CT. OF APP.] WOODLEY AND Co. v. MICHELL AND CO. It is contended that because both ships were registered in Holland in the name of a Dutch company, and were both lawfully sailing under the Dutch flag, and came into collision on the high seas, the plaintiffs' rights apart from the contract must be decided by the Dutch law. But although both ships may have been Dutch, and entitled by the law of Holland to trade with Dutch ports in Java, yet it is not to be forgotten that both ships, were, in fact, owned beneficially by the defendants, and were both navigated by persons who were in fact the servants of the defendants. What, then, is the law applicable, as between the plaintiffs and the defendants, to a loss of the plaintiffs' goods occasioned by a collision between these two ships? What reason is there for saying that Dutch law, as distinguished from English law or the general maritime law, is to govern such a case? The reason alleged is that, each ship being Dutch, the law of the flag-that is the Dutch law-regulates the persons on board each ship, and determines the rights and liabilities of her owners both towards the captains and crews, and towards the owners of the cargoes on board. This reason is based on a very common and fruitful source of error-viz., the error of identifying ships with portions of the territory of the states to which they belong. The analogy is imperfect, and is more often misleading than the reverse, as I have endeavoured to point out before: Reg. v. Keyn, 2 Ex. Div. 93, 94.) In this particular case the analogy appears to me more misleading than usual. I am not aware of any decision in this country to the effect that, where two ships come into collision on the high seas, the rights and liabilities of their respective owners have been held to depend on the laws of the respective flags of the ships. The law applicable in this country to cases of collision on the high seas is the maritime law as administered in England, and not the laws of the flags: (see The Johann Friederich, 1 W. Rob. 35; The Leon, 6 P. Div. 148; and Foote on Private International Law, pp. 398 and 403.) According to the maritime law, the defendants, as principals of the captain of the Atjeh, are clearly liable for the consequences of his negligence. If it be objected that the Dutch company, and not the defendants, are the owners of the Atjeh, and responsible for the acts of her captain, the objection is answered by the admission made by the defendants' counsel in this court, that the defendants represent the Dutch company for all the purposes of this action. Probably, even without this admission, the result would be the same, considering that the Dutch company were bare trustees for the defendants. But the admission gets rid of all difficulty with respect to ownership, such as had to be encountered in The General Steam Navigation Company v. Guillou (11 M. & W.877). Assuming, then, that the defendants are liable to the plaintiffs for the loss occasioned by the negligence of the master of the Atjeh, it is necessary to determine the amount of damages to which the plaintiffs are entitled. The action, viewed as an action of tort, appears to come distinctly within sect. 25, clause 9, of the Judicature Act 1873, and the rules of the Admiralty Court have to be ascertained and applied. It becomes unnecessary, therefore, to discuss the doctrine laid down in Thorogood v. Bryan (8 C. B. 115) and other cases of that [CT. OF APP. class, for the Admiralty Court has never adopted that doctrine: (see The Milan, 31 L. J. 105, Adm. and 1 Lush. 388, 403; 1 Mar. Law Cas. O. S. 185; 5 L. T. Rep. N. S. 590.) According to the rules of the Admiralty Court, if the two ships had belonged to different owners, then, as both ships were to blame, the plaintiffs would have been entitled to recover one-half of the amount of their loss from the owners of the Atjeh, and one half from the owners of the Kroon Prins. As both ships belong to the same owners, the above rule would render the defendants liable for both halves, i.e., for the whole of the loss, and this would be the proper result, were it not for the special stipulation contained in the bill of lading, which exonerates the defendants from the share of the loss attributable to the negligence of those in charge of the Kroon Prins. The contract in this case exonerates the defendants from half of the loss and leaves them liable for the other half, and the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment on this footing. Unless the parties can agree upon the sum for which judgment is to be entered, the amount must be ascertained by a reference to a master or a referee. The plaintiffs will be entitled to the costs of the action, but, the appeal having been to a great extent successful, each party should pay his own costs of the appeal. Judgment reversed in part. Solicitors for plaintiffs, Waltons, Bubb, and Walton. Solicitors for defendants, Lovell, Son, and Pitfield. Thursday, March 1, 1883. (Before BRETT, COTTON, and BowEN, L.JJ.) WOODLEY AND Co. v. MICHELL AND CO. (a) Bill of lading-Perils of the sea-Collision-Negligence. A collision between two ships caused by the negligence of