THE

MONTHLY REVIEW,

For JANUARY, 1759.

Epiftles philofophical and moral. 8vo. 6s. Wilcox.

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ROM the earliest dawn of science, to the firft philofophy of the prefent age, mankind have been perplexed with fuch various and irreconcileable opinions, that philofophical fpeculations have, for fome time paft, been growing into difefteem and neglect.

The vanity of fome fpeculatifts, has made them ambitious to become the parents of a partial fyftem, while the foolish pride of others has endeavoured to deftroy all system whatever, and to eftablish univerfal doubt on the ruins of knowlege. Both have been equally enemies to truth; and it is perhaps difficult to determine, whether bigotry or fcepticism have been of greatest prejudice. Indeed the difference between them appears to be rather nominal, than effential; the profefled difbeliever may be deemed as great a bigot as the moft orthodox zealot; for the mind which is closed against conviction, and obftinately rejects all fixed principles, is as much bigotted as that which pertinaciously, fupports false principles.

The former difpofition however is not only moft unpleafing to ourselves, but moft dangerous to others. When the mind has no data, no fettled principles to which it may recur as the rule of action, the agent can feel little or no fatisfaction within himself, and fociety can have no moral fecurity whatever againit him. The moft permanent, and we may add, the most pleafing enjoyment the human foul is capable of entertaining, is that which arifes from a confcioufnets of having acted up to that VOL. XX.

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ftandard of rectitude, which we conceive to be the proper meafure of our duty and the best grounds on which we can expect others to place confidence in us,, is the affurance we give them that we act under the influence of fuch moral obligations.

Thefe obligations to morality, however, can never exift in a mind uninfluenced. by religious and philofophical principles. It is therefore the worst office which we can do to mankind, to overthrow establilled tenets, without fubftituting others of equal moral efficacy in their ftead: fince it is much better, in many cafes, to be governed by erroneous opinions, than to be agitated by fceptical notions.

Prejudice, it is certain, is always an enemy to truth: but perhaps in fome minds it is a friend to virtue. All capacities cannot command a fufficient degree of attention to pursue the intricacies of philofophical fpeculation; neither, if they could, are they endued with proper powers of perception to difcern and judge for themfelves. Thefe muft neceffarily be governed by prejudices, and, if you remove them, you leave fuch weak objects without any principle whatever. It muft indeed be confelled, that the force of prejudice is not very powerful in the prefent age. Men in general are too wife to adopt the opinions of their forefathers, yet at the fame time too indolent to establish any of their own: and as they live without fyftem, they make present convenience the fole rule of their conduct. Their virtues are only occafional, but their vices habitual. Not content with having conquered the prejudices of Education, they triumph over reafon,

and over nature.

In thefe days of infidelity however, we do not remember to have met with a fceptick of more candour and good fenfe than the ingenious Author of the Epiftles before us. Though he profefles to proceed on the Horatian principle, and to detach himself from all foregoing fyftems, yet he does not leave us without a guide.

He affures us that he is more ambitious of the character of a philofopher, than that of a poet. But notwithstanding the modeity of his pretenfions, he difcovers great poetic merit. His figures are bold and flriking, and his imagery apt and beautiful. Nevertheless, he is not always attentive to the harmony of his numbers; neither has he preferved that perfpicuity of expreffion, requifite in philofophical difquifitions: and though we agree with him that precepts in verfe are beft remembered, yet we will venture to fay that they are generally moft difficult to comprehend. The fetiers of rhyme and meafure will not admit of that copious, Clear, and precife expreffion, which we may command in profe. We night produce leveral initances, where the Author has facrificed

fenfe

fenfe, and grammatical correctnefs, to found: but we forbear fuch trivial criticisms, as the fubject opens room for more important animadverfions.

Thefe Epiftles are introduced by a facetious Dedication to the firft Minister of State for the Time being, in which the Writer ridicules all party attachments, and profelles to facrifice all prudential views to the love of truth.

In his first Epistle he examines the different criterions of truth; and obferves that fcience, or demonftrative knowlege, is fupposed to be the leaft exceptionable teft of what is true or falfe in general. But, as particular opinions are not always the effect of knowlege, he inquires if there be no other criterion to relieve the doubts and reconcile the oppofite fentiments of mankind. He endeavours to prove, that the difpenfations of providence, as well as the dictates of revelation, are inadequate to the purpose. He obferves, that the Chriftian page admits of different conftructions, as Hereticks of every kind find their tenets in the gofpel: and he fhews, that even the ftriking fcenes of nature operate variously on different minds, according to the different degrees of knowlege with which they are endued. He cenfures divines and philofophers, as mercenary wranglers, or bigots to particular fyftems, rather than fair enquirers after, or teachers of, the truth. He then proceeds to characterize a fair and ingenuous enquirer, and affirms that fortitude and moderation are the grand requifites to form fuch a character. The Author however proceeds with great impartiality; he is no lefs fevere against the heterodox than the orthodox, and he advifes Lorenzo to beware of both.

