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OF EXPEDIENCY-DIFFICULTIES ATTENDING IT. [ESSAY I. Bearing still in mind that the rule "to endeavour to produce the greatest happiness in our power," is objectionable only when it is made an ultimate rule, the reader is invited to attend to these short considerations.

I. In computing human happiness, the advocate of expediency does not sufficiently take into the account our happiness in futurity. Nor indeed does he always take it into account at all. One definition says, "The test of the morality of an act is its tendency to promote the temporal advantage of the greatest number in the society to which we belong." Now many things may be very expedient if death were annihilation, which may be very inexpedient now: and therefore it is not unreasonable to expect, nor an unreasonable exercise of humility to act upon the expectation, that the Divine laws may sometimes impose obligations of which we do not perceive the expediency or the use. "It may so fall out," says Hooker, "that the reason why some laws of God were given, is neither opened nor possible to be gathered by the wit of man."* And Pearson says, "There are many parts of morality, as taught by revelation, which are entirely independent of an accurate knowledge of nature." And Gisborne, " Our experience of God's dispensations by no means permits us to affirm, that he always thinks fit to act in such a manner as is productive of particular expediency; much less to conclude that he wills us always to act in such a manner as we suppose would be productive of it." All this sufficiently indicates that expediency is wholly inadmissible as an ultimate rule.

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II. The doctrine is altogether unconnected with the Christian revelation, or with any revelation from Heaven. It was just as true, and the deductions from it just as obligatory, two or five thousand years ago as now. The alleged supreme law of morality-" Whatever is expedient is right"-might have been taught by Epictetus as well as by a modern Christian. But are we then to be told that the revelations from the Deity have conveyed no moral knowledge to man? that they make no act obligatory which was not obligatory before? that he who had the fortune to discover that "whatever is expedient is right," possessed a moral law just as perfect as that which God has ushered into the world, and much more comprehensive?

III. If some subordinate rule of conduct were proposed,-some principle which served as an auxiliary moral guide,-I should not think it a valid objection to its truth, to be told that no sanction of the principle was to be found in the written revelation: but if some rule of conduct were proposed as being of universal obligation, some moral principle which was paramount to every other-and I discovered that this principle was unsanctioned by the written revelation, I should think this want of sanction was conclusive evidence against it: because it is not credible that a revelation from God, of which one great object was to teach mankind the moral law of God, would have been silent respecting a rule of conduct which was to be a universal guide to man. We apply these considerations to the doctrine of expediency: Scripture contains not a word upon the subject.

IV. The principles of expediency necessarily proceed upon the supposition that we are to investigate the future, and this investigation is, as every one knows, peculiarly without the limits of human sagacity: an

Eccles. Polity, b. 3, s. 10. †Theory of Morals, c. 3. + Principles of Mor. Phil.

CHAP. 2.]

LIABILITY TO ABUSE.

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objection which derives additional force from the circumstance that an action, in order to be expedient, "must be expedient on the whole, at the long run, in all its effects collateral and remote."* I do not know whether, if a man should sit down expressly to devise a moral principle which should be uncertain and difficult in its application, he could devise one that would be more difficult and uncertain than this. So that, as Dr. Paley himself acknowledges, "It is impossible to ascertain every duty by an immediate reference to public utility." The reader may therefore conclude with Dr. Johnson, that "by presuming to determine what is fit and what is beneficial, they presuppose more knowledge of the universal system than man has attained, and therefore depend upon principles too complicated and extensive for our comprehension: and there can be no security in the consequence when the premises are not understood."‡

V. But whatever may be the propriety of investigating all consequences "collateral and remote," it is certain that such an investigation is possible only in that class of moral questions which allows a man time to sit down and deliberately to think and compute. As it respects that large class of cases in which a person must decide and act in a moment, it is wholly useless. There are thousands of conjectures in life in which a man can no more stop to calculate effects collateral and remote, than he can stop to cross the Atlantic: and it is difficult to conceive that any rule of morality can be absolute and universal, which is totally inapplicable to so large a portion of human affairs.

