believes his representation to that effect, and if the infant accepts the benefits of the contract, he will then be estopped from claiming the exemption of minority when the contract is sought to be enforced against him.171 And in at least one state, it is provided by statute that a minor cannot disaffirm a contract where "the other party had good reason to believe the minor capable of contracting." This, however, is only available to a person who, when making the contract, was ignorant of the fact that the other contracting party was a minor.172 The view has also been expressed that a minor who has procured another to enter into a business transaction with him by means of a false representation as to his age, can have the contract avoided, but only on restoring all that he has received under it,173 and that such a false representation may lay the basis for an action on the case for deceit.174 But where an infant makes no misrepresentation as to his age, is not questioned on the point, and does not volunteer any information, the mere fact that the person with whom he deals does not know that he is a minor, or even has reason to believe from his appearance that he is of full age, does not render the contract valid or estop the minor from disaffirming it.175 And for even stronger reasons, where the agent of a person, in selling goods to a minor, induces him to state his age in the written contract as twenty-one, the infant will not

171 Grauman, Marx & Cline Co. v. Krienitz, 142 Wis. 556, 126 N. W. 50; Commander v. Brazil, 88 Miss. 668, 41 South. 497, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1117; Lake v. Perry, 95 Miss. 550, 49 South. 569; Ackerman v. Hawkins, 45 Ind. App. 483, 88 N. E. 616; Pace v. Cawood, 33 Ky. Law Rep. 592, 110 S. W. 414; County Board of Education v. Hensley, 147 Ky. 441, 144 S. W. 63, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 643.

172 Code Iowa, § 3190; Beller v. Marchant, 30 Iowa, 350; First Nat. Bank v. Casey, 158 Iowa, 349, 138 N. W. 897. And see Gen. St. Kan. 1909, § 5062; Szwed v. Morris & Co., 187 Mo. App. 510, 174 S. W. 146.

178 International Land Co. v. Marshall, 22 Okl. 693, 98 Pac. 951, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1056; Ackerman v. Hawkins, 45 Ind. App. 483, 88 N. E. 616.

174 New York Building, Loan & Banking Co. v. Fisher, 23 App. Div. 363, 48 N. Y. Supp. 152.

175 Frank Spangler Co. v. Haupt, 53 Pa. Super. Ct. 545; Grauman, Marx & Cline Co. v. Krienitz, 142 Wis. 556, 126 N. W. 50.

thereby be estopped from relying on his infancy as a defense to an action on the contract.176

§ 303. Ratification.-The contracts of an infant being for the most part voidable only, and not void, he may ratify and confirm them if he elects to do so.177 But this cannot be done until he has attained his majority, for an attempted ratification of an infant's contract, made while the infancy still continues, would be voidable for precisely the same reason which invalidates the original contract.178 It has been a debated question whether it is necessary to a valid ratification that the party should have knowledge of his legal right to disaffirm the contract or promise, but the weight of authority inclines to the position that a ratification otherwise sufficient and effective is not rendered nugatory by the fact that the party may not have been aware that he had the privilege of repudiating the engagement.179 The ratification, however, must be entirely voluntary, and it is not good if made under duress or threats, or extorted by false representations that the person will otherwise be sent to jail.180 But it is not necessary that there should be any new consideration for the affirmance of the original promise,181 and the ratification relates back and renders the original contract binding from the time it was made, so that

176 International Text-Book Co. v. Doran, SO Conn. 307, 68 Atl. 255.

177 Holmes v. Rice, 45 Mich. 142, 7 N. W. 772; Wall v. Mines, 130 Cal. 27, 62 Pac. 386; Winchester v. Thayer, 129 Mass. 129; Jones v. Jones, 141 Ga. 727, 82 S. E. 451.

178 Ex parte McFerren, 184 Ala. 223, 63 South. 159, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 543, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 672; In re Farley, 213 N. Y. 15, 106 N. E. 756.

