they were getting broader on the bow, and would therefore indicate a position of safety. Hall, Q.C. and Baden-Powell, for the respondents, were not called upon. BRETT, M.R.-It seems to me that in these cases of vessels, whether steamers or sailing vessels, which find themselves in a fog, we must hold them very strictly to the regulations. As I ventured to say in The Beryl (ubi sup.), these regulations are made not only for the purpose of preventing collisions, but of preventing danger of collision, and we must take care to hold vessels in thick fogs strictly to the regulations so as to avoid danger of collision. I still am of opinion that we cannot condemn or relieve these ships by the proof of what were the actual facts. We must judge them by what an officer of care and skill ought to have judged the facts to be. That the Edith was solely to blame is obvious, and we need not trouble ourselves about her. The question is as to the Dordogne, whether she was also to blame. That question must be solved by what ought to have appeared to be the circumstances of risk of collision to an officer of reasonable care and skill in command of the Dordogne. Now the circumstances, in fact, were that there was so dense a fog that you could not see another ship until within a ship's length off, until, when you did see her, a collision was almost inevitable. Whilst the Dordogne was in this fog she was at sea, in a place where it would not be extremely probable that she I would meet another vessel. This is not like the case of a vessel going up or down a river, or up or down a somewhat narrow arm of the sea like a channel. In such a case, whether an officer hears a whistle or not, he ought to contemplate the probability of meeting with other vessels, because he is in a narrow channel where vessels that are meeting would almost inevitably be in the same line as himself. Take, for instance, the Thames before an officer hears a whistle I think he ought to have brought his vessel, in such a fog as this, as nearly as possible to a standstill, so as only just to have command over her. But in the open sea, where it is not very probable that he will meet another vessel, I think that that would be a moderate speed, which, if he was in a river and likely to meet a vessel the next minute, ought not to be his speed. But even when at sea, before he hears a whistle, he ought to reduce his way to a moderate speed, though what his speed is to be must of course differ under different circumstances. Now when at sea an officer hears a whistle he is brought to the conclusion that there is a vessel in the neighbourhood. A good deal must of course depend upon the indication which is given by the other vessel of her presence. I cannot doubt myself but that the sound of a whistle must give some indication of where the vessel is. It is impossible to my mind to say that a whistle sounded at a mile and a half off would sound the same as a whistle sounded one hundred yards off. Personally I cannot believe that. Therefore, if a ship at sea in such a fog hears a whistle which would indicate that another vessel is a mile or a mile and a half off, she ought at once to reduce her speed to a more moderate speed, though moderate speed under these circumstances would be very different to moderate speed when the vessels came closer together. This case is not to be determined by what was done at the time the first whistle [CT. OF APP. was heard. Here we have three, and perhaps more, successive whistles, all coming closer. What must be the conclusion to be derived from those whistles ? We know that in fact these vessels were coming closer and closer to each other. We, however, have to judge of what ought to have been the conclusion or suspicion of the officer in charge of the Dordogne. What would that succession of whistles tell him? For myself I should have had no doubt, when you have a succession of whistles, each one coming closer, that each whistle would show him that the other vessel was coming nearer. It is said that the whistles showed him that she was coming in a particular direction, that is, that she was getting broader on his bow. I do not think it signifies whether the whistles get broader on the bow or not, if they show that the vessel is coming closer. If it is coming nearer and nearer in a dense fog (and every one knows that in dense fogs you cannot tell where exactly a vessel is from the sound of her whistle), and you cannot tell the direction in which it is coming, are not those such circumstances as should lead a prudent officer to suppose that if he went on as he was there would be danger? The moment the whistles show him that a vessel is really coming substantially nearer and nearer to him, he not being able to tell the direction in which she is coming, the truth of which observation is in this case shown by the ultimate fact, I have not myself any doubt that he ought to obey not only the 13th article, but also the 18th article if his vessel is a steamer. If it is only the 13th article which he ought to obey, as the other vessel comes nearer and nearer, "moderate speed" becomes more moderate and more moderate. That which is moderate speed, when the vessels are two or three miles apart, is not moderate speed when the vessels are within half a mile of each other. As the vessels get nearer and nearer he must bring his ship to as complete a standstill as is possible without putting himself out of command (a). If his vessel (a) THE EARL OF DUMFRIES.-In this case, since decided by Butt, J. on Jan. 14, 1885, it was held that where in a dense fog a steamship has been brought to a standstill in the water, those in charge of her on hearing a whistle are entitled to get such way on her as will put her under command. The facts were, that the engines of the steamship Boskenna Bay were stopped on account of a dense fog; the result being that the vessel was lying dead in the water when the whistle of the steamship Earl of Dumfries was heard on the port bow. The helm of the Boskenna Bay was then put hard-a-port, and on a second whistle being heard the engines were put ahead, the helm being kept a-port. Shortly afterwards the loom of the Earl of Dumfries was seen and the vessels came into collision, the stem of the Boskenna Bay striking the starboard side of the Earl of Dumfries. Butt, J., after finding the Earl of Dumfries to blame, dealt with the Boskenna Bay as follows: " With regard to the Boskenna Bay I do not forget that she was being carefully navigated. When the fog came on she stopped her engines, and had brought herself to a standstill in the water. The question arises, what ought she to have done on hearing the whistle of the Earl of Dumfries? Is a vessel so circumstanced to lie like a log on the water, or ought she to set her engines