either is not a peril of the seas within the meaning of those words in a bill of lading. The plaintiffs were the owners of a cargo of barley shipped at Caen on board the defendants' schooner Kate for delivery in London. The bill of lading was in the usual form, the only exception contained in it being the exception of "perils of the sea." The Kate, while sailing up the Thames, collided with a steamer, and was sunk, and the cargo lost. In an action to recover the value of the cargo the jury found that the collision was caused by the Kate starboarding her helm, but that there was no negligence on her part. There was no finding as to the steamer. Held, that the loss was not occasioned by a peril of the sea. THIS was an appeal by the plaintiffs from the judgment of Hawkins, J. at the trial of the action. The action was brought by the plaintiffs, who were indorsees for value of a bill of lading against the defendants, who were the owners of the schooner Kate, to recover the value of a cargo of barley shipped on board that vessel. The cargo was shipped at Caen in Normandy, on board the Kate, to be carried to London, under a bill of lading, which contained only one exception, that of "perils of the sea.' While the Kate was sailing (a) Reported by A. A. HOPKINS, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. CT. OF APP.] WOODLEY AND CO. v. MITCHELL AND CO. up the Thames she came into collision with the steamer Fyneoor, and was sunk and the cargo lost. The plaintiffs sued the defendants to recover the value of the cargo, alleging negligence on board the Kate. The defendants denied the negligence, and pleaded that the loss was occasioned by a "peril of the sea." At the trial before Hawkins, J. the jury found that the collision was in fact caused by the Kate starboarding her helm, but that there was no negligence on the part of those in charge of her. There was no finding as to the Fyneoor. Upon these findings Hawkins, J. entered judgment for the defendants. The Chartered Mercantile Bank of India v. The Netherlands India Steam Navigation Company, 52 L. J. 220, Q. B.; 5 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 65. "Peril of the sea" in a bill of lading has a different meaning to those words in a policy of insurance. The rule in the case of a policy of insurance is that the causa proxima of the loss is to be regarded; but the rule in the case of a bill of lading is that the causa causans is to be looked to. They cited Buller v. Fisher, 3 Esp. 67; Trent and Mersey Navigation v. Wood, 3 Esp. 127; Dudgeon v. Pembroke, L. Rep. 2 App. Cas. 284; 36 be Webster, Q.C. and Sutton for the respondents.A peril of the sea is such an accident as may expected to happen on the sea. [The COURT referred to Lloyd v. The General Iron Screw Colliery Company, 3 Hurl. & C. 284; 2 Mar. Law Cas. O. S. 32.] The passage from Parson's Maritime Law there quoted is altered in later editions (see ed. 1869, vol. 1, bk. 1, chap. 7, p. 259.) If the passage as altered is good law this case is clearly within it. [BRETT, L.J.— I doubt whether the passage quoted from the later edition of Parson's Maritime Law is correct.] BRETT, L.J.-I am of opinion that this appeal must be allowed. The jury have found that this collision between a sailing vessel and a steamer was caused by the sailing vessel starboarding her helm, but they have also found that, under the circumstances, this starboarding of the helm was not an act of negligence; and there has been no finding at all as to the steamer. The question is whether, on these findings, judgment ought to be entered for the plaintiffs, who are the owners of the cargo on board the sailing vessel, or for the defendants, who are the owners of the sailing vessel. It seems to me that, in such a case as this, it was only necessary for the plaintiffs to prove non-delivery of the cargo-the defendants could only answer that in one way, by showing that such non-delivery was caused by something .xcepted by the bill of lading. Now the bill of ading only excepts "perils of the sea," the defendants, therefore, had to bring this case within that exception. I am not prepared to retract anything I said in The Chartered Mercantile [CT. OF APP. Bank of India v. The Netherlands Steam Navigation Company (ubi sup.), but I am bound to say that I do not think that all I there said was so necessary for the decision of that case as to make it binding on us here. We need not now consider whether all that was said there was right or wrong. This much, however, I must say herethat although a collision which happens without any negligence on the part of either vessel is, or may be, a peril of the sea, yet a collision which happens in consequence of the negligence of those on board either of the vessels, so that without some negligence somewhere it would not have happened, is not a "peril of the sea" within the meaning of those words in an English bill of lading. On the findings of the jury in this case, I therefore think the defendants must fail, as the jury have only found that the collision happened without negligence on board one of the two vessels. But if we look at the findings by the light of the facts of the case, then