defendant, in order that a complete and final decree may be made and a multiplicity of suits prevented. An objection to the non-joinder, if deemed necessary by the defendant to his own protection, and when apparent on the face of the bill, is taken by demurrer, or otherwise by plea or answer setting forth the facts by which other persons named therein are made necessary or proper parties. If the defendant does not for any reason think fit to take the objection before, the defect may be availed of, to a limited extent, at the final hearing upon the pleadings and proof. But when thus delayed the objection receives far less favor from the court, and its allowance is said to depend to some extent upon sound discretion.

If there be an omission of an indispensable party, so that a complete decree cannot be made without him, the court will itself, ex mero motu, take notice of the fact and direct the cause to stand over, in order that such new party may be added; or dismiss the bill, when the plaintiff is chargeable with laches.

In such cases it must appear that the decree will have the effect of depriving the party omitted of his legal rights. Where the defect is formal and technical merely, and is only objected to at the hearing, and especially if other parties are needed only for the defendant's protection, the decree will not be delayed if the non-joinder produces no other prejudice to the rights of parties before the court.

It is the familiar rule that some defences cannot be made in all stages of the cause with equal effect, but will be regarded as waived when expense and delay have been incurred which might have been avoided.

All leasehold or other titles acquired pendente lite are affected with notice; and parties claiming such titles need not be joined, but are bound by the decree.

In a suit brought against a party whose title to real estate is disputed, the occupying tenants or lessees claiming possession under him are not deemed necessary parties, upon the ground that their rights are in some sort represented and so far protected.

The rule requiring all parties having a community of interests to be joined, or proper reason shown for the nonjoinder, does not apply, even if that rule would be enforced when the defendant does not suggest the defect in his pleading. The remedy applied will obviate the need of any further litigation by other parties having similar rights.

The words "provided that" and "provided also" do not always constitute a condition, and the question whether there be a condition, as well as whether it be precedent or subsequent, is to be determined by ascertaining the intention of the parties from the whole language used and the nature of the act required. When for the purpose of its fulfilment it implies that the grantee is to have possession and control of the premises, it is ordinarily construed to be a condition subsequent.

It is clearly competent to prove a waiver of the strict performance of stipulations or conditions by parol evidence of the acts and declarations of parties.

The court has jurisdiction to enforce a contract between the owner of the land and his neighbor purchasing part of it-that the latter shall either use or abstain from using the land purchased in a particular way. The question is not whether the covenant runs with the land, but whether a party shall be permitted to use the land in a manner inconsistent with the contract entered into by his vendor and with notice of which he purchased. That the question does not depend upon whether the covenant runs with the land is evident from this, that if there was a mere agreement, and no covenant, the court would enforce it against a party purchasing with notice of it, for if an equity is attached to the property by the owner, no one purchasing with notice of that equity can stand in a different situation from the party from whom he purchased.

The questions which have arisen with respect to the devolution of the benefit of covenants of that kind have been decided upon similar principles, and equally without any reference to technical distinctions depending upon the covenants running or not running with the land.

It has often been decided, that where a tract of land is subdivided into lots, and those lots are conveyed to separate purchasers, subject to conditions that are of a nature to operate as inducements to the purchase, and to give each purchaser the benefit of a general plan of building or occupation, so that each shall have attached to his own lot a right in the nature of an easement or incorporeal hereditament in the lots of the others, a right is thereby acquired by each grantee which he may enforce against any other grantee.

Conditions prohibiting the prosecution of any offensive trade or manufacture upon the premises, or the using of them for the keeping of swine, or of a livery stable, would in practice be beneficial to the neighborhood generally, although they were intended for the benefit of a particular house that the grantor had himself built as a dwelling in that immediate neighborhood.

If the court finds nothing in the terms of the conveyance, or in the plan or covenant, or in the circumstances of the transaction, or the situation of the property, that will justify it in saying that any general plan or system was intended by the grantor to be established for the benefit of grantees, or to make a part of their respective titles, and it be shown that there was a waiver by the grantor, it is not likely to uphold the restrictive obligation.

