owners of the Stella were in no way further liable except in one respect, namely, for the costs of the actions. By reason, however, of this latter liability it was of importance that the claims should be assessed without unnecessary expenditure. The limitation proceedings were taken in the ordinary way in the Admiralty Division. Some actions for life claims, however-about a dozen in all-had been commenced in the Queen's Bench Division, and it was anticipated that there would be a good many more similar actions brought. If these actions were tried out each would entail its own series of costs, and the defendants would have to stand the worry and expense of all the various actions. There was another simple alternative. The claims might all be made in the Admiralty Division, and assessed in the simple and expeditious manner adopted in that Division by the Registrar and Merchants. An application was therefore made to the judge in the Admiralty Division for an expression of opinion, and also in the Queen's Bench Division for an order that certain actions taken as test cases should be transferred to the Admiralty Division. The order could not be made by the Admiralty judge, but it could by the Queen's Bench judge. The latter, however, refused to make the order, and on appeal the Court of Appeal confirmed and approved his decision. It is difficult to see how this can be considered other than a perfectly sound judicial decision. Under the Act which authorises such claims, the plaintiffs are undoubtedly entitled to have their claims assessed by a jury, and, as pointed out, the ordinary course is for the claims, if not resisted, after judgment by default, to be assessed by a jury in the Sheriffs' Court. That is the plaintiff's strict right, and it is a course which has been adopted in other cases. The question, however, arises whether this is a course which in the interests of all parties should be countenanced. The costs in each case may not be heavy, but they must be material. There is the common law action first, then the Sheriff Court proceedings, and lastly the proceedings to enforce the judgment and verdict in the Admiralty Division against the proceeds in that Court. In such a case as the Stella it is hard to see how anybody can obtain the least advantage from this complication of proceedings. True it is quite likely that a jury will give a plaintiff a verdict for a larger amount than the Registrar and Merchants might be inclined to award. If, however, all the claimants have their damages assessed by juries, they cannot in the aggregate get a penny more, however large the verdicts, than if they, all round, had their damage assessed by the possibly less susceptible tribunal of the Registrar and Merchants. If the juries gave in the aggregate £100,000, or if the Registrar and his advisers gave £20,000, in either case the plaintiffs would get no more than the £15,000 odd. We cannot help thinking that there should be some amendment of Lord Campbell's Act to meet such a case, or that some other alteration in the law should be devised rendering it compulsory that claims for life as well as property should be brought in the Admiralty Division. It would not in the least affect the ultimate result to the life claimants, while it would lighten the burden thrown on the defendants very considerably. There is nothing to prevent life claimants now agreeing to submit their claim to a reference in Admiralty, but this is not enough. One claimant naturally is unwilling to go there if it is open to other outstanding claimants to appeal to possibly more generous juries. If the present system is to be reformed, as we certainly think it should be, it must be by statutory enactment. A wasteful expenditure of unnecessary costs is advantageous to nobody, and in the long run not even to the lawyers.-August 9. LAY DAYS.-DEMURRAGE. SIR,-A little vessel came to London, coastwise, with a cargo of clay, and was ready to discharge on Wednesday morning, 17th instant, having arrived at discharging place (according to bill of lading) on Tuesday afternoon. There is no charter-party, and bill of lading says nothing as to discharging time. Vessel has in, by bill of lading, 111 tons, and I claim by custom of the port 49 tons per day. Merchants dispute this. Can you refer to any legal decision establishing this custom? Vessel did not finish discharging until Wednesday, 24th inst. Her days being up on Friday night as above, I claim the Sunday and Monday Bank Holiday on demurrage. Can you refer me to any legal decision establishing that Sundays and holidays are claimable on demurrage, although not as lay days? This little vessel costs me more than 4d. per registered ton per day, which I can prove by my payments. Is there any rule or custom establishing 4d. per registered ton as a maximum or minimum for all kinds of craft? Yours, &c., KETCH-OWNER. [The alleged custom would have to be established by evidence. We do not believe it could be established. The real question would probably be, what was a reasonable time for the vessel to be kept discharging in the circumstances. There is no fixed rule or custom establishing one rate of demurrage.] LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. SIR, Will you kindly give me your opinion on the following questions in connection with Clause 503 of the Merchant Shipping Act, which limits the owner's liability as follows, that is to say:-"(1) In respect of loss of life or personal injury, either alone or together, with loss of or damage to vessels, goods, merchandise, or other things, an aggregate amount not exceeding £15 for each ton of their ship's tonnage; and (2) In respect of loss of or damage to vessels, goods, merchandise, or other things, whether there be in addition loss of life or personal injury, or not, an aggregate amount not exceeding £8 for each ton of their ship's tonnage." In the case of a wrong-doing ship causing loss of life and loss of goods, &c., what is she liable for? I interpret the Act to mean that the owner's liability in such a case is limited to £15 per register ton for life, plus £8 per register ton for goods, together £23 per register ton. But a shipowner here argues that a shipowner's liability in such a case is limited to £15 per ton on her register for life and goods together. If this latter contention is correct, we are driven to the conclusion that the Merchant Shipping Act places more value on goods than on life; because if a wrong-doing ship loses life and not cargo she is liable up to £15 a ton, but if she loses cargo and life it would appear from this argument that £8 out of £15 is apportioned to cargo, and the balance to life. Yours, &c., AN OLD READER OF YOUR PAPER. [The Act is really clear. When there is loss of life or personal injury as well as loss or damage to ship or goods, the limitation is £15 and not £23 per ton. The difficulty which occurs to our correspondent is not justified. The claimants in respect of loss of life or personal injury not only have the sole right to claim against the £7 per ton, but if their just claims exceed this amount they are entitled for the balance to claim pari passu with the other claimants against the £8 per ton. (The Victoria, 13 P.D., 125.)] MUTUAL INSURANCE.