language of church history and of theological controversy assigns to metaphysical theology but a segment of the whole circle of a theological system; which segment is made up mainly of the doctrines of depravity, predestination, the extent of the atonement, and the operation of Divine grace in the regeneration, sanctification and perseverance of the saints.. In the remarks I am about to make, this restricted and popular definition will be employed. Limited as this range of topics must appear, when compared with the whole of a theological system, it is not uncommon to suppose that metaphysical theology is a vast wilderness of theories ; unmarked

well defined thoroughfares, and that each individual travcrsing its arid wastes, pursues his own devious path unguided and uncontrolled by the footsteps of his predecessors.

Such a supposition is erroneous. But two leading systems of metaphysical theology are logically possible, and the history of the church evinces that the mass of those who have journeyed in these regions in search of truth, have with surprising uniformity pursued the one or the other of these highroads. It is true that individual tourists, and indeed whole companies of travelers, have entered upon these principal roads at different points, have continued their routes irregularly, sometimes even passing from the one to the other. Yet the track of such wanderers will usually be found to lie principally in the direction of one of the main roads rather than the other. These two systems are characterized and determined by the views of the human will, upon which they are respectively founded. The one system rests upon a theory which makes the will in some sense necessary, and the other system, upon a theory which leaves it wholly free. By affirming that one of these theories regards the will as in some sense necessary, while the other leaves it free, I do not intend, by the use of terms, to prejudice my audience against the one theory, and in favor of the other. In the proper place I shall exhibit, in the language of one of the ablest advocates of the former theory, the sense in which the will is believed to be necessary. Before entering upon our proposed investigations, which have respect to these two metaphysico-theological systems, allow me to remark, that much circumlocution will be avoided by selecting some comprehensive epithet for each system. Augustinism and Calvinism are terms descriptive of the one system, and as these names are endeared to its advocates, they will be indiscriminately employed. For the other system the choice of a name is more difficult. Its

enemies would readily suggest Pelagianism; but this, as we shall see, is inapplicable. Nor will Arminianism accurately define it; for it is difficult to perceive wherein Arminius differed from Calvin on some of the points in metaphysical theology. Permit me then to speak of it as the Free Will Theology. I wish farther to say, by way of preliminary, that it should be distinctly understood that the controversy between the advocates of these two systems, does not respect the truthfulness of the doctrines of depravity, election, atonement and grace. These grand doctrines are the foundation of all evangelical Christianity, and are confessed in every creed. The controversy respects merely the metaphysical explanation of these doctrines, and the mode of harmonizing them with each other, and with the attributes of God, and the faculties of man. Bigots of every creed, and bigots alone, are accustomed to regard those as denying the doctrines themselves, who reject their explanations of them.

We begin with the Calvinistic system, and propose to show that it is based upon the hypothesis of a necessary will: that this hypothesis is incorrect, and that such a system was utterly unknown in the Christian Church until the fifth century. What the peculiarities of this theology are, will appear in the examination of the first of these points.

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I. Our first proposition, namely, that the Calvinistic theology is based on the hypothesis of a necessary will, admits of that species of summary proof, which is derived from the admissions of its candid and intelligent friends. (Hill's Lectures in Divinity, p 599.) But our plan involves a more full development of the proposition, and to this we proceed. The key-stone of the metaphysical arch which sustains the Calvinistic system is the formula of Edwards: The will is always. as the greatest apparent good is." (Inquiry, p 20.) This he explains by saying, "I use the term 'good," as of the same import with agreeable.' To appear good to the mind is the same as to appear agreeable or seem pleasing to the mind, (p 20.) Thus the greatest apparent good' is that which seems most agreeable or pleasing to the mind, and in determining what is most agreeable, the will does not always regard the dictates of reason or understanding. "If by the dictate of the understanding," says Edwards, is "meant what reason declares to be best, or most for the person's happiness, taking in the whole of its duration, it is not true that the will always follows the last dictate of the understanding. Such a dictate is quite a different matter from things appearing now most agreea

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ble, all things being put together which relate to the mind's present perceptions in any respect." (p 25.) We are left then, to the desires or affections as the ultimate arbiter of what is 6 now most agreeable, or in other words, of what shall determine the will. Indeed Edwards does not regard desire and will as distinct. "The will and the affections of the soul," he says, "are not two faculties," and consequently," a man never in any instance wills any thing contrary to his desires, nor desires any thing contrary to his will." (p. 17.) The strongest desire,' therefore, and that which appears now most agreeable,' are identical, and the connection between this strongest desire and the volition or choice, is so close, that it is not sufficient to say that the desire determines the choice: the strongest desire, or that which at the moment appears most agreeable, is the choice. The culminating point of desire is volition. "I have chosen rather," observes Edwards, "to express myself thus, that the will is always as the greatest apparent good, or as what appears most agreeable than to say the will is determined by the greatest apparent good, or by what seems most agreeable; because an appearing most agreeable to the mind, and the mind's preferring, seem scarcely distinct." (p 21.) The connection between the strongest desire and the choice, is said to be that of a moral or philosophical necessity, but by using the qualifying terms, moral and philosophical, Edwards does not mean to make the necessity less absolute than natural necessity. "Moral necessity," (we quote his own words,) "may be as absolute as natural necessity. That is, the effect may be as perfectly connected with its moral cause, as a natural, necessary effect is with its natural cause." (p 33.) "The difference between moral and natural in this respect," he adds, "does not lie so much in the nature of the connection as in the two terms connected."