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VI. Lastly, the rule of expediency is deficient in one of the first requisites of a moral law-obviousness and palpability of sanction. What is the process by which the sanction is applied? Its advocates say, the Deity is a benevolent Being as he is benevolent himself, it is reasonable to conclude he wills that his creatures should be benevolent to one another: this benevolence is to be exercised by adapting every action to the promotion of the "universal interest" of man: "Whatever is expedient is right :" or, God wills that we should consult expediency. Now we say that there are so many considerations placed between the rule and the act, that the practical authority of the rule is greatly diminished. It is easy to perceive that the authority of a rule will not come home to that man's mind, who is told, respecting a given action, that its effect upon the universal interest is the only thing that makes it right or wrong. All the doubts that arise as to this effect are so many diminutions of the sanction. It is like putting half a dozen new contingencies between the act of thieving and the conviction of a jury; and every one knows that the want of certainty of penalty is a great encouragement to offences. The principle too is liable to the most extravagant abuse--or rather extravagant abuse is, in the present condition of mankind, inseparable from its general adoption. "Whatever is expedient is right," soliloquizes the moonlight adventurer into the poultry yard: "It will tend more to the sum of human happiness that my wife and I should dine on a capon, than that the farmer should feel the satisfaction of possessing it;" --and so he mounts the hen-roost. I do not say that this hungry moralist would reason soundly, but I say that he would not listen to the philosophy which replied, "Oh, your reasoning is incomplete: you must take into account all consequences collateral and remote; and then you will find † B. 6, c 12. + Western Isles.

Mor. and Pol. Phil. b. 2, c. 8.

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PAGANS.

[ESSAY L that it is more expedient, upon the whole and at the long run, that you and your wife should be hungry, than that hen-roosts should be insecure."

It is happy, however, that this principle never can be generally applied to the private duties of man. Its abuses would be so enormous that the laws would take, as they do in fact take, better measures for regulating men's conduct than this doctrine supplies. And happily, too, the Universal Lawgiver has not left mankind without more distinct and more influential perceptions of his will and his authority, than they could ever derive from the principles of expediency.

But an objection has probably presented itself to the reader, that the greater part of mankind have no access to the written expression of the will of God; and how, it may be asked, can that be the final standard of right and wrong for the human race, of which the majority of the race have never heard? The question is reasonable and fair.

We answer then, first, that supposing most men to be destitute of a communication of the Divine will, it does not affect the obligations of those who do possess it. That communication is the final law to me, whether my African brother enjoys it or not. Every reason by which the supreme authority of the law is proved, is just as applicable to those who do enjoy the communication of it, whether that communication is enjoyed by many or by few: and this, so far as the argument is concerned, appears to be a sufficient answer. If any man has no direct access to his Creator's will, let him have recourse to "eternal fitnesses," or to "expediency;" but his condition does not affect that of another man who does possess this access.

But our real reply to the objection is, that they who are destitute of Scripture are not destitute of a direct communication to the will of God. The proof of this position must be deferred to a subsequent chapter; and the reader is solicited for the present to allow us to assume its truth. This direct communication may be limited, it may be incomplete, but some communication exists; enough to assure them that some things are acceptable to the Supreme Power, and that some are not; enough to indicate a distinction between right and wrong; enough to make them moral agents, and reasonably accountable to our common Judge. If these principles are true, and especially if the amount of the communication is in many cases considerable, it is obvious that it will be of great value in the direction of individual conduct. We say of individual conduct, because it is easy to perceive that it would not often subserve the purposes of him who frames public rules of morality. A person may possess a satisfactory assurance in his own mind, that a given action is inconsistent with the Divine will, but that assurance is not conveyed to another, unless he participates in the evidence upon which it is founded. That which is wanted in order to supply public rules for human conduct, is a publicly avouched authority; so that a writer, in deducing those rules, has to apply ultimately to that standard which God has publicly sanctioned.

CHAP. 3.]

SUBORDINATE MORAL RULES.

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CHAPTER III.

SUBORDINATE STANDARDS OF RIGHT AND WRONG.

THE written expression of the Divine will does not contain, and no writings can contain, directions for our conduct in every circumstance of life. If the precepts of Scripture were multiplied a hundred or a thousand fold, there would still arise a multiplicity of questions to which none of them would specifically apply. Accordingly, there are some subordinate authorities, to which, as can be satisfactorily shown, it is the will of God that we should refer. He who does refer to them and regulates his conduct by them, conforms to the will of God.

