between the Courts or possibly the assessors. The Algoa had been at anchor in the river Elbe athwart river. It was held in the Admiralty Division that her second anchor light was in a wrong position, and that she was alone in fault, the Gannet not being to blame, as the light might have been hidden. On appeal to the Court of Appeal it was held that both were to blame, as the second light should have been seen. In the Dundee and Carlotta case a question was raised whether the Sea Rules were applicable in the Thames. It was held they were not in the circumstances, being inconsistent with the local Rules, but the Court considered they might be applicable so far as not inconsistent. It is perhaps unfortunate that the decision was not more definite, as the point is one of practical importance. The "J. W. Taylor v. the Hopper No. 4" is important from the fact that in his judgment it was strongly pointed out by the judge in the Admiralty Division that the Thames by-laws were in part unintelligible, a matter which should be dealt with by the proper authorities. In the Gemma case a question of considerable interest to foreign owners was determined. The Gemma was arrested in a collision action and released on bail. The action was tried, and the Gemma held to blame; damages were assessed exceeding the bail, and the ship was seized under writ of fi. fa. An application by her owners for her release was granted in the Admiralty Division, but the subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeal was allowed, with costs. In the Philadelphian, the question was considered as to what was the proper position of the forward anchor light of a vessel which under the Regulations is bound to carry two anchor lights, one forward and one aft. It was held in the Admiralty Division that 60-70 feet from the stern in a vessel 313 feet long was not a proper place. This seems to exhaust the list of notable collision actions with the exception of two, in which questions of compulsory pilotage were raised. In the Columbus it was held in the

Admiralty Division that a foreign ship not carrying passengers in the Thames from a port in Europe north and east of Brest was exempt under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, notwithstanding the Pilotage Act, 1897. In the Glanystwyth it was held that a vessel from Turkey, having discharged part cargo at Ipswich, and proceeding thence to Leith, was exempt as engaged in the coasting trade under the Act of 1894. Neither are of the first importance, but compulsory pilotage law is in such a state of chaos that every decision has to be remembered. Akin to collision comes "damage to ship," and there was of these claims. one of some peculiarity, the Ralph Creyke, an unusual action brought by the owners of a vessel damaged by running ashore, against lighthouse authorities for neglecting to maintain leading lights in a river. The duties of such authorities were considered, and the action was dismissed in the Admiralty Division. Jurisdiction is always a difficult point, and the Fulham affords an example. The vessel had been arrested and detained by the Receiver of Wreck, having been in distress 20 miles from Falmouth. An action was brought against the Receiver by the owners, but judgment was given for the defendant, and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. The point was whether under the Merchant Shipping Act the Receiver was entitled to, and, indeed, was bound, to detain the ship in such circumstances where a salvage claim may be made. The decision was, in the particular case, in favour of the Receiver, but the result may be to throw upon these officials a very difficult duty. On the subject of limitation of liability, the "Brunel v. the Glanmire" case may be noted. The question was whether a tug which was not registered ought to have been, and therefore her owners were not entitled to limitation. The tug could carry 15 tons; if measured under the Act she would have been over 15 tons gross and under 15 tons net. It was held in the Admiralty Division that she was

under 15 tons burden, and therefore not bound to be registered, and the Court of Appeal confirmed this decision. Appeals from Registrar's Reports have been few in number, and it has again been shown how well the assessment of damages is decided in the Admiralty Division. Only three appeals need be mentioned. In the Mediana an objection was allowed in the Admiralty Division, but the appeal to the Court of Appeal was allowed with costs. The Robert Adamson was a contention between the ship and cargo owners. The cargo owners had paid some general average, and it was held by the Registrar that this payment was to be taken into consideration; but the Admiralty Division held to the contrary—a question of law on which a difference of opinion might well be expected. The Leonis also raised a difficult question as to the payment to be made for a floating dock of an old-fashioned construction. In the year there were two Board of Trade re-hearings. At the China inquiry at Aden, the master's certificate was suspended six months, and the second mate was severely censured. A re-hearing was ordered by the Board of Trade, with this peculiar result: At the re-hearing no charge was made against the master. He was, however, held in fault, but no order was made as he had lost his certificate for six months. The second officer was absolved, but each party to the re-hearing had to bear his own costs. In the Throstlegarth the master appealed, his certificate having been suspended. The Admiralty Division decided in his favour, on the ground that his not stopping his vessel when placed in a difficulty by a pilot cutter jibing was merely an error in judgment which did not justify suspension. This fairly exhausts the Admiralty cases of any importance.

