Who Gets What--and why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2015 - 260 sivua
A Nobel laureate reveals the often surprising rules that govern a vast array of activities -- both mundane and life-changing -- in which money may play little or no role.
If you've ever sought a job or hired someone, applied to college or guided your child into a good kindergarten, asked someone out on a date or been asked out, you've participated in a kind of market. Most of the study of economics deals with commodity markets, where the price of a good connects sellers and buyers. But what about other kinds of "goods," like a spot in the Yale freshman class or a position at Google? This is the territory of matching markets, where "sellers" and "buyers" must choose each other, and price isn't the only factor determining who gets what.
Alvin E. Roth is one of the world's leading experts on matching markets. He has even designed several of them, including the exchange that places medical students in residencies and the system that increases the number of kidney transplants by better matching donors to patients. In Who Gets What -- And Why, Roth reveals the matching markets hidden around us and shows how to recognize a good match and make smarter, more confident decisions.
Mitä ihmiset sanovat - Kirjoita arvostelu
WHO GETS WHAT--AND WHY: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market DesignKäyttäjän arvio - Kirkus
The co-recipient of the 2012 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences introduces what he calls the new economics of matchmaking and market design. Roth (Economics/Stanford Univ.; co-author: The ... Lue koko arvostelu
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Who Gets What — and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design
Alvin E. Roth
Rajoitettu esikatselu - 2015
Who Gets What -- And Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design
Alvin E. Roth
Esikatselu ei käytettävissä - 2016
Who Gets What - And Why: The Hidden World of Matchmaking and Market Design
Esikatselu ei käytettävissä - 2015
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