To a son who is obliged to regulate all his actions by his father's will, there are two ways in which he may practise obedience-one, by receiving, upon each subject, his father's direct instructions, and the other, by receiving instructions from those whom his father commissions to teach him. The parent may appoint a governor, and enjoin that, upon all questions of a certain kind the son shall conform to his instructions: and if the son does this, he as truly and really performs his father's will, and as strictly makes that will the guide of his conduct, as if he received the instructions immediately from his parent. But if the father have laid down certain general rules for his son's observance, as that he shall devote ten hours a day to study and not less-although the governor should recommend or even command him to devote fewer hours, he may not comply; for if he does, the governor and not his father is his supreme guide. The subordination is destroyed.

This case illustrates, perhaps with sufficient precision, the situation of mankind with respect to moral rules. Our Creator has given direct laws, some general and some specific. These are of final authority. But he has also sanctioned, or permitted an application to, other rules; and in conforming to these, so long as we hold them in subordination to his laws, we perform his will.

Of these subordinate rules it were possible to enumerate many. Perhaps, indeed, few principles have been proposed as "the fundamental rules of virtue," which may not rightly be brought into use by the Christian in regulating his conduct in life: for the objection to many of these principles is, not so much that they are useless, as that they are unwarranted as paramount laws. Sympathy" may be of use, and "nature" may be of use, and "self-love," and "benevolence;" and, to those who know what it means, "eternal fitnesses" too.

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Some of the subordinate rules of conduct it will be proper hereafter to notice, in order to discover, if we can, how far their authority extends and where it ceases. The observations that we shall have to offer upon them may conveniently be made under these heads: The Law of the Land: The Law of Nature: The Promotion of human Happiness, or Expediency: The Law of Nations: The Law of Honour.

These observations will however necessarily be preceded by an inquiry into the great principles of human duty as they are delivered in Scripture, and into the reality of that communication of the Divine will to the mind, which the reader has been requested to allow us to assume.

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MORAL AND RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS.

(ESSAY I.

CHAPTER IV.

COLLATERAL OBSERVATIONS.

The reader is requested to regard the present chapter as parenthetical. The parenthesis is inserted here, because the writer does not know where more appropriately to place it.

IDENTICAL AUTHORITY OF MORAL AND RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS.

THIS identity is a truth to which we do not sufficiently advert either in our habitual sentiments or in our practice. There are many persons who speak of religious duties as if there were something sacred or imperative in their obligation that does not belong to duties of morality,many, who would perhaps offer up their lives rather than profess a belief in a false religious dogma, but who would scarcely sacrifice an hour's gratification rather than violate the moral law of love. It is therefore of importance to remember, that the authority which imposes moral obligations and religious obligations is one and the same-the will of God. Fidelity to God is just as truly violated by a neglect of his moral laws as by a compromise of religious principles. Religion and morality are abstract terms, employed to indicate different classes of those duties which the Deity has imposed upon mankind: but they are all imposed by Him, and all are enforced by equal authority. Not indeed that the violation of every particular portion of the Divine will involves equal guilt, but that each violation is equally a disregard of the Divine authority. Whether, therefore, fidelity be required to a point of doctrine or of practice, to theology or to morals, the obligation is the same. It is the Divine requisition which constitutes this obligation, and not the nature of the duty required: so that, while I think a Protestant does no more than his duty when he prefers death to a profession of the Roman Catholic faith, I think also that every Christian who believes that Christ has prohibited swearing, does no more than his duty when he prefers death to taking an oath.

I would especially solicit the reader to bear in mind this principle of the identity of the authority of moral and religious obligations, because he may otherwise imagine that, in some of the subsequent pages, the obligation of a moral law is too strenuously insisted on, and that fidelity to it is to be purchased at "too great a sacrifice of ease and enjoyment.",

THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

The purpose for which a reference is here made to these sacred subjects, is to remark upon the unfitness of attempting to deduce human duties from the attributes of God. It is not indeed to be affirmed that no illustration of those duties can be derived from them, but that they are too imperfectly cognizable by our perceptions to enable us to refer to them for specific moral rules. The truth indeed is, that we do not accurately and distinctly know what the Divine attributes are. We say