the amount of them is a subject of dispute, the Court of Chancery will interfere, and, by injunction, restrain the sailing of the ship till the amount of the shares, for which security is to be given, shall be ascertained, which will probably be by reference to the master (c). But this application to the Court of Chancery must be made as expeditiously as possible; and in a case where the ship was to sail the day after the application was made, and the delay was unaccounted for, an injunction was refused (d). We have seen that the Court of Admiralty cannot, in any case, compel any of the part-owners to sell their interest (e). The French ordinance (f) prohibits one part-owner of a ship from forcing his companion to a sale (which, by the French laws, one tenant in common might in general do), except in case of equality of opinions, upon the undertaking of a voyage. But a part-owner may by our law dispose of his interest to another person at any time; a rule better adapted to the present state of commerce than that (g) which formerly prevailed among some of the nations of the continent, and which did not permit the sale of a ship until after a possession of three or more years, or at least not till after the performance of one voyage at the charge and risk of the part-owners (h). The old rule appears to have been framed with a view to the interest of the master, who in former times was a principal owner, and was the person who, with the pecuniary assistance of the other owners, generally caused the ship to be built, in the expectation of being employed in the command; an expectation that might be defeated, if the others could sell their shares to strangers, who, acquiring a majority of interest, might appoint a friend of their own (i). In a late case it was held, that a part-owner who had arrested the ship by process out of the Admiralty Court, and obtained security for his share, was bound to pay his proportion of the expense of the repairs and outfit incurred previous to the arrest, but not entitled to any share of the profits of the voyage (k). It was formerly considered that the Court of Admiralty had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the rights of mortgagees of ships arrested under its process, or sold by its authority; but the better opinion seems to be, that though a mortgagee could not institute a suit in that court, he might appear in a suit to protect his interests (1). (c) Haly v. Goodson and another, 2 Meriv. 77; 2 Dod. 420. But (d) Christie v. Craig, 2 Meriv. 137. see Castelli v. Cook, 7 Hare, 89; and Darby v. Baines, 9 Hare, 369. (e) Ouston v. Hebden, 1 Wills. 101; cited in the preceding page. It is otherwise in the United States, where the Courts of Admiralty, founding themselves upon the general maritime law, have asserted their right to decree a sale on a disagreement of part-owners of a ship as to its employment. See the notes to the fifth American edition of this work, by Perkins. (9) Valin on the French Ordinance, tom. prem. 583; Loccennius de Jure Marit. lib. 3, c. 5, s. 3; Consolato, c. 54. (h) Molloy, book 2, c. 1, s. 3. (k) Davis v. Johnstone, 4 Sim. 539. Castelli v. Cook, 7 Hare, 93. (1) Neptune, 3. Hagg. 132. The Percy, 3 Hagg. 402. The Dowthorpe, 2 Wm. Rob. 80. By the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 65, s. 3, it is enacted, "That when any ship or vessel shall be under arrest by process issuing from the said High Court of Admiralty, or the proceeds of any ship or vessel, having been so arrested, shall have been brought into and be in the registry of the said court, in either such case the said court shall have full jurisdiction to take cognizance of all claims and causes of action of any person, in respect of any mortgage of such ship or vessel, and to decide any suit instituted by any such person in respect of any such claims or causes of action respectively;" and it has been held that the Act, which relieved the Court of Admiralty from all obstacles in respect of mortgages, gave it power over the freight as well as the ship (m). This jurisdiction has been extended to any claim in respect of any duly registered mortgage, whether the ship or her proceeds be under arrest of the court or not (n). And the Court of Admiralty has now jurisdiction to decide all questions between the co-owners or any of them, touching the ownership, employment, and earnings of any ship registered at any port in England or Wales, or any share thereof, to settle all accounts between the parties in relation thereto, and to direct the ship or any share thereof to be sold, or make such order in the premises as to it shall seem fit (0). Power of one Part-Owner to bind another by his Contract. Office and Authority of Ship's Husband. With regard to the repairs of a ship and other necessaries for the employment of it, one part-owner may, by ordering these things on credit, render his companions liable to be sued for the price of them, unless their liability be expressly provided against (p); yet if the person who gives the credit on such an occasion does not at the (m) The Dowthorpe; and the Prince Regent, decided by Lord Stowell, in 1822, cited in the former case by the present learned judge of the Court of Admiralty. This enabling power does not extend to all questions arising out of a deed of mortgage, but is confined to the ship itself being mort. gaged the Fortitude, 2 Wm. Rob. 217. See Place v. Potts, 8 Exch. 704. (n) 24 Vict. c. 10, s. 11. (0) 24 Vict. c. 10, s. 8. (p) Wrightv. Hunter, 1 East, 20; Bland, ex parte, 2 Rose, 93. Bickham v. Knight, 5 Scott, 629. It has been decided, this passage notwithstanding, by the Court of Common Pleas, in an action against a partowner, for repairs done on the orders of a managing owner, to whom the defendant had given notice, that he would not sail the ship again, offering to sell his shares; and