I think it appears at once inevitable that the defendants must fail, because the moment it appears that the collision was between a sailing vessel and a steamer the court is bound to take notice of the rule that it is the duty of the sailing vessel to keep her course, and the duty of the steamer to keep out of the way. The defendants then, as it seems to me, are in this inevitable difficulty. The only way in which the finding of the jury can be dealt with is to assume that the Kate was put into a position of such extreme peril by the negligence of the steamer, that those in charge of her may be excused from obedience to the rule. Even if there was no negligence on board the Kate, there must have been some on board the steamer, and it is clear law that a collision which happens in consequence of negligence on either vessel cannot be said to be a "peril of the sea within the meaning of those words in a bill of lading. COTTON, L.J.-I am of the same opinion. The plaintiffs sue for non-delivery of the cargo; the defendants are clearly liable unless there is something in the bill of lading to excuse them from their liability. The defendants say that they are excused under the exception of perils of the sea. There is no decision binding on this court which lays down that a collision caused by the negligence of either vessel is a peril of the sea; and it appears to me that, where there is in fact no peril arising either from the waves or the wind, and an accident happens in consequence of a negligent act of someone that accident cannot properly be said to arise from a peril of the sea. Here the defendants are in this dilemma-that, in order to prove that there was no negligence on their own ship, they are obliged to assume negligence on board the steamer. I agree with Brett, L.J. that the finding of the jury can only be right on the supposition that the steamer was guilty of negligence. Therefore, it seems to me that whichever way we look at it, the defendants are liable, and that this appeal must be allowed. BOWEN, L.J.-The plaintiffs are entitled to succeed unless the defendants can show that the loss was occasioned by a peril of the sea. The jury have found that the loss was caused by the starboarding of the helm of the carrying vessel, the Kate; and they have added that there was no negligence on board the Kate. It is clear to my mind that on this finding alone the owners of the Kate are not entitled to judgment. But it does not stop there, because we have to consider whether, taking the findings of the jury in conjunction with the admited facts of the case, we are of opinion that the loss was caused by a peril of the sea. Now, the facts are that the Kate was going up the Thames under no sort of peril of wind or tide, and in no danger whatever, and the steamer was coming down. All that can be urged is that the Kate was driven to starbord her helm by the action of the steamer. Under these circumstances I think there is, at any rate, no evidence that the loss was occasioned by a peril of the sea; and, though I do not in the least dissent from what has been said by Brett, L.J., I think it suffi cient to say that in the present case the findings of the jury do not entitle the defendants to judg. ment. In an action for wages and wrongful dismissal brought by persons domiciled in England against a foreign ship, in which they had served under articles signed in a port of the country to which the ship belonged, in which action imprisonment, hardship, and ill-treatment were alleged, the Court refused to interfere with the discretion of the judge below in declining to exercise jurisdic tion against the protest of the consul, which alleged that, by the law of the country to which the ship belonged, all disputes relating to the ship, or claims against the owner or master, were to be referred to and decided by the tribunals or consuls of that country. THIS was an appeal by the plaintiffs from a decision of Sir Robert Phillimore, given on the 7th Nov. 1882, by which he had declined to exercise jurisdiction in a wages action brought by seamen against a foreign ship. The action was brought by three English engineers against the Spanish steamer Leon XIII. to recover wages and damages for wrongful dismissal. After the statement of claim had been delivered, the Spanish Consul at Liverpool made a protest against the jurisdiction of the English court, and on motion by the owners of the Leon XIII., the court refused to exercise jurisdiction. The facts of the case are fully reported in the court below: (47 L. T. Rep. N. S. 659; 5 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 25; 8 P. Div. 121.) J. P. Aspinall and French for the appellants. R. T. Reid, Q. C. and W. G. F. Phillimore, for the respondents, were not called upon. The argument was substantially the same as (a) Reported by J. P. ASPINALL and F. W. RAIKES, Esqrs. Barristers-at-Law, [CT. OF APP. that used in the court below. The cases cited were The Nina, 17 L. T. Rep. N. S. 391, 585; 3 Mar. Law The St. Oloff, 2 Pet. Adm. 428 (Amer.); April 25.-BRETT, M.R.