Lorenzo, credit not too foon

Fine tales and tidings from the moon:
Nor, howsoever learn'd or just;
In prieft or prophet put thy trust.
By Paul or by Apollos taught,
Still to one tell their tenets brought,
Their doctrines, howfoever true,
Adopt not till they're fo to you.
For oft, when stript of its difguife,
Folly the wisdom of the wife.

Yet fupercilioufly reject
No dogmas that the world refpect.
'Gainft fuch too rafhly ne'er inveigh;
Nor caft thy grandfire's wit away.
Difdaining at the lamp to pore,
That lights us to the claffick lore,

It is neceffary to premife, that thefe Epiftles bear reference to a part of this work published fome time fince, and intitled Epiftles to Lorenzo; of which the reader may find an account in our Review, Vol. XVI. p. 226,

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The half taught deift thus exclaims
At texts rever'd and hallow'd names,
Damning profane or facred writ,
That fquares not with his fhallow wit.

But while, through ignorance or pride,
Opinions thus the world divide;

Faith made the priest's and flatefman's tool;
By turns while truth and falfhood rule,
Or, with fome temporizing view,

Nonfenfe, that's neither falfe nor true;
Canft thou, at eafe in doubt, my friend,
On points too dark thy faith fufpend?
Cantt thou the world's etteem forego;
And burns thy bofom but to know?
Is truth thy only creed profefs'd?
Canil leave to providence the reft ?
Throw partial fyitems all afide,

And take thy knowledge for thy guide.

In the fecond Epiftle, our Author argues, that by the general pretenfions of mankind to common fenfe, it is admitted that knowlege is the criterion of truth. Common fenfe, he says, is the privilege of every mind without diftinction; enabling us equally to draw like conclufions from like premifes. He infers from hence, that all actual difpute arifes from a different acceptation of the matter in queftion. He obferves that the capacity and credulity of individuals, are different in confequence of their diverfity of temperament, education, and experience. It is therefore, he fays, injurious and ridiculous to infult others, for thinking in the manner we ourselves fhould have done, under the fame circumftances: and ftill more abfurd to reprobate the reft of mankind, for not believing what we ourfelves do not, nor can poffibly be made to believe. This leads our Author to fome reflections on the truth of revelation, which, he fays, if it be admitted in general, as what is revealed from heaven muft undoubtedly be true, the difficulty of knowing what is particularly fo, or who are the truly infpired, is yet inexplicably great. Though the power of working miracles, fays he, be allowed as a proof of infpiration in the agent: the fallacy of pretended ones, and the fuppofed infpiration of impoftors, are almoft invincible obftacles to our difcovery of the truth. He combats the fuppofition, that real miracles are trangreffions of the laws of nature: he acknowledges, however, that we cannot philofophically deny, that God fometimes produces effects, for ends best known to himself, by means wholly unknown to us; and he concludes with afferting, that the criterion of fcience is to be neglected enly in points indifputably and intelligibly revealed.

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These are topicks of a very nice nature, and it requires uncommon skill to treat them fo as to preferve the freedom of enquiry, and at the fame time not offend tender confciences, or incur the cenfure of affected zealots: for there are many, who pretend vaft concern for the established church, and the myfteries of our holy religion, who have, in fact, no more regard for the proteftant establishment, than they have for the Turkish Prophet or the Scarlet Whore. But our Author is not fingular in his opinion. Many have fhrewdly contended, that science is the proper criterion by which to examine points not intelligibly revealed. According to them, it is not fufficient that a number of traditional facts concur, to induce a belief of a PARTICULAR revelation; but they infift that we muft examine the mystery depending upon thofe facts, by reafoning a priori & pofteriori; that is, we muft confider, firft, to what end fuch a revelation could be given; and fecondly, how far the effects have answered the purpose intended. The design of all revelations, say they, from heaven, muft certainly be, to make mankind wifer and better; if a PARTICULAR revelation, therefore, difclofes no more than what was known before by the light of reafon or prior revelation; or if it leaves mankind in the fame state of error, doubt, and impiety, they affirm that there is great room to fufpect that it is fupported by impofture. In vain we tell them, that we muft not argue against the use of revelation, from the abuse of it; and infift, that the fame objections which are made against the infufficiency of revelation for the purpose propofed, may be urged against the infufficiency of reafon itself. They reply, that admitting all that is here expreffed, yet if reafon, which was given by Heaven as a guide to virtue, proved an incompetent conductor, and it was found neceflary to fuperadd revelation, to discover new truths, or confirm and diffufe fuch as were before but partially known, then, in fuch cafe, there was the ftronger neceffity that fuch revelation fhould be clear, indifputable, and intelligible; for to add one infufficient guide to another, fay they, is rather to confound, than direct us in our fearch after truth. They therefore affirm, that all traditional revelation fhould be examined by the criterion of science. We will only add, that the Chriftian revelation has been fatisfactorily tried by this criterion, and the truth of it fully proved. If it has not, as our Author infinuates, totally banifhed doubt, it has, neverthelefs, reconciled the fentiments of mankind, on the most important truths, to a degree of certainty, which pagan philofophy could never eftablish.

Reafon is here used in a fenfe diftinct from Revelation; though perhaps they may, in fome fenfe, be confidered as fynonimous: for Reafon itself may be deemed a kind of divine revelation.

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