ENGLAND'S GREAT INTEREST

IN THE

CHOICE

OF THIS

NEW PARLIAMENT.

Dedicated to all her FREEHOLDERS and ELECTORS.

Published in the Year 1679:

SIN

INCE it hath pleafed God and the king to begin to revive and restore to us our ancient right of frequent parliaments, it will greatly concern us, as to our prefent intereft, and therein the future happiness of our pofterity, to act at this time with all the wifdom, caution, and integrity we can. For befides that it is our own bufinefs, and that if, by a neglect of this fingular opportunity, we defert ourselves, and forfake our own mercies, we must expect to be left of God, and good men too. It may be there has never happened, not only in the memory of the living, but in the records of the dead, fo odd and fo ftrange a conjuncture as this we are under. It is made up of fo many unusual and important circumftances (all affecting us to the very heart) that whether we regard the long fitting of the late parliament, or its abrupt and most unexpected diffolution, or the prorogation of the laft, and its furprising diffolution, or the ftrong jealoufies of the people, and that universal agitation that is now upon the spirit of the nation, and the reasons and motives thereof (fo far as we can reach them) there

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there seems never to have been a time, wherein this kingdom ought to fhew itself more ferious and diligent in the bufinefs of its own fafety.

To be plain with you, All is at stake:' and therefore I must tell you, that the work of this parliament is,

Firft, To purfue the discovery and punishment of the plot for that has been the old fnake in the grafs, the Trojan horse, with an army in the belly of it.

Secondly, To remove, and bring to juftice, those evil counsellors, and corrupt and arbitrary ministers of state, that have been fo industrious to give the king wrong measures, to turn things out of their ancient and legal channel of administration, and alienate his affections from his people.

Thirdly, To detect and punish the penfioners of the former parliament, in the face of the kingdom: this breach of truft being treafon against the fundamental conftitution of our government.

Fourthly, To fecure to us the execution of our ancient laws by new ones; and, among the rest, such as relate to frequent parliaments, the only true check upon arbitrary minifters, and therefore feared, hated, and opposed by them.

Fifthly, That we be fecured from popery and flavery, and that Proteftant Diffenters be eafed.

Sixthly, That, in cafe this be done, the king be releafed from his burdenfome debts to the nation, and eased in the bufinefs of his revenue. And let me be free with you, if you intend to fave poor England, you must take this general measure, viz. To guide and fix your choice upon men, that you have reafon to believe are well-affected, able, and bold, to serve the country in these respects.'

The words of the writ, (at least the import of them) are, To chufe wife men, fearing God, and hating covetoufnefs:' and what to do? fays the fame writ, To advise the king of the weighty matters of the kingdom.' Let us not then play the fools or knaves, to neglect or betray the common in

tereft

tereft of our country by a base election: let neither fear, flattery, nor gain bias us. We must not make our publick choice the recompence of private favours from our neighbours; they muft excufe us for that: the weight of the matter will very well bear it. This is our inheritance, all depends upon it: men do not ufe to lend their wives, or give their children, to fatisfy perfonal kindneffes; nor must we make a swop of our birth-right, (and that of our pofterity too) for a mess of pottage, a feaft, or a drinking-bout; there can be no proportion here: and therefore none must take it ill, that we ufe our freedom about that, which, in its conftitution, is the great bulwark of all our ancient English liberties. Truly, our not confidering what it is to chufe a parliament, and how much all is upon the hazard in it, may, at laft, lofe us fatally by our own choice. For I must needs tell you, if we mifcarry, it will be our own fault; we have nobody elfe to blame for such is the happiness of our conftitution, that we cannot well be destroyed, but by ourfelves and what man in his wits would facrifice his throat to his own hands?

We, the commons of England, are a great part of the fundamental government of it; and three rights are fo peculiar and inherent to us, that if we will not throw them away for fear or favour, for meat and drink, or those other little present profits that ill men offer to tempt us with, they cannot be altered or abrogated. And this I was willing to give you a brief hint of, that you may know what fort of creatures you are, and what your power is; left, through ignorance of your own strength and authority, you turn flaves to the humours of those, that properly and truly are but your fervants, and ought to be used fo.

The first of these three fundamentals is property, that is, right and title to your own lives, liberties, and eftates' in this, every man is a fort of little fovereign to himself: no man has power over his perfon, to imprison or hurt it, or over his eftate, to invade or ufurp it: only your own tranfgreffion of the laws,

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(and

(and thofe of your own making too) lays you open to lofs; which is but the punishment due to your offences, and this but in proportion to the fault committed. So that the power of England is a legal power, which truly merits the name of government. That which is not legal, is a tyranny, and not properly a government. Now the law is umpire between king, lords, and commons, and the right and property is one in kind through all degrees and qualities in the kingdom: mark that.

The fecond fundamental, that is your birthright and inheritance, is legiflation, or the power of making laws: No law can be made or abrogated in England

without you.' Before Henry the Third's time, your ancestors, the freemen of England, met in their own perfons; but their numbers much increafing, the vastnefs of them, and the confufion that muft needs attend them, making fuch affemblies not practicable for bufinefs, this way of reprefentatives was first pitched upon as an expedient, both to maintain the common right, and to avoid the confufion of those mighty numbers. So that now, as well as then, No law ⚫ can be made, no money levied, nor a penny legally • demanded (even to defray the charges of the government) without your own confent:' than which, tell me, what can be freer, or what more fecure to any people?

Your third great fundamental right and privilege is executive, and holds proportion with the other two, in order to complete both your freedom and fecurity, and that is, Your fhare in the judicatory power, in ⚫ the execution and application of thofe laws that you agree to be made.' Infomuch as no man, according to the ancient laws of this realm, can be adjudged in matter of life, liberty, or estate, but it must be by the judgment of his peers, that is, twelve men of the neighbourhood, commonly called a JURY; though this hath been infringed by two acts, made in the late long parliament, one against the Quakers in particular, and the other against Diffenters in general, called,

⚫ An

An act against feditious conventicles,' where perfons are adjudged offenders, and punishable without a jury; which, it is hoped, this enfuing parliament will think fit in their wisdom to repeal; though with less severity, than one of the fame nature (as to punishing men without juries) was by Henry the Eighth, who, for executing of it, hanged Empfon and Dudley.

Confider with yourselves, that there is nothing more your interest, than for you to understand your right in the government, and to be constantly jealous over it; for your well-being depends upon its prefervation.

In all ages there have been ill men; and we, to be fure, are not without them now; fuch as, being confcious to themselves of ill things, and dare not stand a parliament, would put a final diffolution upon the very conftitution itself, to be fafe, that fo we might never fee one another.

But this being a task too hard for them to compafs, their next expedient is, to make them for their turn, by directing and governing the elections; and herein they are very artificial, and too often fuccefsful: which indeed is worse for us than if we had none. For thus the conftitution of parliaments may be deftroyed by parliaments, and we, who by law are free, may hereby come to be made Лlaves by law. If then you are free, and refolve to be fo, if you have any regard to God's Providence, in giving you a claim to fo excellent a conftitution, if you would not void your own rights, nor lay a foundation of vaffalage to your unborn followers, the poor pofterity of your loins, for whom God and nature, and the conftitution of the government, have made you trustees, then feriously weigh these following particulars.

I. In your prefent election, receive no man's gift, or bribe, to chufe him; but be affured, that he will be falfe to you, that bafely tempts you to be falfe to your country, yourselves, and your children. How can you hope to fee God with peace, that turn mercenaries in a matter, on which depends the well-being of an whole kingdom, for prefent and future times?

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Since