-In this case an action has been brought against a Spanish ship in the Admiralty Court by certain engineers who had served on board the defendants' ship. The action was brought to recover wages due, compensation for wrongful dismissal, and perhaps to recover damages for alleged false imprisonment. I say "perhaps " because it must be noticed that in the statement of claim there is no prayer for damages for false imprisonment, unless it be considered as included in the prayer for general relief. The suit then having been instituted in the Admiralty Court, a protest was presented by the Spanish consul at Liverpool, in which it is asserted that the dispute ought to be tried, not in the Admiralty Court, but by the Spanish consul, and though there is some alleged difficulty as to what consul is meant in the protest, it seems to me clear that it means the Spanish consul at Liverpool, that is to say, at the place where the ship was seized and the dispute arose. The consul's protest was supported by his affidavit, and both protest and affidavit allege these grounds why the case should not be tried in the Admiralty Court: that although the plaintiffs are British sailors, yet they entered into a contract with the master of a Spanish ship, and that it was made in a Spanish port. I think this latter fact is immaterial. Although the plaintiffs are Englishmen, they have entered into a contract to serve on board a Spanish ship, and nowhere else. The consul also alleges facts which are evidence to show that the contract is a Spanish contract in the Spanish language, and in the form of Spanish articles, all being strong, indeed, I may say conclusive, evidence to show that the contract of service was a Spanish contract of service. The consul goes on to state that a Spanish seaman serving under such articles is liable in case of a dispute between him and the shipowner to have it settled by Spanish law, and by Spanish law the plaintiffs can only have the case settled before a Spanish court or a Spanish consul abroad, meaning thereby, as I have said, the consul at the place where the dispute arises. To this protest and affidavit no answer by affidavit has been made, that is, no sworn answer, that the Spanish consul's statement of the Spanish law is an erroneous exposition of that law. Under these circumstances, and with that evidence before him, the learned judge of the Admiralty Court held, in obedience to the decisions of Dr. Lushington and the Privy Council, that he had, notwithstanding the protest, jurisdiction to try the action, but that he had a discretion to exercise in respect of it, namely to decide whether he should try it himself or leave the parties to go before the Spanish consul; in other words, to refer the matter to be tried by the consul. Then this is an appeal against that decision, on the ground that the learned judge erroneously exercised his discretion. The learned judge, in giving his CT. OF APP.] COVERDALE, TODD, AND Co. v. GRANT AND Co. judgment states that he gives his decision first of all on the ground that a man "must be considered pro hac vice to be subject of that country to which the vessel belongs." That is his first and then he says ground; 66 upon the whole, without entering into the cases which are fully considered, and the principles of law applicable to them in the case of The Nina (ubi sup.), I am of opinion that no difference is established between that case and the present, and I must dismiss this suit," meaning that he could see no difference between this case and the principles of law acted on in former cases. These principles are distinctly stated in The Nina (ubi sup.), and The Golubchick (ubi sup.), and it is clear that the court, even though there is express provision in the articles that the seamen bind themselves to go before the tribunals of the country to which the ship belongs, is not ousted of its jurisdiction. But it is equally clear that though the Admiralty Court has the jurisdiction, yet in each particular case it will exercise its discretion and consider if it will entertain the action or not. It seems to me that The Nina lays down this ground to guide the judicial discretion, that if all the foreign consul does is to protest without giving reasons, then the Court of Admiralty in its discretion will proceed with the action. But if he does give reasons, then the Court of Admiralty will inquire into the reasons, and allow them to be contradicted. Then when it has entered into the facts it will proceed to exercise its discretion in each particular case. In The Nina the circumstances were that certain English sailors entered into articles on a Portuguese ship, and I will assume that under those articles they undertook to abide by the decision of a Portuguese tribunal. But there it is to be noticed that there was no negative stipulation that they would not apply to an English court for redress. There was there an affidavit of the consul supporting the protest that by Portuguese law these sailors could only proceed before a Portuguese tribunal. Then the Court of Admiralty held that, though not bound to give up its jurisdiction, yet under the circumstances of such a protest it would decline to go further with the matter, and released the ship. The court held that the fact of