179 Bestor v. Hickey, 71 Conn. 181, 41 Atl. 555; Anderson v. Soward, 40 Ohio St. 325, 48 Am. Rep. 687; Clark v. Van Court, 100 Ind. 113, 50 Am. Rep. 774; Ring v. Jamison, 66 Mo. 424; Taft v. Sergeant, 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 320; Morse v. Wheeler, 4 Allen (Mass.) 570. But compare Coe v. Moon, 260 Ill. 76, 102 N. E. 1074; Norris v. Vance, 3 Rich. (S. C.) 164.

180 Ford v. Phillips, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 202; Healy v. Kellogg (Sup.) 145 N. Y. Supp. 943. But an adult's promise to pay a debt contracted during infancy, made in response to a threat of suit unless payment is made, is not under duress. Bestor v. Hickey, 71 Conn. 181, 41 Atl. 555.

181 Bell v. Burkhalter, 176 Ala. 62, 57 South. 460.

an action need not be brought upon the new promise.182 And where the former infant, now of age, has his election either to ratify or to repudiate the contract, his decision. once made is final. That is, when he has ratified a contract made in his infancy, he cannot thereafter disaffirm it.183

As to the necessity of a ratification and the sufficiency of various forms of ratification, the authorities are not in harmony. Some of the decisions maintain the rule that an executory contract made by an infant does not become valid unless affirmed,184 but that an executed contract needs no ratification, but is binding until disaffirmed, so that the other party may sue on the contract, and it is then for the infant to plead his minority in defense, and if he does so, the other party may then show anything in the nature of a ratification.185 In England, the matter of the ratification of infants' contracts is governed by Tenterden's Act (9 Geo. IV, c. 14), which is in the nature of an extension of the statute of frauds, and which, on this point, provides that such a ratification, to be available in an action, must be in writing and signed by the party to be charged; and this provision, or one substantially similar to it, has been adopted in the laws of several of the states.186 But in the absence

182 Minock v. Shortridge, 21 Mich. 304; Whitney v. Dutch, 14 Mass. 457, 7 Am. Dec. 229.

183 Luce v. Jestrab, 12 N. D. 548, 97 N. W. 848; Healy v. Kellogg (Sup.) 145 N. Y. Supp. 943; Rev. Civ. Code La. art. 2228.

184 O'Donohue v. Smith, 130 App. Div. 214, 114 N. Y. Supp. 536. 185 Henry v. Root, 33 N. Y. 526; Clemmer v. Price, 59 Tex. Civ. App. 84, 125 S. W. 604.

186 See Proctor v. Sears, 4 Allen (Mass.) 95; Fetrow v. Wiseman, 40 Ind. 148; Ward v. Scherer, 96 Va. 318, 31 S. E. 518; Carroll v. Durant Nat. Bank, 38 Okl. 267, 133 Pac. 179; Barnes v. American Soda Fountain Co., 32 Okl. 81, 121 Pac. 250; Lamkin v. Ledoux, 101 Me. 581, 64 Atl. 1048, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 104. The statute in Missouri (Rev. St. 1899, § 3423) provides that no action shall be maintained to charge a person on a debt contracted during infancy, unless the debt shall have been ratified otherwise than by a verbal promise, and that the following acts shall constitute a ratification: An acknowledgment in writing, a partial payment, a disposal of the property for which the debt was contracted, and a refusal to deliver property in defendant's possession, for which such debt was contracted, to the person to whom the debt is due. And it is held that, since this provision is directly opposed to the common-law doctrine of ratification of infants' contracts, it must be construed as exclu

of such a statute, ratification of a contract voidable for infancy may be effected in several ways. In the first place, acceptance of the contract as a binding obligation is sufficient if shown by the person's continuing to act under it without demur. Thus, if one contracts while an infant to render services to another, and continues in the employment after coming of age without demanding increased wages or proposing any other change, it is evidence of an affirmance of the contract.187 But the rule is generally accepted that mere acquiescence and silence by the person after attaining full age is not a ratification of a contract made by him during his minority, however long such acquiescence continues, short of the statutory period of limitations.188 It is said by the Supreme Court of the United States: "We think the preponderance of authority is that, in deeds executed by infants, mere inertness or silence continued for a period less than that prescribed by the statute of limitations, unless accompanied by affirmative acts manifesting an intention to assent to the conveyance, will not bar the infant's right to avoid the deed, and those confirmatory acts must be voluntary.” 189 And a ratification cannot be inferred from incidental or collateral circumstances, in the face of an explicit declaration of the party that he did not intend to become bound.190