Of the shipping cases as distinct from those which may be described as Admiralty actions, there were a fair number which are of some commercial interest. Taking, first, the decisions bearing on questions connected with affreightment,

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the Isis case was taken a step further on appeal from the Queen's Bench Division; but the Court of Appeal confirmed the material part of the decision of the Court below, which was to the effect that where cargo is to be brought "alongside" for loading the contract is not fulfilled by bringing it on rail to places varying from 70 feet to 120 yards from the ship, notwithstanding the custom. The advanced freight case, the Olivebank, was also heard on appeal, but the decision of the Queen's Bench Division was affirmed. This was to the effect that where part cargo was destroyed during loading the shipowners were not entitled to the stipulated advanced freight on the destroyed cargo. The Brenda was a claim against charterers by shipowners for the cost of discharging into barge and on to quay from ship's rail, notwithstanding the admitted custom of the Port of London that shipowners were required to do such work, although outside the ship. The plaintiffs relied on the special clause, The cargo to be brought to and taken from alongside the steamer at charterers' risk. and expense, any custom of the port notwithstanding." Judgment was given in the Queen's Bench Division for the plaintiffs. This is a good instance of a custom which has been allowed to obtain force being successfully withstood by taking sufficient care in drafting the contract of affreightment. Demurrage actions have been few, and of little interest; but the Grimsby "colliery guarantee" case, the Crosshill, came before the Court of Appeal, and the judgment of the Queen's Bench Division was confirmed. The point decided was that under the usual colliery guarantee at Grimsby the time for loading only commenced when the vessel came under the tip. The Forest case was also further appealed to the House of Lords. The question was as to the meaning of time for loading and discharging "350 tons per "350 tons per working day of 24 hours." Shipowners contended that this meant per working day from the time work started to the same time next day, and so on.

Charterers contended that it meant per each 24 working hours. The Queen's Bench Division and the Court of Appeal had decided in favour of the charterers, and the House of Lords were of the same opinion. A question of interest to charterers was decided in the Pocklington case. The dispute was between charterers and shipowners as to the division of a salvage award. There was a special clause in the charter-party, "salvage for owners and charterers equal benefit." The question was whether the division was to be of the gross award, but the Court held that the damage to each party was to be first deducted. Some half-dozen marine insurance cases may be mentioned. The Elmfield was a claim against the insurers of a ship, damaged in collision and run ashore, for consequential damage—namely, for the cost of discharging her cargo, which had become wet and rotten. It was held in the Queen's Bench Division that this damage was too remote and could not be recovered. The case was taken on appeal to the Court of Appeal, but the appeal was dismissed. In the Ramlah, freight chartered or as if chartered was insured, part of the cargo was jettisoned, and the bill of lading freight on the rest was less than the chartered freight. It was held by the Queen's Bench Division, on the claim being made against the underwriters, that, as the charter freight was a lump-sum freight, and the cargo was worth it, there was no loss of the same. An appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed. In the Lodore case a cargo of coals had heated, and the ship in consequence put into a port of distress. The question was whether the underwriters on freight were entitled to general average contribution. This was answered in the negative, on the ground that, as the cargo could not have been carried on, the freight was lost before the General Average Act. In the Victory case it was decided in the Queen's Bench Division that under the collision clause underwriters were liable for the cost of removing the wreck of the vessel with