Opinion of the Court. 344 U.S. From the earliest days, this Court has refused to accept jurisdiction of interlocutory decrees, such as is involved in this case. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 6 Wheat. 448, the first case presenting this issue to this Court, an injunction had been granted by a Chancery Court of the State of New York. The defendant answered and moved to dissolve the injunction. The court denied the motion to dissolve, and the defendant appealed to the Court for the Trial of Impeachments and Correction of Errors which affirmed. The appeal to this Court was dismissed because there was no final decree in the court of last resort for this Court to review. The provision of § 1257 that only "Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court . . ." has been carried in almost identical language since the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 85, § 25. "This requirement is not one of those technicalities to be easily scorned. It is an important factor in the smooth working of our federal system." Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 124. The distinction between a preliminary or temporary injunction and a final or permanent injunction was elementary in the law of equity. The classical concept was at once recognized and applied in Gibbons v. Ogden, supra. There is no room here for interpretation. The rule remains unchanged. True, as long as a temporary injunction is in force it may be as effective as a permanent injunction, and for that reason appeals from interlocutory judgments have been authorized by state legislatures and Congress. But such authorization does not give interlocutory judgments the aspect of finality here, even though we may have inadvertently granted certiorari. Baldwin Co. v. Howard Co., 256 U. S. 35, 40. 178 DOUGLAS, J., dissenting. It is argued that if this is not held to be a final decree or judgment and decided now, it may never be decided, because to await the outcome of the final hearing is to moot the question and to frustrate the picketing. However appealing such argument may be, it does not warrant us in enlarging our jurisdiction. Only Congress may do that. Furthermore, the interlocutory decree could have been readily converted into a final decree, and the appeal could have proceeded without question as to jurisdiction just as effectively and expeditiously as the appeal from the interlocutory injunction was pursued in this case. Since there was no final judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama for review, the writ of certiorari must be dismissed as improvidently granted. It is so ordered. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs, dissenting. The question presented is the power of the state court to issue a temporary injunction in this kind of labor dispute. If petitioners had sought mandamus or another appropriate state writ directed against the judge who issued the temporary injunction, I should have no doubt that it would be a final judgment which we would review. See Bandini Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U. S. 8, 14. Cf. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549, 565. I see no difference of substance between that case and this. The mischief of temporary injunctions in labor controversies is well known. It is done when the interlocutory order is issued. The damage is often irreparable. The assertion by the state court of power to act in an interlocutory way is final. Whether it has that power may be determined without reference to any future proceedings which may be taken. Unless the rule of finality is to be DOUGLAS, J., dissenting. 344 U.S. purely mechanical, which to date it has not been (see Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 124), we should determine now whether the National Labor Relations Act permits a state court to interfere with a labor controversy in a way, which though interim in form, irretrievably alters the status of the dispute or in fact settles it.* *This "practical" rather than "technical" construction is as necessary here as it is in cases involving appeals from "final decisions" in the federal system. See Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 545-546. Syllabus. WIEMAN ET AL. v. UPDEGRAFF ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF OKLAHOMA. No. 14. Argued October 16, 1952. Decided December 15, 1952. Oklahoma Stat. Ann., 1950, Tit. 51, §§ 37.1-37.8 (1952 Supp.), requires each state officer and employee, as a condition of his employment, to take a "loyalty oath," stating, inter alia, that he is not, and has not been for the preceding five years, a member of any organization listed by the Attorney General of the United States as "communist front" or "subversive." As construed by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, it excludes persons from state employment solely on the basis of membership in such organizations, regardless of their knowledge concerning the activities and. purposes of the organizations to which they had belonged. Held: As thus construed, the Act violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 184-192. (a) The Due Process Clause does not permit a state, in attempting to bar disloyal persons from its employment on the basis of organizational membership, to classify innocent with knowing association. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 485; Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U. S. 56; and Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U. S. 716, distinguished. Pp. 188-191. (b) The protection of the Due Process Clause extends to a public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 485, and United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, distinguished. Pp. 191-192. 205 Okla. 301, 237 P. 2d 131, reversed. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed the judgment of a trial court sustaining the constitutionality of Okla. Stat. Ann., 1950, Tit. 51, §§ 37.1-37.8 (1952 Supp.), and enjoining payment of salaries to state employees who had refused to subscribe to the "loyalty oath" required by that Act. 205 Okla. 301, 237 P. 2d 131. On appeal to this Court, reversed, p. 192. H. D. Emery argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief was Robert J. Emery. 226612 0-53--17 Opinion of the Court. 344 U.S. Fred Hansen, First Assistant Attorney General of Oklahoma, argued the cause for the Board of Regents of the Oklahoma Agricultural Colleges et al., appellees. With him on the brief was Mac Q. Williamson, Attorney General. Paul W. Updegraff argued the cause and filed a brief pro se. Osmond K. Fraenkel filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma upholding the validity of a loyalty oath1 prescribed by Oklahoma statute for all state officers and 1 "I, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties upon which I am about to enter. "And I do further swear (or affirm) that I do not advocate, nor am I a member of any party or organization, political or otherwise, that now advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the State of Oklahoma by force or violence or other unlawful means; That I am not affiliated directly or indirectly with the Communist Party, the Third Communist International, with any foreign political agency, party, organization or Government, or with any agency, party, organization, association, or group whatever which has been officially determined by the United States Attorney General or other authorized agency of the United States to be a communist front or subversive organization; nor do I advocate revolution, teach or justify a program of sabotage, force or violence, sedition or treason, against the Government of the United States or of this State; nor do I advocate directly or indirectly, teach or justify by any means whatsoever, the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of this State, or change in the form of Government thereof, by force |