To express the substance of this theory popularly and briefly: If from any cause man's affections should become so perverted that a present sinful gratification should seem more agreeable or pleasing to the mind than the opposite virtuous choice, the sinful gratification would necessarily be chosen, notwithstanding the virtuous choice might be recommended as best by the reason, and sanctioned by the monitions of conscience.. With this outline of the Calvinistic theory of the will, we are prepared to develop the doctrines based upon it. The doctrine of depravity arises first in order—a doctrine not sim ple, but complex, embracing the several particulars of original sin, federal representation and imputation.

That man inherits from Adam a nature that is corrupt in such a sense that his desires, affections and passions are inclined to evil, is admitted by all evangelical Christians. Linking this universally conceded fact with the metaphysical theory just given, we have before us the Calvinistic view of original sin, namely, an inherited corrupt nature sustaining such a relation to the will as to necessitate sinful choices. Sinful man is no longer free to good, but only to evil. Thus Augustine : "By the first pair so great a sin was committed, that by it human nature was changed for the worse, an obligation of sin and a necessity of death being transmitted to posterity." (Wiggers, p 91.) So again: "It," that is, original sin, "is not merely a voluntary and possible sin, from which one has the freedom to abstain, but even a necessary sin from which he has not the freedom to abstain." (Ibid, 91.) "Man has only freedom for "The will of man is free to sin only. (Ib. 114.)

sin."

The various elements of the doctrine of depravity are almost inseparably united. It is therefore in vindication, or perhaps merely in explanation* of the view of original sin just given that we are brought to the doctrines of federal representation and imputation. Calvinistic writers are not always careful to discriminate between these several parts, nor is there entire harmony in their views respecting imputation and representation. We will endeavor to disintegrate these latter elements, and present the different views entertained in relation to them.

Federal head and federal representative are terms applied by Calvinists to Adam, to indicate the relation he sustained to his posterity. The older and stricter writes of this school are believed to have held that this relation was that of personal identity. Later writers generally deny any such identity and some of them even deny that the older authors ever taught it. I have no wish to fasten this opinion upon these

* The various elements of depravity are believed to be logically connected. Since Calvinists deny to man any ability to good, they seem compelled to invent some scheme by which to hold him accountable. Such an invention are the theories of representation and imputation. Man being in Adam either by identity or by a legal union, is no more freed from obligation by the forfeitures of his representative than if he had lost his ability by his own proper act. But Calvinists do not thus state the connection, for they make man responsible, because he possesses the freedom which Edward's system still leaves him. The connection in this case is given as it is, because I have aimed throughout the address, to state the opinions of others as nearly as possible as they themselves would express them.

ancient worthies, and therefore I shall submit their own language, that you may judge as well as others. Augustine holds the following language. "When that pair, (Adam and Eve) received the divine sentence of condemnation, the whole race were in the first man." (Wiggers p. 270. "In respect to the origin of the seed from which all were to spring, all men were in that individual and all these were HE, none of whom as yet existed individually." Ib. p. 278. Language could scarcely express identity if this does not. Stapper, an eminent divine of Switzerland attempts to illustrate the connection in question by a figure drawn from the root and branches of a tree. "Seeing all Adam's posterity" he says, "are derived from their first parent as their root, the whole of the human kind with its root, may be considered as constituting but one whole or mass; so as not to be properly distinct from its root, the posterity not differing from it, otherwise than the branches from the tree." Edwards quotes this passage with approbation. (Works, Vol. 2, p. 545) and adds similar illustrations of his own, such as the identity of the seedling and the old tree, of the human body in infancy and old age. The opponents of Calvinism are not alone in supposing that Edwards, by these illustrations, meant to teach the personal identity of Adam and his race. The Rev. Dr. Dick of Scotland, one of the ablest and most popular of recent Calvinistic writers so understands him, and gives a synopsis of his argument on the subject, with a successful refutation of the sentiment. (Lectures, p. 240.)

Modern Calvinists, in general, regard the connection between Adam and his posterity "as the conjunction of separate beings by a legal union." Such is the language of Dr. Dick, (Theology, p. 240.) Dr. Hill's statement is substantially the same: "Adam as a federal head acted for his posterity." (Divinity, p. 406.) On either of these hypothesises of federal representation, the doctrine of imputation is closely connected. with it. As the older Calvinists use language implying the identity of Adam and his posterity, they are equally if not more distinct in speaking of his first sin as the act of his descendants, alleging that they were blameworthy and ill-deserving on account of it, and that it is imputed to them because it is theirs. Thus Edwards: "The sin of apostacy is not theirs merely because God imputes it to them, but it is truly and properly theirs, and on that ground, God imputes it to them." (Original Sin, p. 559.) So the Westminster confession of faith, "All mankind sinned in him, and fell with him in that first transgression." (Larger Catechism, Quest. 22.) So also Augustine: "Adam