normal action.185 Paranoia is a typical form of monomania, but not the only manifestation of it. An insane delusion is a fixed belief in the mind of the patient of the existence of a fact which has no objective existence, but is purely the figment of his imagination, and which is so extravagant that no sane person would believe it under the circumstances of the case, the belief, nevertheless, being so unchangeable that the patient is incapable of being permanently disabused by argument or proof. The characteristic which distinguishes an insane delusion from other mistaken beliefs or opinions is that it is not a product of the reason but of the imagination, that is, not a mistake of fact induced by deception, fraud, insufficient evidence, or erroneous reasoning, but the spontaneous conception of a perverted imagination, having no basis whatever in reason or evidence.186

The rule of law in regard to deeds, contracts, and other business dealings of persons thus afflicted is that monomania with reference to subjects not connected with the transaction in question, and not causing, inducing, or influencing it, will not be sufficient to invalidate it.137 An act sought to be invalidated by reason of the doer's insanity must be the direct offspring and result thereof, and the fact that one is subject to an insane delusion does not alone

185 Black's Law Dictionary (2d edn.) title "Insanity," and numerous cases there cited. As to hypochondria and a morbid state of mind with reference to disease and the apprehension of death, see Beville v. Jones, 74 Tex. 148, 11 S. W. 1128.

Burgess v. Pollock, 53
Lewis v. Arbuckle, 85

136 See Lang v. Lang, 157 Iowa, 300, 135 N. W. 604, and numerous other cases cited in Black's Law Dictionary (2d edn.) title "Insanity." The fact that one is a believer in "spiritualism" and makes many apparently unreasonable statements, is not evidence of insanity. Curtis v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Idaho, 629, 75 Pac. 760. 137 McNett v. Cooper (C. C.) 13 Fed. 586; Iowa, 273, 5 N. W. 179, 36 Am. Rep. 218; Iowa, 335, 52 N. W. 237, 16 L. R. A. 677; Staples v. Wellington, 58 Me. 453; Hovey v. Hobson, 55 Me. 256; Emery v. Hoyt, 46 Ill. 258; Turner v. Rusk, 53 Md. 65; Meigs v. Dexter, 172 Mass. 217, 52 N. E. 75; State v. Grand Lodge, 78 Mo. App. 546; Dennett v. Dennett, 44 N. H. 531, 84 Am. Dec. 97; Lozear v. Shields, 23 N. J. Eq. 509; Jones v. Hughes, 15 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 141; Ekin v. McCracken, 32 Leg. Int. (Pa.) 405; Boyce's Adm'r v. Smith, 9 Grat. (Va.) 704, 60 Am. Dec. 313.

render him incompetent to make a deed or contract, unless it appears that such delusion extended to the very subject out of which the contract or conveyance grew or was the moving cause of it.138 It should be remembered that the test of mental competence is the ability to understand and intelligently assent to, not business matters in general, but the particular transaction in question, and hence a contract should not be set aside because of insane delusions in the mind of a contracting party, unless he was influenced thereby to such an extent that he had no reasonable understanding of the nature and effect of that contract.139 And one claiming to avoid a contract by reason of a temporary hallucination resulting from disease, which existed prior to the making of the contract, must show its continued existence when the contract was made, and that it was of a character affecting his capacity to make the contract.140

But on the other hand, one who is controlled by an insane delusion upon a particular subject is, as to that subject, a person of unsound mind, although his reason as to other subjects may be unimpaired.141 Here, then, we have the case of one who may be perfectly capable of understanding the nature and consequences of his acts, and may even exhibit considerable sagacity and shrewdness, and yet may be impelled by his particular delusion to do some act affecting his rights or property which otherwise he would not have planned or even considered. Acts so prompted should clearly be treated as the acts of a madman or lunatic. Thus, where the maker of a note was under the insane delusion (very common in cases of paranoia) that he was being persecuted, pursued, and threatened, and that if he did not give the note in question he would be killed or imprisoned, it was held that the note was void.142 In another case, a person, acting under an insane delusion that a conspiracy existed between his wife and children to injure

