majefty. The civil lift, thus liquidated, together with the four millions and an half, interest of the national debt, and the two millions produced from the finking fund, make up the feven millions and a quarter per annum, neat money, which were before ftated to be the annual produce of our perpetual taxes; besides the immense, though uncertain, fums arifing from the annual taxes on land and malt, but which, at an average, may be calculated at more than two millions and a quarter; and, added to the preceding fum, make the clear produce of the taxes, exclufive of the charge of collecting, which are raised yearly on the people of this country, amount to near ten millions fterling

THE expenfes defrayed by the civit lift are thofe that in any fhape relate to civil government; as, the expenfes of the houshold; all falaries to officers of ftate, to the judges, and every of the king's fervants; the appointments to foreign embaffadors; the maintenance of the queen and royal family; the kings private expenses, or privy purse; and other very numerous outgoings, as fecret fervíce money, penfions; and other bounties: whith fometimes have fo far exceeded the revenues appointed for that purpose, that application has been made to parliament to discharge the debts contracted on the civil lift; as particularly in 1724, when one million was granted for that purpose by the statute 11 Geo. I. c. 17. and in 1769, when half a million was appropriated to the like uses, by the ftatute g Geo. III. c. 34.

THE Civil lift is indeed properly the whole of the king's revenue in his own diftinct capacity; the reft being rather the revenue of the public, or it's creditors, though collected, and diftributed again, in the name and by the officers of the crown: it now standing in the fame place, as the hereditary income did formerly; and, as that has gradually diminished, the parliamentary appointments have encreased. The whole revenue of queen Elizabeth did not amount to more than 600,000l. a year; that'

Sf 2

of

g-Lord Clar. continuation. 163.

h

i

of king Charles I was 800,000l. and the revenue voted for king Charles II was 1,200,000l. though complaints were made (in the first years at least) that it did not amount to fo much *. But it must be observed, that under thefe fums were included all manner of public expenfes; among which lord Clarendon in his fpeech to the parliament computed, that the charge of the navy and land forces amounted annually to 800,000l. which was ten times more than before the former troubles'. The fame revenue, fubject to the fame charges, was fettled on king James II": but by the encrease of trade,and more frugal management, it amounted on an average to a million and half per annum, (befides other additional customs, granted by parliament", which produced an annual revenue of 400,000/.) out of which his feet and army were maintained at the yearly expenfe of° 1,100,000l. After the revolution, when the parliament took into it's own hands the annual fupport of the forces both maritime and military, a civil lift revenue was fettled on the new king and queen, amounting, with the hereditary duties, to 700,000l. per annum"; and the fame was continued to queen Anne and king George I'. That of king George II, we have feen, was nominally augmented to '800,000l. and in fact was confiderably more. But that of his present majesty is exprefsly limited to that fum; and, by reason of the harges upon it, amounts at prefent to little more than 700,000l. And upon the whole it is doubtlefs much better for the crown, and also for the people, to have the revenue fettled upon the modern footing rather than the antient. For the crown; because it is more certain, and collected with greater cafe: for the people; becaufe they are now delivered from the foedal hardfhips, and other odicus branches of the prerogative. And though complaints have fometimes been made of the encrease of the civil lift, yet if we confider the fums that have been formerly granted, the limited extent under which it is now eftablished, the reve

nues1

Com. Journ. 4 Sept. 1660. ibid.

it Ibid. 4 Jun. 1663. Lord Clar. ibid.

} Ibid. 165.

m Stat. 1 Jæ. II. c. 1.

n Ibid. c. 3 & 4.

o Com. Journ. 1 Mar, 20 Mar. 1688.
Ibid. 14 Mar. 1701.

P

q Ibid. 17 Mar. 1701. 11 Aug. 1714%

r Stat. 1 Geb. II. c. r.

nues and prerogatives given up in lieu of it by the crown, and (above all) the diminution of the value of money compared with what it was worth in the last century, we must acknowledge these complaints to be void of any rational foundation; and that it is impoffible to fupport that dignity, which a king of Great-Britain should maintain, with an income in any degree less than what is now established by parliament.