ahead and so get some steerage way on her? I should be very sorry to hold that a vessel is not under those circumstances to get some way on her. But, if she does set her engines ahead she must do so with care and caution, and only give herself such way as is necessary to get herself under command. If the Boskenna Bay had done that and nothing more, she would be blameless. But the Elder Brethren think she did more, she not only put her engines is a steamer she must go at least dead slow. If the other is really coming anything like near to him he ought to obey art. 18 and stop and reverse. To a sailing ship art. 18 does not apply, because she cannot stop and reverse, but she ought, if she is under full sail, to take sail off till she brings herself as nearly to a standstill as will give her command of herself. Now what ought the officer of the Dordogne to have concluded? Upon that I have asked the following question of the gentlemen who assist us: "Considering the way in which these vessels were approaching each other, would each successive whistle tell the officer in charge of the Dordogne that the other ship was approaching nearer and nearer to him?" They agree with the view I should have come to and say "yes." If so, he ought to have brought his ship to a standstill at an early period, and when the other vessel was coming near to him he ought to have stopped and reversed. Certainly at the time the last whistle was sounded he ought immediately to have stopped and reversed, whereas, I think, the order was only given when he saw the other vessel. He therefore broke art. 18. The learned judge of the Admiralty Court relied upon another circumstance to show that the Dordogne was going at a very considerable pace at the time of the collision. I think it only right to state that upon this point I have asked our assessors the question: "Does the severity of the injuries suffered by the Edith lead to any conclusion as to the speed of the Dordogne at the moment of collision ?" I do not know what the advice of the Trinity Masters to the judge of the Admiralty Court was, but I am bound to say that the gentlemen assisting us do not think it would lead to any conclusion as to the speed of the Dordogne at the moment of collision. I therefore do not rely upon the severity of the blow at all. But I rely upon the facts I have stated and the rule I have stated. I am therefore of opinion that in this case the Dordogne broke art. 13 by not going at a moderate speed sooner than she did; and I am further of opinion, which is quite sufficient to decide this case, that she broke art. 18 by not reversing sooner than she did. The decision of the learned judge of the Admiralty Court must therefore be supported and this appeal dismissed. COTTON, L.J.-We have not to consider what was the conduct of the Dordogne when the first whistle was heard. It is clear that there was a succession of whistles, that the vessels were coming nearer and nearer, and were, in fact, getting very near one another. Now it was the duty of the Dordogne to stop and reverse her engines if there was risk of collision. But it is said that, inasmuch as these whistles were getting broader and broader on the bow, the officer on the Dordogne might reasonably conclude that there was no danger. ahead, but she put her helm hard-a-port. She also set on her engines at the rate of thirty-five revolutions, and I think they were so kept for not less than four minutes. Having regard to this and other facts in the case, I think that there was an unjustifiable amount of headway put on her. I think that the navigation of the Earl of Dumfries was not careful, and I think that, although the Boskenna Bay was at the outset being carefully navigated, there was an error in giving her too much headway. The result therefore is that both vessels must be held to blame "--ED. [CT. OF APP. (Before BRETT, M.R., BOWEN and FRY, L.JJ.) THE PONTIDA. (α) ON APPEAL FROM THE PROBATE, DIVORCE, AND ADMIRALTY DIVISION. Bottomry bond-Authority of master-Owners of cargo-Necessity-Registrar and merchants. The authority of a master to raise money on bottomry is limited as against the owners of cargo to such an amount as is necessary to enable the ship to complete her voyage with safety, and even where the money is advanced by a person who is not the ship's agent, and has no interest in the repairs effected on the ship, and honestly believes from inquiries made that the money is necessary, he cannot recover as against the cargo owner anything in respect of items other than those which are in fact necessary. Fry, L.J., dubitante. (b) The registrar and merchants have a discretionary (a) Reported by J. P. ASPINALL and F. W. BAIKES, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law. (b) We find on reference to the American case of The Barque Edward Albro (10 Benedict, 668), decided in the Southern District Court of New York by Choate, J. in 1879, that the court there disallowed certain items in a bottomry bond which were not necessary for the prosecution of the voyage. It is, however, to be noticed that in that case the bond was on ship and freight only, and that the point as to the lender having made reasonable inquiries does not appear to have been taken. According to Choate, J.: "The test of what may be secured in a bottomry bond is not whether the expense is one for which the creditor will have a maritime lien without any express agreement, but whether it was properly and necessarily incurred by the master in pursuance of his authority as agent of the owner for the prosecution of the voyage." Öne item charged in the bottomry bond and allowed was the funeral expenses of a former master, who had died at the port in which the bond had been entered into. His remarks on this item are as follows: "The funeral expenses of the master should, I think, be allowed. Where a master of a ship dies in a foreign port without means to defray his funeral expenses, and the agent of the ship pays these expenses, humanity and the interests of commerce, and the rela tions of the parties to the vessel, justify one in treating the expense as a necessity of the ship." The analogous question as to the liability of shipowners for medical attendance to their crew in foreign ports is discussed in the American cases of The Brig George (1 Sumn. 151) and Winthrop v. Carlton (12 Mass. 4). According to sect. 228 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 104), where the master or any seaman receives any hurt or injury in the service of the ship, the expenses of medical attendance and subsistence in case of illness, and of burial in case of death, are to be defrayed by the shipowner without deduction from wages. The French code contains a similar provision: (cf. Code de Commerce, arts. 262, 263, and 261.)—ED. |