138 Reese v. Shutte, 133 Iowa, 681, 108 N. W. 525. 139 Mathews v. Nash, 151 Iowa, 125, 130 N. W. 796.

140 Staples v. Wellington, 58 Me. 453.

141 Riggs V. American Tract Soc., 95 N. Y. 503; Lemon v. Jenk. ins, 48 Ga. 313; Cook v. Parker, 4 Phila. (Pa.) 265.

142 Ellars v. Mossbarger, 9 Ill. App. 122.

him, because of which he desired to prevent them from inheriting his estate, gave to defendant a large part of his property, under an arrangement suggested by defendant's agent, whereby defendant was to pay interest on the value of the property during the life of the donor, and it was held that the gift was void and that the property could be recovered by an action.143 And again, where a person holding policies of life insurance, though having the mental capacity to know the nature and effect of his contracts, labored under an insane delusion that his children were about to murder him in order to collect the insurance, and was induced by this delusion to surrender his policies in consideration of the payment of their surrender value, it was held that such surrender was voidable after his death at the instance of his personal representatives.144 In this case it was said: "We see no reason why a diseased condition of the mind which impels a person to make a contract he otherwise would not make should not be held to operate as effectually to avoid the contract as would a diseased condition of the mind which prevents such person from understanding the nature and effect of such contract. If the purpose of the law is to protect persons so far deprived by disease of their normal mental faculties as to be unable to protect themselves, that purpose would fail of accomplishment if relief were refused to one who understood, in the ordinary sense of the word, the nature and effect of a contract, yet was impelled by an insane delusion to enter into it, when but for the delusion he would not do so."

§ 267. Old Age and Senile Dementia.-Old age and physical infirmity, separately or combined, do not constitute mental incompetency and are not inconsistent with legal sanity.145 Want of mental capacity to make a valid contract or conveyance will not be presumed merely because of

143 Riggs v. American Tract Soc., 95 N. Y. 503. See Sedgwick v. Jack, 111 Iowa, 745, 82 N. W. 1027.

144 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hagler (Tex. Civ. App.) 169 S. W. 1064.

145 Taylor v. Moore, 112 Ky. 330, 65 S. W. 612; Whitlock v. Dixon, 150 N. C. 616, 64 S. E. 504; Lee v. Lee, 258 Mo. 599, 167 S. W. 1030.

advanced age, though accompanied by disease or bodily infirmity or feebleness.146 The law prescribes no age limit beyond which one is incapacitated from executing a binding contract or a legally effective deed,147 and even the fact that a grantor is nearly a centenarian does not conclusively show him to be mentally incompetent.148 As a general rule, therefore, neither old age, sickness, nor distress in mind or body will incapacitate a person who has possession of his mental faculties and is able to understand the transaction in which he is engaged from disposing of his property or binding himself by a contract.149 But further than this, though the mind of a person may be to some extent impaired by age or disease, or both, still if he has the capacity to comprehend and act rationally in the transactions in which he is engaged,-if he can understand the nature of his business, and the effect of what he is doing, and can exercise his will with reference to it,-his acts will be valid, and his deeds and contracts should not be set aside unless it also appears that there was fraud, duress, or undue influence.150 Mere impairment of memory by reason of advanced years does not of itself indicate a want of capacity to execute a deed, but it must appear that the grantor did

146 Chadd v. Moser, 25 Utah, 369, 71 Pac. 870.

147 Howard v. Howard, 112 Va. 566, 72 S. E. 133.

148 Broaddus v. James, 13 Cal. App. 464, 110 Pac. 158.

149 Crow v. Childress (Tex. Civ. App.) 169 S. W. 927; Jennings v. Hennessy, 26 Misc. Rep. 265, 55 N. Y. Supp. 833; Doherty v. Noble, 138 Mo. 25, 39 S. W. 458.

