that setting bodily force aside, woman is designed by nature to be not only the companion, but the peer of man, the participator of his sublimest speculations, his noblest virtues, his patriotism, his valour; and that in those countries where she holds an inferior position, it is the laws and iniquitous institutions that confine her to it.

Socrates had, indeed, very particular reasons to be grateful to women. It was from two of them, Diotima and Aspasia, that he derived, according to his own account, his philosophy, and that matchless style of domestic eloquence, which bore down before it all opposition. The speech of Diotima on love is introduced into the "Banquet." Its tone and character are little in accordance with the idea vulgarly entertained on the education and accomplishments of Hellenic women; but Plato was too exquisite a judge of propriety, too much alive to what was due to himself and to his own reputation, too sensible of how injudicious it would be to outrage probability, to have introduced that speech, or that other of Aspasia in the "Menexenos," had there been the least possible absurdity in attributing such eloquence, or so much profound philosophy, to individuals of that sex.

But however these points may be disposed of, it will be hard to prove that there has ever existed a political community in which women have exercised a greater or more beneficial influence than in the polity of Plato. In all republics, indeed, as Lady Montague acutely remarks, women have their full share, if not something more, in the manage

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ment of public business; and as their education too commonly unfits them for comprehending the nature of that business, their interference is, for the most part, productive of very mischievous results.

To wave this disquisition, let me advert briefly to the form of the commonwealth, which in many of its regulations, is exactly conformable to nature. Having divided the mental powers of man into reason, irritability, and desire, he makes a corresponding division of the population of his state into three classes-the magistrates, the military, and the populace; the first governed by calm wisdom, the second by the angry passions, under the guidance of reason, the third by the feelings of the moment, whatever they may be. He could not conceive the possibility of communicating the lessons of philosophy to the multitude; nor could any other man, until those lessons were embodied by Christianity in a brief moral code, comprehensible to all men, whose injunctions and prohibitions come sanctioned, moreover, by the authority of the Almighty. The condition of the common people, therefore, has been altered by Christianity. From a gross and sensual throng, they may, where the other classes do their duty, be converted into masses manageable by reason, open to the influences of religion, inspired with the enlightened love of country; and although in themselves incapable, as a body, of exercising the functions of government, by no means precluded from furnishing from among their own ranks, both wise legislators and able commanders.

Plato's magistrates were to be chosen from the military caste, upon principles which could not fail to give satisfaction to the most democratic of mankind. Virtue and wisdom were their sole titlee to nobility and rule. They were to be chosen to govern, because nature, by bestowing on them the capacity, had evidently designed them for it; not because their acres were numerous, or their purses well filled. Education, too, was to concur in enlarging, strengthening, and polishing their minds; and philosophy and religion, those two most consummate teachers of happiness, were through life to be their counsellors, supporters, and guides. A state so governed would be under the immediate direction and control of nature. Virtue, which is but the health of the soul, would become the general habit of the community; contention and violence would be unknown; misery would cease; and the Golden Age, feigned by the poets, would be called into a real existence upon earth.

Every one has heard it was the opinion of Plato, that nations would never be well governed or happy, until kings should be philosophers, or philosophers kings. Experience has taught mankind a different lesson. Philosophers are now employed in discovering how, in order to be happy, mankind may deliver themselves from their kings, which, after so many ages of useless toil and experiment, is the only hope they have left. However, it is in the "Republic" that he expresses that opinion; and the reader who is at the pains to examine, that while making use of the term king,

Plato by no means intended what we understand by it, but something extremely different-as different, in fact, as virtue is from vice. His notions of a philosopher, too, differed very materially from those which prevail in our day. He did not understand by it a man who stands all day at the tail of a pair of bellows in a laboratory, with sooty face and hands begrimed with charcoal, watching the results of a chemical experiment. Such a person he would have considered a highly useful servant of philosophy, but would have found for him a name altogether different from that of philosopher. Nor did he intend by the term a botanist, a natural historian, or an astronomer. Even the logician, who reasons subtly, and the sophist, who understands something of everything, and on any given question can discourse a full hour by Shrewsbury clock, would by no means have come up to Plato's conception of a philosopher. He bestowed the name on those, and those only, who have arrived by meditation at the knowledge of eternal truth; who, smitten by the beauty of virtue, not only love and admire it, but pursue it with all their soul and with all their strength, who nourish it, who exercise it, who put their whole trust in it; and who, in proportion to the loftiness and perfection of their theoretical wisdom, are versed likewise in practice and experience, and in all the arts which lead to private virtue and public felicity."

Mor

9 Conf. Stallbaum De Argument. et Consil, &c. i. 36. genstern, p. 202-212. De Geer. Diatr. de Polit. Plat. Princip. p. 164-175. with Books vi. and vii. of the Republic, passim.

It has been observed above, that Plato divides the powers of the mind into three, and that in his ideal state were three classes of men corresponding to that division of the mental faculties. Follow

ing out the idea that a commonwealth is but a compound entity, bearing a strict analogy to an individual man, he considers the excellence of a perfect polity to be of the same nature with that of a good citizen. For the perfection of a state consists in the prevalence of four forms of virtue :-wisdom, the distinguishing quality of those rulers and magistrates, who consult and deliberate on whatever concerns the happiness and prosperity of the people; fortitude, which must exist in the military caste, who, under the direction of the magistrates, protect the rights and interests of the community; temperance, which constrains the multitude to yield obedience to their rulers, and live in peace and harmony with each other; and, lastly, justice, which prevails when the citizens not only are united by a kind of brotherly love, but cheerfully perform each class their several duties, whereby all the minor virtues, both public and private, are strengthened and preserved.10

Having explained and described the several excellencies of a state, which, as I have observed, are in his view identical with those of the individual, he proceeds to develope the corruptions and perversions of government, which likewise correspond exactly with various modifications of human de

10 De Repub. iv. 427 e.-435 a.