United States-China Relations 11 Years After the Shanghai Communique: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-eighth Congress, First Session, February 28, 1983U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983 - 124 sivua |
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18 million administration agreement aid to China allies American arms sales Asian August 17 August 17 communique authorities on Taiwan Beijing benefits bilateral billion Carter CHIU commitment Committee Communist Congress countries cultural Dalai Lama differences diplomatic relations discussions economic exchanges exports foreign policy future of Taiwan human rights important Institute interests Jilin University Joint Communique mainland maintain major martial law military Nanjing University Nationalist negotiation nine-point normalization party Peking PENG People's Republic position PRC's rapprochement region rela relationship Republic of China resolution reunification ROC government sales to Taiwan Secretary Shultz Shanghai Communique sides Sino-American relations Sino-Soviet situation SOLARZ solution Soviet Union strategic subcommittee SULLIVAN Taiwan independence Taiwan issue Taiwan problem Taiwan question Taiwan Relations Act Taiwan Straits Taiwanese textile threat Tibet tion trade U.S. government U.S. policy U.S. relations United States-China relations University 1980 US-China relations WOLFOWITZ
Suositut otteet
Sivu 43 - Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means; (4) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States...
Sivu 74 - Government states that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution.
Sivu 51 - the state may establish special administrative regions when necessary. The systems to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by laws enacted by the National People's Congress in the light of the specific conditions.
Sivu 95 - Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and - to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.
Sivu 29 - We maintain diplomatic relations with many governments of which we do not necessarily approve. The reality is that, in this day and age, coups and other unscheduled changes of government are not exceptional developments. Withholding diplomatic relations from these regimes, after they have obtained effective control, penalizes us. It means that we forsake much of the chance to influence the attitudes and conduct of a new regime. Without relations, we forfeit opportunities to transmit our values and...
Sivu 50 - After the country is reunified, Taiwan can enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region and it can retain its armed forces.
Sivu 50 - Taiwan can enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region and it can retain its armed forces. The Central Government will not interfere with local affairs on Taiwan.
Sivu 1 - States, and are matters of international concern; (3) to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means...
Sivu 61 - If the political, economic, social and cultural gaps between the Chinese mainland and free China continue to narrow, the conditions for peaceful reunification can gradually mature. The obstacles to reunification will be reduced naturally with the passage of time.
Sivu 61 - Chinese strategist of olden times, this is an effort "to defeat the military force of the other side without fighting a battle." On January 20, 1961, in his inaugural speech. President John F. Kennedy said the United States would never fear to negotiate but would never negotiate out of fear. President Reagan said in his State of the Union address in 1982 that America will negotiate only from a position of strength. The eminent views of these two American presidents clearly express the position and...