after the repairs had commenced that he would not pay for them; that a part-owner of a ship has no general authority to bind his co-owners for repairs; that whether such authority has been expressly or impliedly given to him is a question of fact, and that a part-owner, to exonerate himself from the liabilities for repairs ordered by another partowner, is not bound to give express notice that he will not be liable for them. Brodie v. Howard, 17 C. B. 109; 25 L. J. C. P. 57; and see Whitwell v. Perrin, 4 C. B. (N. S.) 412. But in an action by a ship's husband against a part-owner for contribution to the amount of works, being alterations and not necessary repairs, done to a ship under a contract, to the making of which the defendant had assented, was held that he could not revoke the authority given by him after it had been acted upon, and that the onus of showing that he had done so before the contract entered into was upon him. Chappell V. Bracy, 6 H. & N. 45; 30 L. J. (N. S.) Ex. 24. time know that there are other part-owners, he may sue him alone from whom he receives the order (g). It is usual for the several part-owners to appoint a person, frequently one of their own number, to be the manager of their joint concern, their general agent in the use and employment of the vessel, under the name of ship's husband (r). His duties and powers as such are often defined and limited by the terms of a special agreement for that purpose between him and his employers or co-owners. Where no such agreement has been made, he is to exercise an impartial judgment in the employment of tradesmen and the appointment of officers; and be careful that his choice in the selection of a master be not biassed by any private pecuniary transaction (s). He is to see that the ship is properly repaired, equipped, and manned— to procure freights or charter-parties-to preserve the ship's papers— to make the necessary entries-adjust freight and averages,-disburse and receive moneys, and keep and make up the accounts as between all parties interested (t). His acts for these purposes are considered to be the acts of all the part-owners, who are liable on all contracts entered into by him for the conduct of their common concern-the employment of the ship. Yet, where a tradesman brought an action for cordage against the owners of a ship, and it was proved that he had taken a bill of the managing owner for the amount, which was dishonoured, and renewed, and dishonoured again, Lord Ellenborough (u) said, "If the plaintiff, dealing with the managing owner, has adopted him, he has discharged the others. If he has adjusted accounts with him ou that footing, the other defendants are entitled to the benefit of it." A part-owner has been held liable for repairs ordered by a co-owner to whom he had sold one moiety of his interest in the ship, and demised the other moiety, appointing him ship's husband and general manager; (q) Doo v. Chippenden, coram Kenyon, C. J., at Westminster sittings, H. T. 1790; and Baldeney and another v. Ritchie, 1 Starkie, 338, upon Pleas in Abatement. De Mautort v. Saunders, 1 B. & Ad. 398. (r) See, as to the authority of ship's husband, Mr. Justice Story's Commentaries on the Law of Agency. (8) Card and another v. Hope, 2 Barn. & Cress. 661. Green v. Briggs, 6 Hare, 408. Darby v. Baines, 9 Hare, 372. (t) Sims v. Brittain, 4 Barn. & Adol. 375; Law Magazine, art." Mercantile Law," No. 13. See Kent's Commentaries, Edin. ed. 147. See also Story's Commentaries on Agency, p. 32. "The ship's husband," says Beawes (Lex Mercatoria, p. 47), "is, as it were, a steward on land to the owner of the ship, as the officer bearing that name is on board, when the ship is at sea." "The ship's husband," says Mr. Bell (Principles of the Law of Scotland, 449), " is the agent or commissioner for the owners. be a part-owner or a stranger. His powers He may are by mandate or written commission by the owners, or by verbal appointment; the latter chiefly where he is also part-owner. His duties are-1. To arrange everything for the outfit and repair of the ship-stores, repairs, furnishings; to enter into contracts of affreightment; to superintend the papers of the ship. 2. His powers do not extend to the borrowing of money; but he may grant bills for furnishings, stores, repairs, and the necessary engagements, which will bind the owners, although he may have received money wherewith to pay them. 3. He may receive the freight; but is not entitled to take bills instead of it, giving up the lien by which it is secured. 4. He has no power to insure for the owner's interest without special authority. 5. He cannot give authority to a law agent that will bind his owners for expenses of a law suit. 6. He cannot delegate his authority" See also 1 Bell's Commentaries, p. 411. (u) Reed v. White, 5 Esp. R. 122. But see Griffiths v. Hicks, 15 L. T. 349. although the repairs were ordered during the continuance of the demise (t). But one part-owner, though he be also managing owner, cannot, by ordering an insurance of a ship, without authority from another, charge the other with any part of the premium, unless the other afterwards assent to the insurance, because this is no part of the joint concern; a share in a ship being the distinct property of each individual part-owner, whose own affair it is to protect it by insurance (u). It is otherwise if they be in partnership together, and the order be given in the name or on account of the firm (w). So one part-owner, although he be the husband, cannot as such pledge the other to the expenses of a law-suit (x); and the admission of a partner as to a subject not of copartnership, but of conjoint ownership in a vessel, is not binding on his copartner (y). It is the business of a ship's husband to obtain from each of the part-owners his contribution to the charges of the outfit, repairs, and other necessaries; and if he advance for one part-owner his proportion of such contribution, he may sue him separately for the amount (z). He has a lien also, in his character of ship's husband, and agent for the owners, for expenses disbursed by him as such, or by the owners, for each individual part-owner, on the share of such part-owner, in the produce of the joint adventure (a). 