CHAP. 6.]

NATIONAL VICES-INFANTICIDE.

71

is," says Locke, "scarce that principle of morality to be named, or rule of virtue to be thought on, which is not somewhere or other slighted and condemned by the general fashion of whole societies of men, governed by practical opinions and rules of living quite opposite to others."-And Paley: "There is scarcely a single vice which, in some age or country of the world, has not been countenanced by public opinion: in one country it is esteemed an office of piety in children to sustain their aged parents, in another to despatch them out of the way: suicide in one age of the world has been heroism, in another felony; theft, which is punished by most laws, by the laws of Sparta was not unfrequently rewarded: you shall hear duelling alternately reprobated and applauded according to the sex, age, or station of the person you converse with the forgiveness of injuries and insults is accounted by one sort of people magnanimity, by another meanness."

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Upon all which I observe, that to whatever purpose these reasonings are directed, they are defective in an essential point. They show us indeed what the external actions of men have been, but give no proof that these actions were conformable with the secret internal judgment; and this last is the only important point. That a rule of virtue is "slighted and condemned by the general fashion," is no sort of evidence that those who joined in this general fashion did not still know that it was a rule of virtue. There are many duties which, in the present day, are slighted by the general fashion, and yet no man will stand up and say that they are not duties. "There is scarcely a single vice which has not been countenanced by public opinion;" but where is the proof that it has been approved by private and secret judgment? There is a great deal of difference between those sentiments which men seem to entertain respeting their duties when they give expression to "public opinion," and when they rest their heads on their pillows in calm reflection. "Suicide, in one age of the world, has been heroism, in another felony;" but it is not every action which a man says is heroic that he believes is right. "Forgiveness of injuries and insults is accounted by one sort of people magnanimity, by another, meanness ;" and yet they who thus vulgarly employ the word meanness do not imagine that forbearance and placability are really wrong.

I have met with an example which serves to confirm me in the judgment, that public notions, or rather public actions, are a very equivocal evidence of the real sentiments of mankind. "Can there be greater barbarity than to hurt an infant? Its helplessness, its innocence, its amiableness, call forth the compassion even of an enemy.-What then should we imagine must be the heart of a parent who would injure that weakness which a furious enemy is afraid to violate? Yet the exposition, that is, the murder, of new-born infants was a practice allowed of in almost all the states of Greece, even among the polite and civilized Athenians." This seems a strong case against us. But what were the grounds upon which this atrocity was defended?" Philosophers, instead of censuring, supported the horrible abuse, by far-fetched considerations of public utility."

By far-fetched considerations of public utility! Why had they recourse to such arguments as these? Because they found that the custom could not be reconciled with direct and acknowledged rules of virtue: because Theory Mor. Sent. p. 5, c. 2.

*Mor. and Pol. Phil. b. 1, c. 5.

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DUELLING.

[ESSAY I. they felt and knew that it was wrong. The very circumstance that they had recourse to "far-fetched" arguments is evidence that they were conscious that clearer and more immediate arguments were against them. They knew that infanticide was an immoral act.

I attach some importance to the indications which this class of reasoning affords of the comparative uniformity of human opinion, even when it is nominally discordant. One other illustration may be offered from more private life. Boswell, in his Life of Johnson, says that he proposed the question to the moralist, "Whether duelling was contrary to the laws of Christianity?" Let the reader notice the essence of the reply: "Sir, as men become in a high degree refined, various causes of offence arise which are considered to be of such importance that life must be staked to atone for them, though in reality they are not so. In a state of highly polished society, an affront is held to be a serious injury. It must therefore be resented, or rather a duel must be fought upon it, as men have agreed to banish from their society one who puts up with an affront without fighting a duel. Now, sir, it is never unlawful to fight in selfdefence. He then who fights a duel does not fight from passion against his antagonist, but out of self-defence, to avert the stigma of the world, and to prevent himself from being driven from society.-While such notions prevail, no doubt a man may lawfully fight a duel." The question was, the consistency of duelling with the laws of Christianity; and there is not a word about Christianity in the reply. Why? Because its laws can never be shown to allow duelling; and Johnson doubtless knew this. Accordingly, like the philosophers who tried to justify the kindred crime of infanticide, he had recourse to "far-fetched considerations,"--to the high polish of society,-to the stigma of the world,—to the notions that prevail. Now, while the readers of Boswell commonly think they have Johnson's authority in favour of duelling, I think they have his authority against it. I think that the mode in which he justified duelling evinced his consciousness that it was not compatible with the moral law.

