high in his favor; and if the great evidence of this favor be the durableness of the benefits that are the fruits of it, and the chief fruit of it is life; then it is at least to be expected, that they will escape that mortality which is such a remarkable disgrace to those that have the human nature, and so wonderful to behold in those whom the Most High has made to differ so much from the beasts in capacity, dignity, end and design. We might surely expect, that these high favorites should, with regard to life and durableness of happiness, not be mere beasts, and have no pre-eminence above them; and that they should not be like the grass, and the flower of the field, which in the morning flourisheth and groweth up, but in the evening is cut down and withered; that all their happiness and all the benefits of God's favor should not be like a shadow, like a dream, like a tale that is told; that it should not be as a span, and should not pass away as the swift ships, as the eagle that hasteth to the prey; that it should not be swifter than a weaver's shuttle;-to which things the life of man is compared in Scripture.

The things of this world are spoken of as having no profit or value, because they are not lasting, but must be left at death, and therefore are mere vanity (i. e., wholly worthless), and not worthy that any man should set his heart on them, Psalm xlix. 6 to the end, Prov. xxiii. 4, 5, chap. xi. 7, Ecclesiastes ii. 15, 16, 17, chap. iii., ten first verses, verse 19, chap. v. 14, 15, 16. But the rewards of righteousness are abundantly represented as exceedingly valuable and worthy that men should set their hearts upon them, because they are lasting, Prov. iii. 16, viii. 18, and x. 25, 27, Isaiah Iv. 3, Psalm i. 3 to the end, Isaiah xvii. 7, 8, and innumerable other places. How can these things consist one with another, unless there be a future state?

It is spoken of as a remarkable thing, and what one would not expect, that good men should die as wicked men do, as it seems to be, by good men's dying a temporal death as wicked men do, Eccles. ii. 16, chap. ix. 3, 4, 5. And therefore, it may be argued, that it does but seem to be so; but that in reality it shall not be so, inasmuch as, though good men die a temporal death as wicked men do, yet, as to their happiness, they die not, but live forever in a future state. It is an evidence of a future state, that in the Old Testament so many promises are made to the godly, of things that shall be after they are dead, which shall be testimonies of God's great favor to them, and blessed rewards of his favor; so many promises concerning their name, and concerning their posterity, and the future church of God in the world; and yet that we are so much taught in the Old Testament that men are never the better for what comes to pass after they are dead, concerning these things (i. e., if we look only at the present life, without taking any other state of existence into consideration), Job xiv. 21, Eccles. i. ii. iii. 22, and ix. 5, 6. Yea, the wise man says expressly, that the dead have no more of a reward, i. e., in any thing in this world, Eccles. ix. 5.

That man shall die as a beast, seems to be spoken of, Eccles. iii. 16 to the end, as a vanity, an evil, a kind of mischief and confusion, that appears in the world. Therefore this is an argument, that God, the wise orderer of all things, who brings order out of confusion, will rectify this disorder by appointing a future state.

These representations of the Old Testament, wherein the life of man is set forth as being so exceedingly short, as a flower, as a shadow, as a dream, a tale that is told, as a span, a moment, &c., have no propriety at all in them any other way, than as man's life is short, in a comparative view, compared with things pertaining to men, that would naturally lead us to expect that it should be incomparably longer; such as the dignity of man's nature above all other

creatures, his being made in the image of God; his being of a capacity so much superior, his being made for such an end and business, and capable of such happiness, made capable of looking forward and having some comprehension of an endless life, his necessary desires of such a life, &c. Otherwise, why is not the shortness of the duration of other things in like manner set forth and insisted on, which do not last longer than the life of man? But if it be so indeed, that man's life is exceedingly short, considering his nature, end, capacity and desires, then doubtless the righteous, who are represented as the high favorites of God, who shall be the subjects of his blessings every way, and particularly shall have life as the great fruit of his favor and blessing, will have a life, or duration, that shall be long, answerably to their nature, desires, &c.

It is an argument that the Old Testament affords for the proof of a future life and immortality, that we are there taught, that mortality is brought in by sin, and comes as a punishment of sin. Therefore, it is natural to suppose, that when complete forgiveness is promised, and perfect restoration to favor, and deliverance from death, and the bestowment of life, as the fruit of this favor, eternal life and immortality is intended.

§ 5. That the state of divine judgment and retribution is hereafter, in another life, and not in this, is manifest from this, that some of the highest acts of virtue consist in dying well, in denying ourselves of life in a good cause, for God, and a good conscience, or rather than commit what is in itself vicious and vile; for our country, for the church of God, and the interest of that holy society.