5. Adjustment of the Interests of Part-Owners on the Bankruptcy of one of them. The interest of part-owners in the profit and loss of an adventure undertaken by their mutual consent, is not affected by the (t) Preston v. Tamplin, 2 H. & N. 363; 21 L. J. Ex. 346. (u) Ogle v. Wrangham, coram Kenyon, C. J., Guildhall Sittings, H. T. 1790; French V. Backhouse, 5 Burr, 2727; and Bell v. Humphries, 2 Starkie, 345. (w) Hooper and another v. Lusby, 4 Campb. 67. See also Robinson v. Gleadow, 2 Bing. N. C. 156; Roberts v. Ogilby, 9 Price, 269; Hatsell v. Griffith, 2 C. & M. 679. (x) Campbell and another, appellants, v. Stein, respondent, 6 Dow. 135. It has been held, however, that he has power to bind his co-owner, as his agent, to release the vessel from an arrest in the Admiralty Court, by procuring bail for damages and costs, and having done so, and the suit against the vessel having terminated, the co-owner is liable to the bail for the amount they may have had to pay under the bail bond. Barker v. Highley, 32 L. J., C. P. 270. (y) Jaggers v. Bennings, 1 Stark. 14. Part-ownership is but a tenancy in common, and a person who has only a part interest in a ship is generally a part-owner, and not a joint tenant or partner. As part-owner, he has only a disposing power over his own interest in a ship, and he can convey no greater title. But there may be a partnership as well as a co-tenancy in a vessel; and in that case one part-owner, in the character of a partner, may sell the whole vessel, and he has such an implied power over the whole partnership effects as we have already seen. The vendee, in a case free from fraud, will have an indefeasible title to the whole ship. When a person is to be considered as a part-owner, or as a partner in a ship, depends upon circumstances. The former is the general relation between shipowners; the latter the exception, and requires to be especially shown.-Kent's Com. on Mercantile and Commercial Law, Edin. edit. p. 150. See also Wright v. Hunter,1 East's Rep. 20. Holderness v. Shackels, 8 B. & Cress. 12. And see Collyer on Partnership," on Partowners of Ships." (z) Helme v. Smith, 7 Bing, 709. Brown v. Tapsco, 6 M. & W. 119. (a) Holderness v. Shackels, post. bankruptcy of one of them taking place after the commencement of the voyage, although he has not paid his full share of the outfit. In such a case, if the other part-owners have in that character paid the expense of the outfit, or made themselves responsible for it, they will have a right to deduct his share thereof from the portion of the profits of the voyage to be paid to his assignees (b). In the case of Holderness and another v. Shackels, which was trover for twenty tons of whale oil, the plaintiffs were the assignees of Foxton, a bankrupt, who, jointly with one Locking, and the defendant, was partowner of the ship Jane, a vessel engaged in the whale fishery. The usual mode of managing the cargo was, that on the arrival of the vessel at her homeward port, the blubber was deposited in a warehouse rented by the part-owners, and the oil produced from it was then put into casks, each owner's share being weighed out and placed separately in the warehouse, in casks marked with his initials. After the division, the practice was for the warehouseman to deliver to the order of each part-owner his share of the oil, unless notice was given by the ship's husband that the part-owner's share of the disbursements had not been paid. In that case the warehouseman used to detain the oil till the ship's husband's demand had been satisfied. After the division, and after a portion of Foxton's share of the oil had been delivered to him, he became bankrupt, and the warehouseman had orders from the ship's husband not to deliver to A. the remaining oil, as his share of the disbursements of the ship had not been paid. Mr. Justice Bayley said "Where there is a joint adventure which produces certain goods, the proper course is, first to deduct all the expenses which have been incurred in order to obtain those goods, and then to divide the residue among the shareholders, in proportion to the shares to which each is entitled respectively. In this case, the joint adventurers obtained a quantity of oil in bulk. No partner, or representative of a partner, had a right to his aliquot part of that oil until he had paid his share of the expense of procuring it. That will be the case whether the shareholder has become bankrupt, or continues solvent. If he continues solvent, he may pay his share of the outfit and of the expense. If he does not pay it in money, the other part-owners have a right to see that an aliquot part of what has been gained in the adventure be retained, so as to pay that share of the outfit which he ought to pay. In this case, Foxton became bankrupt; and having become bankrupt, if he could have paid in money his share of the outfit, there would have been twenty-nine tons of oil coming to him. He could not pay, and therefore, as it seems to me, the justice and law of the case is, that his share of the expense should be paid out of the twenty-nine tons, and that until he has paid his share of the expense, he cannot claim that quantity." In one case indeed, where the outfit had been conducted by a person appointed to manage the concern as purser or ship's husband, in pursuance of an agreement made by three others at the time of (b) 8 B. & C. 612. And see Green v. Briggs, 6 Hare, 395; Boyd v. Mangles, G |