the sailors being British seamen would not cause them to entertain the action, if, being British seamen, they had bound themselves by a foreign contract to serve on board a foreign ship. That entirely supports the proposition laid down by the learned judge here, that when seaman enter into the service of a Spanish ship, with Spanish papers and a Spanish flag, they are to be taken to be, pro hâc vice, Spanish subjects. Therefore the case is to be decided as if these men were Spanish sailors serving on board a Spanish ship, and under Spanish articles; and the consul says that being such they can only complain to a Spanish court or consul, and he therefore submits that the court should not exercise jurisdiction. In The Nina the court acted in accordance with the consul's wish; so here, when the learned judge says, "I abide by The Nina," he means to say, and does in effect say, although not literally, that, applying the principles in The Nina, these engineers are to be conconsidered as Spanish sailors; and that in the face of the protest, which he thinks a fair and proper one, the court will not exercise its jurisdiction. It is then said that the learned judge has exercised [CT. OF APP. his discretion wrongly. What then is the rule as regards this point in the Court of Appeal ? The appellant must show that the judge has exercised his discretion on wrong principles, or that he has acted so differently from what is the view of the Court of Appeal that they are justified in saying he has exercised it wrongly. I cannot see that any wrong principle has been acted on by the learned judge, or anything done in the exercise of his discretion so unjust or unfair as to entitle us to overrule his discretion. He acted expressly in accordance with The Nina, and I think the judgment is correct. Then it is suggested that the materials before the learned judge were erroneous, and that the consul's statement of Spanish law was incorrect. Perhaps if this had been distinctly proved before us now, it may be that we might have altered the decision of the learned judge, but as the matter stands we have no materials before us to show that the consul's statement of the Spanish law is erroneous; and, although a long period of time has elapsed since the hearing of this case in the court below, nothing in the nature of evidence has been brought before us to support the assertion of the appellants' counsel, and we are not bound to take their statement as to the contents of the Spanish code. There is no suggestion that an affidavit can be obtained, and it is said there is no Spanish expert in London or any of the large English seaports. We cannot act on these suggestions; there is really no good ground advanced why we should have different materials before us. are in fact powerless to overrule the learned judge, so that these men must go before the Spanish consul at Liverpool, and the appeal must be dismissed with costs. BOWEN, L.J. Concurred. We Judgment dismissed. Solicitors for the appellants, Pritchard and Sons, agents for Yates, Son, and Stannanought, Liverpool. Solicitors for the respondent, Gregory and Co., agents for Hill, Dickinson, and Lightbound, Liverpool. Tuesday, May 29, 1883. (Before BRETT, M.R., LINDLEY and FRY, L.JJ.) COVERDALE, TODD, and Co, v. Grant and Co. (a) Charter-party-Exception-Frost preventing loading-Demurrage. It was agreed by charter-party that the plaintiffs' ship should proceed to Cardiff East Bute Dock, and there load in the customary manner a cargo of iron. The charter-party contained the following clauses: "Cargo to be supplied as fast as steamer can receive. Time to commence from the vessel being ready to load, and ten days on demurrage at 401. per day. Except in case of hands striking work, or frost, or floods, or any other unavoidable accident preventing the loading and unloading, in which case owners to have the option of employing the steamer in some short voyage trade until receipt of written notice from charterers that they are ready to resume employ ment without delay to the ship." The ship arrived in the East Bute Dock, and loading was commenced, but was interrupted by (a) Reported by A. A. HOPKINS, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. reason of a severe frost, which prevented the lighters containing the iron coming through the canal into the dock, the docks themselves being free from ice. Held, in an action to recover demurrage, that the defendants were not protected by the exception in the charter-party as to detention by frost. The decision of Pollock, B. reversed. THIS was an appeal from a judgment of Pollock, B. The action was brought to recover demurrage and damages for the detention of the plaintiffs' steamship Mennythorpe. The facts are fully stated in the report in the court below (46 L. T. Rep. N.S. 632; 4 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 528.) The Solicitor-General (Brynmor Jones with him), for the plaintiffs, referred to Kay v. Field (47 L. T. Rep. N. S. 423; 4 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 588). That case and the present one were decided by Pollock B. on the same grounds at the same time. His judgment in Kay v. Field was reversed by this court. This case is not distinguishable. [He was stopped.] Bowen Rowlands, Q.C. and Moulton for the defeudants, BRETT, M.R.