And thus it is, that with respect to public opinions, and general fashions, and thence descending to private life, we shall find that men very usually know the requisitions of the moral law better than they seem to know them; and that he who estimates the mroal knowledge of societies or individuals by their common language, refers to an uncer tain and fallacious standard.

After all, the uniformity of human opinion respecting the great laws of morality is very remarkable. Sir James Mackintosh speaks of Grotius, who had cited poets, orators, historians &c., and says, "He quotes them as witnesses, whose conspiring testimony, mightily strengthened and confirmed by their discordance on almost every other subject, is a conclusive proof of the unanimity of the whole human race on the great rules of duty and fundamental principles of morals."*

From poets and orators we may turn to savage life. In 1683, that is, soon after the colonization of Pennsylvania, the founder of the colony held a "council and consultation" with some of the Indians. In the course of the interview it appeared that these savages believed in a state of future retribution; and they described their simple ideas of the respective states of the good and bad. The vices that they enumerated as those which would consign them to punishment, are remarkable, inasmuch as they so

* Disc. on Study of Law of Nature and Nations.

PT. 2. CH. 1.]

"

nearly correspond to similar enumerations in the Christian Scriptures. They were theft, swearing, lying, whoring, murder, and the like;" and the New Testament affirms that those who are guilty of adultery, fornication, lying, theft, murder, &c. shall not inherit the kingdom of God. The same writer, having on his travels met with some Indians, stopped and gave them some good and serious advice. "They wept," says he, "and tears ran down their naked bodies. They smote their hands upon their breasts and said, 'The Good Man here told them what I said was all good."†

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But reasonings such as these are in reality not necessary to the support of the truth of the immediate communication of the will of God; because, if the variations in men's notions of right and wrong were greater than they are, they would not impeach the existence of that communica. tion. In the first place, we never affirm that the Deity communicates all his law to every man; and in the second place, it is sufficiently certain that multitudes know his laws, and yet neglect to fulfil them.

If, in conclusion, it should be asked, what assistance can be yielded, in the investigation of publicly authorized rules of virtue, by the discussions of the present chapter? we answer, Very little. But when it is asked, Of what importance are they as illustrating the principles of morality? we answer, Very much. If there be two sources from which it has pleased God to enable mankind to know his will,-a law written externally, and a law communicated to the heart,-it is evident that both must be regarded as principles of morality, and that in a work like the present, both should be illustrated as such. It is incidental to the latter mode of moral guidance, that it is little adapted to the formation of external rules; but it is of high and solemn importance to our species for the secret direction of the individual man.

PART II.

SUBORDINATE MEANS OF DISCOVERING THE DIVINE WILL.

CHAPTER I.

THE LAW OF THE LAND.

THE authority of civil government as a director of individual conduct, is explicitly asserted in the Christian Scriptures :-"Be subject to principalities and powers,-Obey magistrates," "Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake; whether it be to the king, as supreme; or unto governors, as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of evil-doers, and for the praise of them that do well."§

* John Richardson's Life.

+ Ibid.

Tit. iii. 1.

§ 1 Pet. ii. 13.

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THE LAW OF THE LAND.

[ESSAY I. By this general sanction of civil government a multitude of questions respecting human duty are at once decided. In ordinary cases, he upon whom the magistrate imposes a law, needs not to seek for knowledge of his duty upon the subject from a higher source. The Divine will is sufficiently indicated by the fact that the magistrate commands. Obedience

to the law is obedience to the expressed will of God. He who, in the payment of a tax to support the just exercise of government, conforms to the law of the land, as truly obeys the Divine will as if the Deity had regulated questions of taxation by express rules.

In thus founding the authority of civil government upon the precepts of revelation, we refer to the ultimate, and for that reason to the most proper sanction. Not, indeed, that if revelation had been silent, the obligation of obedience might not have been deduced from other considerations. The utility of government,-its tendency to promote the order and happiness of society,-powerfully recommend its authority; so powerfully, indeed, that it is probable that the worst government which ever existed was incomparably better than none; and we shall hereafter have occasion to see that considerations of utility involve actual moral obligation.