§ 6. Isaiah chap. xxxviii. 18, 19, "For the grave cannot praise thee, death cannot celebrate thee; they that go down to the pit cannot hope for thy truth." -"The living, the living he shall praise thee, as I do this day; the father to the children shall make known thy truth." The death that is here spoken of, is death indeed, or is properly so called. The state of death is here spoken of as it is originally, and as being still, a state of death, and not as it is changed by a redemption from a state of death to a state of life. Hezekiah speaks of that death wherein men do really die, or are fully dead, and not that improperly so called, wherein men are a thousand times more alive than they were before, and are immortal, and beyond the possibility of dying. Death, as it is originally, and when it is properly death, is a state wherein men cannot " praise God," nor" celebrate him," nor "hope for his truth." It is a state of evil without any good. It is, as Job says, "the land of darkness, as darkness itself, and the shadow of death, without any order, and where the light is as darkness." It is a state wherein there is no good done, no good enjoyed, no good hoped for. It is a state of absolute emptiness of any good, act or principle, happiness or hope. They that are in hell, are in such a state of death. Such was death originally; such was death as it was threatened to our first parents; and very commonly, when death is spoken of in the Old Testament, it is in this notion of it. For the change of a state of death into a state of more glorious life, was not fully revealed under the Old Testament. Life and immortality are brought to light by the gospel. It is under this notion death seems to be spoken of in Eccles. ix. 4, 5, 6, where it is said, that "a living dog is better than a dead sion ;" and that "the dead have no more a reward;" and that " they have no more a portion forever of any thing that is done under the sun." Hezekiah did not mean, that they that are redeemed from the power of the grave, they that get the victory over death, and shall never die (as Christ promises believers)," shall not praise God, nor hope for his truth."

We see in this instance, that the better men are, the more terrible would it

make death, if there were no future state. For the better they are, the more they love God. Good men have found the fountain of good. Those men who have a high degree of love to God, do greatly delight in God. They have experience of a much better happiness in life than others; and therefore it must be more dreadful for them to have their beings eternally extinct by death. Thus, this seemed above all other things to be the sting of Hezekiah's affliction in his expectation of death, that he should no more have any opportunity of communion with God, and worshipping and praising him; as appears by these two verses, together with the 11th and 22d verses: "I said, I shall not see the Lord, even the Lord in the land of the living; I shall behold man no more, with the inhabitants of the world."-"Hezekiah also said, What is the sign that I shall go up to the house of the Lord?" there not being at that time a clear and full revelation of a future state. Hence we may strongly argue a future state: for it is not to be supposed, that God would make man such a creature as to be capable of looking forward beyond death, and capable of knowing and loving him, and delighting in him as the fountain of all good, and should make it his duty so to do, which will necessarily increase in him a dread of annihilation, and an eager desire of immortality; and yet, so order it, that that desire should be disappointed; so that his loving his Creator, should in some sense make him the more miserable.

§ 7. Nothing is more manifest, than that it is absolutely necessary, in order to a man's being thoroughly, universally and steadfastly virtuous, that his mind and heart should be thoroughly weaned from this world; which is a great evidence, that God intends another world for virtuous men. He surely would not require them, in their thoughts, affections and expectations, wholly to relinquish this world, if it were all the world they were to expect: if he had made them for this world wholly and only, and had created the world for them, to be their only country and home, all the resting place ever designed for them.

§S. If all the creatures God has made are to come to an end, and the world itself is to come to an end, and so to be as though it had never been, then it will be with all God's glorious and magnificent works, agreeably to what is said of the temporal prosperity of the wicked, Job xx. 6, 7, 8: "Though its excellency be never so great, yet it shall perish forever; it shall all fly away as a dream; it shall be chased away as a vision of the night." It shall vanish totally, and absolutely be as though it had not been.

CHAPTER II.

CONCERNING THE NECESSITY AND REASONABLENESS OF THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF SATISFACTION FOR SIN.

§ 1. THE necessity of satisfaction for sin, and the reasonableness of that Christian doctrine, may appear from the following considerations:

1. Justice requires that sin be punished, because sin deserves punishment. What the demerit of sin calls for, justice calls for; for it is only the same thing in different words. For the notion of a desert of punishment, is the very same as a just connection with punishment. None will deny but that there is such a thing, in some cases, as the desert or demerit of a crime, its calling for, or requiring punishment. And to say that the desert of a crime does require punish

ment, is just the same thing as to say, the reason why it requires it is, that it deserves it. So that the suitableness of the connection between the crime and the punishment, consists in the desert; and therefore, wherever desert is, there is such suitableness. None will deny that some crimes are so horrid, and so deserving of punishment, that it is requisite that they should not go unpunished, unless something very considerable be done to make up for the crime; either some answerable repentance, or some other compensation, that in some measure at least balances the desert of punishment, and so, as it were, takes it off, or disannuls it otherwise the desert of punishment remaining, all will allow, that it is fit and becoming, and to be desired, that the crime should be severely punished. And why is it so, but only from the demerit of the crime, or because the crime so much deserves such a punishment? It justly excites so great abhorrence and indignation, that it is requisite there should be a punishment answer. able to this abhorrence and indignation that is fitly excited by it. But by this, all is granted that needs to be granted, to show, that desert of punishment carries in it a requisiteness of the punishment deserved. For if greater crimes do very much require punishment, because of their great demerit, lesser crimes will also require punishment, but only in a lesser degree, proportionably to their demerit; because the ground of the requisiteness of the punishment of great crimes, is their demerit. It is requisite that they should be punished, on no other account but because they deserve it.