-ASSIGNMENT OF MONEY DUE. Mutual insurance clubs should note the case of "Laurie v. West Hartlepools Steamship Thirds Association and David," recently tried in the Queen's Bench Division, as showing the usefulness of the condition against assignment of policies by members. In 1892 R. Short, the owner of the steamship Grimsby, was insured, in respect of average losses which might be sustained by the vessel, with the defendant association. In July of that year the Grimsby stranded and sustained damage, and the plaintiff Laurie was employed to do the necessary repairs. The repairs cost nearly a thousand pounds, and in respect of the average the amount due from the Association to Short was ascertained by the average adjuster to be £245. 1s. 8d. In August Short executed an assignment in writing to Laurie of the money due, or to be due, from the Association in respect of the stranding, and gave notice of the assignment to the Association. In October of the same year Short was adjudicated bankrupt. For no doubt a good and fairly obvious reason the trustee in bankruptcy made no claim on the insurance money, but Laurie, as assignee, did; but the Association declining to pay him, this action was brought to try the question of the liability of the Association. The defence was that by the terms of the policy, "no assignment shall as against the Association give any right to an assignee to receive the sum due unless such assignment shall have been made with the licence of the Association testified by writing under the hand of the Association." Such licence, in fact, had not been obtained. The substance of the case was that the attempt was being made to make the Association pay the full amount due under the policy without their obtaining credit for what was due by Short to the Association in respect of his insurance of his fellow-members, and which had accrued due before the assignment. If, indeed, there had been no assignment, and Short had been the claimant, there were amounts due from him which would have reduced the liability of the Association to him to about £67. If, however, the assignment was good as against the Association, they would have had to pay the full £245 odd, assuming the amount to have been properly estimated, and the debt from Short to the Association would only have given them a claim against Short or against his estate in the bankruptcy proceedings, a claim which in the circumstances could only entitle them to a dividend. The non-assignment condition certainly appeared clear, but it was contended on behalf of the assignee that the condition did not prevent the assignment being good, and that the assignee had an equitable interest, and might sue in the name of the assignor or of the official receiver. The Court, however, refused to accede to this proposition, and gave judgment for the defendants, with a declaration that the plaintiff was entitled to claim against the official receiver. In the event, therefore, the condition fulfilled the purpose for which it was intended. Presumably such associations in general have similar conditions in their rules, but it would be well if the smaller associations should overhaul their rules and see that they are similarly protected, and also all of them should take warning that, even where they have the condition, they should not accept assignments without securing payment of claims due, or which may become due, in the nature of calls against the particular member.-August 3. MARINE INSURANCE.-DAMAGE AND CLASSIFICATION.- It is very difficult to appreciate the exact effect of the decision of the House of Lords in the case of the "Ruabon Steamship Company v. the London Assurance," in conjunction with the earlier decision of their lordships in the case of the "Marine Insurance Company v. the China Transpacific Steamship Company -the steamship Vancouver." In each case a ship was docked for one purpose, and the opportunity taken to do both the intended and certain other work for a separate interest-the one underwriters', the other owners'. In each case the question appeared to be whether the dock charges, while both sets of work were being done, should be divided or should fall on the party for whom the ship was docked. In the first case it was held that the charges should be divided, in the second it has now been held that they should not. In the Vancouver case the vessel was put into dry dock for the purpose of being cleaned, scraped, and painted F ordinary owners' work. When in dock it was discovered that her sternpost was fractured, a damage which had been caused by perils of the sea, and a particular average loss within the policy of insurance. The repairs, as well as the cleaning, were duly done while the vessel was in dock, and in eight days she was discharged from dock. The repairs alone would have taken the whole eight days; the painting alone would have taken only three days. As it happened, it became very material to decide whether the charges for the first three days ought to be borne entirely by the owners or partly by the underwriters, for this reason: the underwriters were only liable for particular average loss if over three per cent., and it was only if part of the first three days' dock charges were for account of the particular average that this loss would be over the three per cent. On the decision of this point depended whether or not the underwriters were liable at all. The question was therefore fought hard. The Queen's Bench Division decided that the expense of the first three days was entirely at the risk of the shipowners, but the judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeal, which held that the dock dues on the three days utilised for both the cleaning and the repairs ought, as a matter of business, to be divided equally. This decision of the Court of Appeal was confirmed by the House of Lords. The Ruabon case was sufficiently similar to make it very generally considered to be within the principle of the Vancouver case. The Ruabon sustained damage which came within the policy of insurance, and she was docked to undergo the necessary repairs. While in the dock the owners took the opportunity of having her surveyed for classification purposes. The survey was not due, and there was no immediate necessity for it to be made, but the owners took advantage of the vessel being in dock, thereby saving the necessity of a second docking a few months later. The question raised was whether the expenses of taking the Ruabon into and out of the dock and placing her there, and the dock dues while she was there, ought to be apportioned between the owners and underwriters. Mr. Justice Mathew held that the case was covered by the Vancouver decision, and that all these expenses, so far as they were common to the repairs and the survey, should be apportioned between the owners and the underwriters, this being, he considered, in accordance with the Vancouver decision. The subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeal led to a difference of opinion in that Court. The majority of the Lords Justices agreed with the Court below, and the appeal was accordingly dismissed. Lord Justice A. L. Smith, however, drew a distinction between the actual dock |