In the next place, if a person, after attaining his majority, retains for an unreasonable length of time property acquired under a contract made while he was an infant, or continues in the enjoyment of any adequate benefit received under the contract, or exercises clear acts of ownership over such property, it is held that he thereby ratifies the

sive, and evidence of a common-law ratification by means other than those prescribed is inadmissible. Koerner v. Wilkinson, 96 Mo. App. 510, 70 S. W. 509.

187 Spicer v. Earl, 41 Mich. 191, 1 N. W. 923, 32 Am. Rep. 152.

188 International Text-Book Co. v. Connelly, 206 N. Y. 188, 99 N. E. 722, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1115; Lynch v. Johnson, 109 Mich. 640, 67 N. W. 908; Watson v. Peebles, 102 Miss. 725, 59 South. 881; Headley v. Hoopengarner, 60 W. Va. 626, 55 S. E. 744.

189 Sims v. Everhardt, 102 U. S. 300, 26 L. Ed. 87; Drake v. Ramsay, 5 Ohio, 251.

190 Minock v. Shortridge, 21 Mich. 304.

contract,11 and this is more particularly the case if, after coming of age, he sells such property as his own.192 Again, a partial payment made on a contract after the person reaches his majority constitutes a ratification of it, provided it is made in pursuance of what the party recognizes as a legal obligation.193 And the same result may be effected by bringing a suit on the contract.194 Finally, a ratification may of course be made by a direct and explicit act or declaration directed to that purpose. No particular form of words is required, but the language employed must import an unequivocal recognition and confirmation of the previous engagement. If they satisfy this requirement, there need not be any direct promise to pay or perform.105 Thus, any written instrument signed by a party which, in the case of an adult, would amount to an adoption of the act of an agent, will, in the case of an infant, after he has attained full age, amount to a ratification.196 But a ratification is not made out by evidence that the person, after coming of age, said that the debt was a just one and that he would pay it if he ever could do so without inconvenience to himself, but that he would not promise to pay it at any definite time.197 And the signing of a bond to release merchandise bought while a minor from attachment at the suit of the vendor is not a ratification of a promise to pay made while a minor.1 So, where an infant executed a written contract

198

191 Hobbs v. Hinton Foundry, Machine & Plumbing Co., 74 W. Va. 443, 82 S. E. 267; Norris v. Vance, 3 Rich. (S. C.) 164; Wickham ▼. Torley, 136 Ga. 594, 71 S. E. 881, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 57; Bell v. Swainsboro Fertilizer Co., 12 Ga. App. 81, 76 S. E. 756; La Cotts v. Quertermous, 84 Ark. 610, 107 S. W. 167; Gannon v. Manning, 42 App. D. C. 206.

192 Hilton v. Shepherd, 92 Me. 160, 42 Atl. 387; Koerner v. Wilkinson, 96 Mo. App. 510, 70 S. W. 509.

193 Snyder v. Gericke, 101 Mo. App. 647, 74 S. W. 377; Parsons v. Teller, 188 N. Y. 318, 80 N. E. 930.

194 Ward v. The Little Red, 8 Mo. 358; Pecararo v. Pecararo (Sup.) 84 N. Y. Supp. 581; Wise v. Loeb, 15 Pa. Super. Ct. 601.

195 Ward v. Scherer, 96 Va. 318, 31 S. E. 518; Thompson v. Lay, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 48, 16 Am. Dec. 325.

196 Pedro v. Pedro, 71 Misc. Rep. 296, 127 N. Y. Supp. 997.

197 Bresee v. Stanly, 119 N. C. 278, 25 S. E. 870.

198 Lamkin v. Ledoux, 101 Me. 581, 64 Atl. 1048, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.)

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