The owner of the fee has the right to sell his land subject to such reservations or restrictions as to its future use and enjoyment as he sees fit to impose, provided they are not contrary to public policy. A restriction in the deed prohibiting the erection of a building on the land conveyed is one he has a right to make. The reservation creates an easement, or servitude in the nature of an easement, upon the land conveyed. The fact that the defendant, when he took the deed, had not actual knowledge of the reservation is immaterial. He derives his title under the deed which contains it, and has constructive notice of the provisions of the deed.

It is now well settled that the burden of a covenant entered into by a grantee in fee for himself, his heirs, and assigns, although not running with the land at law so as to give a legal

remedy against the owner thereof for the time being, is binding upon the owner of it for the time being, in equity, having notice thereof.

A purchaser may be entitled to the benefit of a restrictive covenant entered into with his vendor by another or others where his vendor has contracted with him that he shall be the assign of it, that is, have the benefit of the covenant. And such covenant need not be express, but may be collected from the transaction of sale and purchase. In considering this, the expressed or otherwise apparent purpose or object of the covenant, in reference to its being intended to be annexed to other property, or to its being obtained to enable the covenantee more advantageously to deal with his property, is important to be attended to. Whether the purchaser is the purchaser of all the land retained by his vendor when the covenant was entered into is also important. If he is not, it may be important to take into consideration whether his vendor has sold off part of the land so retained, and if he has done so, whether he has sold subject to a similar covenant; whether the purchaser claiming the benefit of the covenant has entered into a similar covenant may not be so important.

In order to enable a purchaser as an assign to claim the benefit of a restrictive covenant, this, at least, must appear, that the assign acquired his property with the benefit of the covenant, that is, it must appear that the benefit of the covenant was part of the subject-matter of the purchase.

The rule against perpetuities, which governs limitations running over to third persons to take effect in the future, has never been held applicable to conditions, a right of entry for the breach of which is reserved to the grantor or devisor and his heirs, and may be released by him or them at any time.

A restriction against building within a stated distance of streets named in the deed has reference to the line of each street as existing at the date of the deed, and is intended to establish a uniform rule as of that date, which cannot be affected by the subsequent widening or narrowing of either

street by public authority, or by the fact whether a building is erected before or after such alteration of the line.

It has been held that the sale of groceries and provisions is not one of the trades or callings enumerated in deeds, and cannot be considered as a "nauseous or offensive trade,' or a purpose "which shall tend to disturb the quiet or comfort of the neighborhood," within the meaning of the restrictions.

When an estate is put up for sale in lots, subject to a condition that restrictive covenants are to be entered into by each of the purchasers with the vendor, and the vendor is intending at the sale to sell the whole of the property, the question whether it is intended that each of the purchasers shall be liable in respect of those restrictive covenants to each of the other purchasers is a question of fact to be determined by the intention of the vendor and of the purchasers, and that question must be determined upon the same rules of evidence as every other question of intention. And if it is found that it was the intention that the purchasers should be bound by the covenants inter se, a court of equity will, in favor of one of the purchasers, insist upon the performance of the covenants by any other of them, and will do so under such circumstances without introducing the vendor into the matter. The mere fact that the lots were not all sold on one day cannot make any difference. Lapse of time is not of itself a bar to the liability of the purchaser's inter se; it is a matter to be taken into consideration, but it is not a bar.

Where the same vendor, selling to several persons plots of land, parts of a larger property, exacts from each of them covenants imposing restrictions on the use of the plots sold, without putting himself under any corresponding obligation, it is a question of fact whether the restrictions are merely matters of agreement between the vendor himself and his vendees, imposed for his own benefit and protection, or are meant by him and understood by the buyers to be for the common advantage of the several purchasers. If the restrictive covenants are simply for the benefit of the vendor, purchasers of other plots of land from the vendor cannot