150 Rogers v. Cunningham (Ark.) 178 S. W. 413; Jones v. Bolling, 101 Ark. 611, 141 S. W. 1168; Bretthauer v. Foley, 15 Cal. App. 19, 113 Pac. 356; Martin v. Harsh, 231 Ill. 384, 83 N. E. 164, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1000; Lindsey v. Lindsey, 50 Ill. 79, 99 Am. Dec. 489; Stone v. Wilbern, 83 Ill. 105; Burt v. Quisenberry, 132 Ill. 385, 24 N. E. 622; Kelly v. Nusbaum, 244 Ill. 158, 91 N. E. 72; Shea v. Murphy, 164 Ill. 614, 45 N. E. 1021, 56 Am. St. Rep. 215; McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 241 Ill. 366, 89 N. E. 645; Johnson v. Watson, 169 Ill. App. 218; Sargent v. Roberts, 265 Ill. 210, 106 N. E. 805; Slaughter v. McManigal, 138 Iowa, 643, 116 N. W. 726; Nichols v. King, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 124, 68 S. W. 133, 1114; Jones v. Evans, 7 Dana (Ky.) 96; Paine v. Aldrich, 60 Hun, 578, 14 N. Y. Supp. 538; Hodges v. Wilson, 165 N. C. 323, 81 S. E. 340; Nace v. Boyer, 30 Pa. 99; Ellis v. Mathews, 19 Tex. 390, 70 Am. Dec. 353; Stringfellow v. Hanson, 25 Utah, 480, 71 Pac. 1052; Greer v. Greer, 9 Grat. (Va.) 330; Ford v. Jones, 22 Wash. 111, 60 Pac. 48; Jarrett v. Jarrett, 11 W. Va. 584; Buckey v. Buckey, 38 W. Va. 168, 18 S. E. 383.

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152

not have sufficient mind and memory to comprehend the nature and character of the transaction in which he was engaged.151 Thus, for example, a deed executed by a woman eighty-seven years old, pursuant to a fixed intention, and in accordance with the wishes of her late husband, from whom she had received the property, to her niece, who had long cared for her, was held valid, where she was fully advised by attorneys, although the evidence showed some impairment of her mental faculties.15 So, in a case in Illinois, it was held that a grantor was competent to make a deed, although it appeared that he was too old and infirm to attend actively to business, being confined to his house and grounds, and frequently sick in bed, and that he was often unable to attend to his own physical wants, and was childish and fretful.153 And in another case, a grantor's conveyance of land to his sons, in accordance with a purpose which he had often previously expressed, and with which he afterwards expressed satisfaction, was held valid, though made shortly after he was stricken with paralysis, and while he was very feeble and infirm from old age, but intellectually unaffected.154

But while a court of chancery will not presume that extreme old age alone is sufficient to establish a want of mental capacity such as to disable one from conducting his business affairs, yet it will always scrutinize with vigilance the character of transactions resulting in voluntary donations or grants to those who are likely, from their surroundings, to have exercised an influence over the aged and infirm, and will require proof showing the utmost good faith on the part of the grantee.155 And while, as above stated, the utmost vigor of mind and clearness of intellect are not to be expected in the aged, and their absence is not necessarily inconsistent with the possession of sufficient mental capaci

151 Sears v. Vaughan, 230 Ill. 572, 82 N. E. 881; Riordan v. Murray, 249 Ill. 517, 94 N. E. 947.

152 Tate v. Holmes, 76 Fed. 664, 22 C. C. A. 466.

153 Argo v. Coffin, 142 Ill. 368, 32 N. E. 679, 34 Am. St. Rep. 86. 154 McKissock v. Groom, 148 Mo. 459, 50 S. W. 115.

155 Sullivan v. Hodgkin, 11 Ky. Law Rep. 642, 12 S. W. 773; Hayes v. Kerr, 19 App. Div. 91, 45 N. Y. Supp. 1050; Davis v. Chaney, 5 Ky. Law Rep. 689.