And besides, if it be allowed that it is requisite that great crimes should be punished with punishment in some measure answerable to the heinousness of the crime, without something to balance them, some answerable repentance or other satisfaction, because of their great demerit, and the great abhorrence and indignation they justly excite; it will follow that it is requisite that God should punish all sin with infinite punishment; because all sin, as it is against God, is infinitely heinous, and has infinite demerit, is justly infinitely hateful to him, and so stirs up infinite abhorrence and indignation in him. Therefore, by what was before granted, it is requisite that God should punish it, unless there be something in some measure to balance this desert; either some answerable repentance and sorrow for it, or other compensation. Now there can be no repentance of it, or sorrow for it, in any measure answerable or proportionable to the heinousness of the demerit of the crime; because that is infinite, and there can be no infinite sorrow for sin in finite creatures; yea, there can be none but what is infinitely short of it; none that bears any proportion to it. Repentance is as nothing in comparison of it, and therefore can weigh nothing when put in the scales with it, and so does nothing at all towards compensating it, or diminishing the desert or requisiteness of punishment, any more than if there were no repentance. If any ask, why God could not pardon the injury on repentance, without other satisfaction, without any wrong to justice; I ask the same person why he could not also pardon the injury without repentance? For the same reason, could he not pardon with repentance without satisfaction? For all the repentance men are capable of, is no repentance at all, or is as little as none, in comparison with the greatness of the injury; for it bears no proportion to it. And it would be as dishonorable and unfit for God to pardon the injury without any repentance at all, as to do it merely on the account of a repentance that bears no more proportion to the injury, than none at all. Therefore, we are not forgiven on repentance, because it in any wise compensates, or takes off, or diminishes the desert or requisiteness of punishment; but because of the respect that evangelical repentance has to compensation already made.

If sin, therefore, deserves punishment, that is the same thing as to say, that

it is fit and proper that it should be punished. If the case be so, that sin deserves punishment from men; in those cases it is proper it should receive punishment from men. A fault cannot be properly said to deserve punishment from any, but those to whom it belongs to inflict punishment when it is deserv ed. In those cases, therefore, wherein it belongs to men to inflict punishment, it is proper for them to inflict that punishment that is deserved of them.

Again, if sin's desert of punishment be the proper ground of the fitness of its connection with punishment, or rather be that wherein fitness of the connection consists; it will thence follow, not only that it is fit that sin that deserves punishment, should be punished, but also that it should be punished as it de

serves.

It is meet that a person's state should be agreeable to the quality of his dispositions and voluntary actions. Suffering is suitable and answerable to the quality of sinful dispositions and actions; it is suitable that they that will evil, and do evil, should receive evil in proportion to the evil that they do or will. It is but justice that it should be so; and when sin is punished, it receives but its own, or that which is suitably connected with it. But it is a contradiction to say that it is suitably connected with punishment, or that it is suitable that it should be connected with it, and yet that it is suitable it should not be connected with it. All sin may be resolved into hatred of God and our neighbor; as all our duty may be resolved into love to God and our neighbor. And it is but meet that this spirit of enmity should receive a turn in its own kind, that it should receive enmity again. Sin is of such a nature, that it wishes ill, and aims at ill to God and man; but to God especially. It strikes at God; it would, if it could, procure his misery and death. It is but suitable, that with what measure it metes, it should be measured to it again. It is but suitable that men should reap what they sow, and that the rewards of every man's hand should be given him. This is what the consciences of all men do naturally declare. There is nothing that men know sooner, after they come to the exercise of their reason, than that, when they have done wickedness, they deserve punishment. The consciences not only of Christians, and those who have been educated in the principles of divine revelation, but also the consciences of heathens inform them of this: therefore, unless conscience has been stupified by frequent violations when men have done wickedness, there remains a sense of guilt upon their minds; a sense of an obligation to punishment. It is natural to expect that which conscience or reason tells them it is suitable should come; and therefore they are afraid and jealous, and ready to flee when no man pursues.

Seeing therefore it is requisite that sin should be punished, as punishment is deserved and just; therefore the justice of God obliges him to punish sin. For it belongs to God, as the Supreme Ruler of the universality of things, to maintain order and decorum in his kingdom, and to see to it that decency and righteousness take place in all cases. That perfection of his nature whereby he is disposed to this, is his justice: therefore his justice naturally disposes him to punish sin as it deserves.

2. The holiness of God, which is the infinite opposition of his nature to sin, naturally and necessarily disposes him to punish sin. Indeed his justice is part of his holiness. But when we speak of God's justice inclining him to punish sin, we have respect only to that exercise of his holiness whereby he loves that holy and beautiful order that consists in the connection of one thing with another, according to their nature, and so between sin and punishment; and his opposition to that which would be so unsuitable as a disconnection of these things. But now I speak of the holiness of God as appearing not directly and