The purity and practical excellence of the motives to civil obedience which are proposed in the Christian Scriptures are especially worthy of regard. "Submit for the Lord's sake." "Be subject, not only for wrath', but for conscience' sake." Submission for wrath' sake, that is, from fear of penalty, implies a very inferior motive to submission upon grounds of principle and duty; and as to practical excellence, who cannot perceive that he who regulates his obedience by the motives of Christianity acts more worthily, and honourably, and consistently, than he who is influenced only by fear of penalties? The man who obeys the law for conscience' sake will obey always; alike when disobedience would be unpunished and unknown, as when it would be detected the next hour. The magistrate has a security for such a man's fidelity, which no other motive can supply. A smuggler will import his kegs if there is no danger of a seizure,- -a Christian will not buy the brandy, though no one knows it but himself.

It is to be observed, that the obligation of civil obedience is enforced, whether the particular command of the law is in itself sanctioned by morality or not. Antecedently to the existence of the law of the magistrate respecting the importation of brandy, it was of no consequence in the view of morality whether brandy was imported or not; but the prohibition of the magistrate involves a moral obligation to refrain. Other doctrine has been held; and it has been asserted, that unless the particular law is enforced by morality, it does not become obligatory by the command of the state." But if this were true, if no law was obligatory that was not previously enjoined by morality, no moral obligation would result from the law of the land. Such a question is surely set at rest by, "Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man."

But the authority of civil government is a subordinate authority. If from any cause the magistrate enjoins that which is prohibited by the moral law, the duty of obedience is withdrawn. "All human authority ceases at the point where obedience becomes criminal." The reason is simple; that when the magistrate enjoins what is criminal, he has ex

* See Godwin's Political Justice.

PT. 2. CH. 1.]

LIMITS OF ITS AUTHORITY.

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ceeded his power: "the minister of God" has gone beyond his commission. There is, in our day, no such thing as a moral plenipotentiary.

Upon these principles, the first teachers of Christianity acted when the rulers "called them, and commanded them not to speak at all nor teach in the name of Jesus."-" Whether," they replied, "it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye.' They accordingly "entered into the temple early in the morning, and taught:" and when, subsequently, they were again brought before the council and interrogated, they replied, "We ought to obey God rather than men;" and notwithstanding the renewed command of the council, "daily in the temple and in every house, they ceased not to teach and preach Jesus Christ."-Nor let any one suppose that there is any thing religious in the motives of the apostles, which involved a peculiar obligation upon them to refuse obedience: we have already seen that the obligation to conform to religious duty and to moral duty is one.

To disobey the civil magistrate is however not a light thing. When the Christian conceives that the requisitions of government and of a higher law are conflicting, it is needful that he exercise a strict scrutiny into the principles of his conduct. But if, upon such scrutiny, the contrariety of requisitions appears real, no room is left for doubt respecting his duty, or for hesitation in performing it. With the consideration of consequences he has then no concern: whatever they may be, his path is plain before him.

It is sufficiently evident that these doctrines respect non-compliance only. It is one thing not to comply with laws, and another to resist those who make or enforce them. He who thinks the payment of tithes unchristian ought to decline to pay them; but he would act upon strange principles of morality, if, when an officer came to distrain upon his property, he forcibly resisted his authority.‡

If there are cases in which the positive injunctions of the law may be disobeyed, it is manifest that the mere permission of the law to do a given action, conveys no sufficient authority to perform it. There are, perhaps, no disquisitions connected with the present subject which are of greater practical utility than those which show, that not every thing which is legally right is morally right; that a man may be entitled by law to privileges which morality forbids him to exercise, or to possessions which morality forbids him to enjoy.

As to the possession, for example, of property: the general foundation of the right to property is the law of the land. But as the law of the land is itself subordinate, it is manifest that the right to property must be subordinate also, and must be held in subjection to the moral law. A man who has a wife and two sons, and who is worth fifteen hundred pounds, dies without a will. The widow possesses no separate property, but the sons have received from another quarter ten thousand pounds apiece. Now of the fifteen hundred pounds which the intestate left, the law assigns five hundred to the mother, and five hundred to each son. Are these sons morally permitted to take each five hundred pounds, and to leave their parent with only five hundred for her support? Every man I hope will answer, No: and the reason is this; that the moral law,

* Acts iv. 18.

† Acts v. 29, 42.

We speak here of private obligations only. Respecting the political obligations which result from the authority of civil government, some observations will be found in the chapter on Civil Obedience. Ess. iii. c. v.