THIS finishes our enquiries into the fifcal prerogatives of the king; or his revenue, both ordinary and extraordinary. We have therefore now chalked out all the principal outlines of this vaft title of the law, the fupreme executive magiftrate, or the king's majefty, confidered in his feveral capacities and points of view. But, before we intirely difmifs this fubject, it may not be improper to take a fhort comparative review of the power of the executive magistrate, or prerogative of the crown, as it stood in former days, and as it ftands at prefent. And we cannot but obferve, that most of the laws for afcertaining, limiting, and reftraining this prerogative have been made within the compass of little more than a century paft; from the petition of right in 3 Car. I. to the prefent time. So that the powers of the crown are now to all appearance greatly curtailed and diminished fince the reign of king James the firft: particularly, by the abolition of the ftar chamber and high commiffion courts in the reign of Charles the firft, and by the difclaiming of martial law, and the power of levying taxes on the fubject, by the fame prince: by the difufe of foreft laws for a century paft: and by the many excellent provifions enacted under Charles the fecond; especially, the abolition of military tenures, purveyance, and pre-emption; the habeas corpus act; and the act to prevent the discontinuance of parliaments for above three years: and, fince the revolution, by the strong and emphatical words in which our liberties are afferted in the bill of rights, and act of fettlement; by the act for triennial, fince turned into feptennial elections; by the exclufion of certain officers from the houfe of commons; by rendering the feats of thejudges permanent, and th.cir falaries independent; and

by

by restraining the king's pardon from obftructing parliamentary impeachments. Befides all this, if we confider how the crown is impoverished and stripped of all it's antient revenues, so that it greatly depends on the liberality of parliament for it's neceffary support and maintenance, we may perhaps be led to think, that the ballance is inclined pretty ftrongly to the populár feale, and that the executive magiftrate has neither independence nor power enough left to form that check upon the lords and commons, which the founders of our conftitution intended.

BUT, on the other hand, it is to be confidered, that every prince, in the first parliament after his acceffion, has by long ufage a truly royal addition to his hereditary revenue fettled upon him for his life; and has never any occafion to apply, to parliament for fupplies, but upon fome public neceflity of the whole realm. This reftores to him that conftitutional independence which at his firft acceffion feems, it must be owned, to be wanting. And then, with regard to power, we may find perhaps that the hands of government are at leaft fufficiently ftrengthened; and that an English monarch is now in no danger of being overborne by either the nobility or the people. The inftruments of power are not perhaps fo open and avowed as they formerly were, and therefore are the less liable to jealous and invidious reflections; but they are not the weaker upon that account. In fhort, our national debt and taxes (befides the inconveniences before-mentioned) have alfo in their natural confequences thrown fuch a weight of power into the executive fcale of government, as we cannot think was intended by our patriot ancestors; who gloriously struggled for the abolition of the then formidable parts of the prerogative, and by an unaccountable want of forefight established this fyftem in their ftead. The entire collection and management of so vast a revenue, being placed in the hands of the crown, have given rise to fuch a multitude of new officers, created by and removeable at the royal pleasure, that they have extended the influence of government to every corner of the nation. Witness the commiffioners,and the multitude of dependents on the cuftoms, in every port

port of the kingdom; the commiffioners of excife, and their numerous fubalterns, in every inland district; the postmasters, and their fervants, planted in every town, and upon every public road; the commiffioners of the flamps, and their diftributors, which are full as fcattered and full as numerous; the officers of the falt duty, which, though a species of excife and conducted in the fame manner, are yet made a distinct corps from the ordinary managers of that revenue; the furveyors of houses and windows; the receivers of the land tax; the managers of lotteries; and the commiffioners of hackney coaches; all which are either mediately or immediately appointed by the crown, and removeable at pleasure without any reafon affigned: thefe, it requires but little penetration to fee, must give that power, on which they depend for fubfiftence, an influence most amazingly extenfive. To this may be added the frequent opportunities of conferring particular obligations, by preference in loans, fubfcriptions, tickets, remittances, and other money-tranfactions, which will greatly encrease this influence; and that over thofe perfons whofe attachment, on account of their wealth, is frequently the most desirable. All this is the natural, though perhaps the unforeseen, confequence of erecting our funds of credit, and to fupport them establishing our prefent perpetual taxes: the whole of which is intirely new fince the restoration in 1660; and by far the greatest part fince the revolution in 1688. And the fame may be said with regard to the officers in our numerous army and the places which the army has created. All which put together gives the executive power fo perfuafive an energy with refpect to the perfons themselves, and fo prevailing an intereft with their friends and families, as will amply make amends for the lofs of external prerogative.

BUT, though this profufion of offices fhould have no effect on individuals, there is ftill another newly acquired branch of power; and that is, not the influence only, but the force of a disciplined army: paid indeed ultimately by the people, but immediately by

the