—I am of opinion that there is no distinction between this case and that of Kay v. Field, and therefore the judgment appealed from must be reversed. LINDLEY, and FRY, L.JJ. concurred. Appeal affirmed. Solicitors for the plaintiffs, Shum, Crossman, and Co., for Turnbull and Tilley, West Hartlepool. Solicitors for the defendants, Clarke, Rawlings, and Clarke. June 6, 13, 1882, March 2 and 3, 1883. (Before BRETT, COTTON, and BOWEN, L.JJ.) THE FANNY; THE MATHILDA. (a) APPEAL FROM THE PROBATE, DIVORCE, AND ADMIRALTY DIVISION (ADMIRALTY). Charter-party- Shipbroker - Master - Agent Ratification-Foreign port. G., a shipbroker at G. G. chartered the Finnish vessels F. and M. prior to their arrival at G. G., and without communication with the owners. G. had on several previous occasions chartered the F. and M. under similar circumstances, and all of these charter-parties had been carried into effect. After the arrival of the F. and M. at G.G. their masters were on several occasions at G.'s office, and were shown their charter-parties. A fortnight after the vessels' arrival at G.G., during which time freights had risen, the masters refused to take up the charter-parties. Held, that the masters by their conduct had not ratified the charter parties in such a way as to make them binding. A master has no authority to bind his owners by writing forward to a broker in a foreign port, prior to the ship's arrival therein, authorising the broker to charter his ship. The authority of a master to bind his owners by charter party arises when he is in a foreign port, and hie owners are not there, and there is difficulty in communicating with them. (a) Reported by J. P. ASPINALL, and F. W. RAIKES, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law. [CT. OF APP. A master is not the agent for his owners to hold out a person as authorised to charter his ship, so as to bind the owners. THIS was an appeal from the judgment of Sir Robert Phillimore, given on the 13th June 1882, by which he, reversing the decision of the judge of the Grimsby County Court, held that the owners of the Finnish ships, Fanny and Mathilda, were liable for non-performance of two charterparties signed by a Grimsby shipbroker, named Grauberg, under the circumstances hereinafter stated. Ebenhard Grauberg, a native of Finland, carrying on business at Grimsby as a shipbroker for a period of fifteen years, had during that time acted as agent for Finnish ships, he being the only person in Great Grimsby who could speak the Finnish language. Since 1876 he, without any communication with the owners of the ships Fanny and the Mathilda, had, by authority from the masters, made two charter-parties for outward cargoes for the Fanny and nine for the Mathilda, all of which had been accepted by the masters of the respective vessels and duly carried out. These charter-parties had been entered into by Grauberg prior to the arrival of the vessels in Grimsby, and were signed by him "as agent." The following were undisputed facts in the case with respect to the two charter-parties now in question: The charter-party relating to the Fanny was made on Sept. 15, 1881 by Grauberg, and purported to be made between the Master of the Fanny and E. Bannister and Co. (the plaintiff firm), in respect of the carriage of coals to Cronstadt. On Sept. 16, 1881 a similar charterparty relating to the Mathilda was entered into by Grauberg, and Bannister and Co. Both these charter-parties were signed by Bannister, and by Grauberg "as agent.' Sept. 24, 1881 the two vessels arrived in the port of Great Grimsby, when they were boarded by Frost, Grauberg's clerk, and there was some conversation between him and the respective masters as to the chartering of their vessels. Sept. 26, the masters were at Grauberg's office, and were subsequently there on other occasions. Oct. 4, Grauberg dined with the masters on board the Mathilda. Oct. 5, Grauberg received the following letter from the master of the Fanny: Grimsby, Oct. 5, 1881.-Herr Ed. Grauberg.-I do not accept your freight or your charter-party for 71. 108., as I can obtain better freight. I have tried to see you several times, but could not find you. (Signed) A. Yrjola, Oct. 6, Bannister wrote to the master of the Fanny to take cargo on board, in answer to which. the master wrote saying that he had not fixed his ship with Bannister; and Oct. 8, the master of the Mathilda in answer to a similar letter from Bannister, dated Oct. 7, wrote to the same effect. The masters were both Finns, and the charter. parties were drawn up in English. The evidence on behalf of the plaintiff was that Frost, on boarding the vessels, had informed the masters of the charter-parties, at which they had expressed satisfaction; that on Sept. 26, the masters at Grauberg's office had expressed them. selves satisfied with the charter-parties; that on Sept. 29, the masters were shown the charterparties, and after reading them the master of the Fanny took his away with him, and the master of the Mathilda returned his to Grauberg. |