plexed the law of nature with a multitude of abstracted rules and precepts, referring merely to the fitnefs or unfitnefs of th gs, as fome have vainly furmifed; but has graciously reduced the rule of obedience to this one paternal precept," that man should "pursue his own happiness." This is the foundation of what we call ethics, or natural law. For the feveral articles, into which it is branched in our fyftems, amount to no more than demonftrating, that this or that action tends to man's real happiness, and therefore very justly concluding that the performance of it is a part of the law of nature; or, on the other hand, that this or that action is deftructive of man's real happiness, and therefore that the law of nature forbids it.

THIS law of nature, being co-eval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course fuperior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and fuch of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original.

BUT in order to apply this to the particluar exigencies of each individual, it is ftill neceffary to have recourse to reafon : whofe office it is to difcover, as was before obferved, what the law of nature directs in every circumftance of life; by confidering, what method will tend the moft effectually to our own fubftantial happiness. And if our reason were always, as in our first ancestor before his tranfgreffion, clear and perfect, unruffled by paffions, unclouded by prejudice, unimpaired by difeafe or intemperance, the task would be pleasant and eafy; we fhould need no other guide but this. But every man now finds the contrary in his own experience; that his reafon is corrupt, and his underftanding full of ignorance and error.

THIS has given manifold occafion for the benign interpofition of divine providence; which, in compaffion to the frailty, the imperfection, and the blindness of human reafon, hath been

F

pleased,

pleafed, at fundry times and in divers manners, to discover and enforce it's laws by an immediate and direct revelation. The doctrines thus delivered we call the revealed or divine law, and they are to be found only in the holy fcriptures. Thefe precepts, when revealed, are found upon comparifon to be really a part of the original law of nature, as they tend in all their confequences to man's felicity. But we are not from thence to conclude that the knowlege of these truths was attainable by reafon, in it's prefent corrupted ftate; fince we find that, until they were revealed, they were hid from the wifdom of ages. As then the moral precepts of this law are indeed of the fame original with thofe of the law of nature, fo their intrinfic obligation is of equal ftrength and perpetuity. Yet undoubtedly the revealed law is of infinitely more authenticity than that moral fyftem, which is framed by ethical writers, and denominated the natural law. Because one is the law of nature, exprefsly declared fo to be by God himself; the other is only what, by the afliftance of human reafon, we imagine to be that law. If we could be as certain of the latter as we are of the former, both would have an equal authority: but, till then, they can never be put in any competition together.

UPON thefe two foundations, the law of nature and the law of revelation, depend all human laws; that is to fay, no human laws fhould be fuffered to contradict these. There is, it is true, a great number of indifferent points, in which both the divine law and the natural leave a man at his own liberty; but which are found neceflary for the benefit of fociety to be reftrained within certain limits. And herein it is that human laws have their greatest force and efficacy: for, with regard to fuch points as are not indifferent, human laws are only declaratory of, and act in fubordination to, the former. To inftance in the case of murder: this is exprefsly forbidden by the divine, and demonftrably by the natural law; and from thefe prohibitions arife the truc unlawfulnefs of this crime. Thofe human laws, that annex a punishment to it, do not at all increafe it's moral guilt, or

fuperadd

fuperadd any fresh obligation in foro confcientia to abstain from it's perpetration. Nay, if any human law fhould allow or injoin us to commit it, we are bound to tranfgrefs that human law, or elfe we must offend both the natural and the divine. But with regard to matters that are in themselves indifferent, and are not commanded or forbidden by thofe fuperior laws; fuch, for infiance, as exporting of wool into foreign countries; here the inferior legiflature has fcope and opportunity to interpofe, and to make that action unlawful which before was not fo.

If man were to live in a ftate of nature, unconnected with other individuals, there would be no occafion for any other laws, than the law of nature, and the law of God. Neither could any other law poffibly exift: for a law always fuppofes fome fuperior who is to make it; and in a ftate of nature we are all equal, without any other fuperior but him who is the author of our being. But man was formed for fociety; and, as is demonftrated by the writers on this fubject, is neither capable of living alone, nor indeed has the courage to do it. However, as it is impoffible for the whole race of mankind to be united in one great fociety, they must neceffarily divide into many; and form feparate states, commonwealths, and nations, entirely independent of each other, and yet liable to a mutual intercourfe. Hence arifes a third kind of law to regulate this mutual intercourse, called "the law of "nations" which, as none of thefe ftates, will acknowlege a fuperiority in the other, cannot be dictated by either; but depends entirely upon the rules of natural law, or upon mutual compacts, treaties, leagues, and agreements between thefe feveral communities in the conftruction alfo of which compacts, we have no other rule to refort to, but the law of nature; being the only one to which both communities are equally fubject: and therefore the civil law very juftly obferves, that quod naturalis ratio inter omnes homines conflituit, vocatur jus gentium.

THUS much I thought it neceffary to premife concerning the law of nature, the revealed law, and the law of nations, before I proceeded to treat more fully of the principal fubject of this fection, municipal or civil law; that is, the rule by which particular districts, communities, or nations are governed; being thus defined by Juftinian", " jus civile eft quod quifque fibi populus con"flituit." I call it municipal law, in compliance with common fpeech; for, though strictly that expreffion denotes the particular cuftoms of one fingle municipium or free town, yet it may with fufficient propriety be applied to any one state or nation, which is governed by the fame laws and cuftoms.

MUNICIPAL law, thus understood, is properly defined to be" a rule of civil conduct prefcribed by the fupreme power "a ftate, commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong." Let us endeavour to explain it's feveral properties, as they arife out of this definition.

AND, firft, it is a rule: not a tranfient fudden order from a fuperior to or concerning a particular perfon ; but fomething permanent, uniform, and univerfal. Therefore a particular act of the legislature to confifcate the goods of Titius, or to attaint him of high treafon, does not enter into the idea of a municipal law; for the operation of this act is fpent upon Titius only, and has no relation to the community in general; it is rather a sentence than a law. But an act to declare that the crime of which Titius is accufed fhall be decmed high treafon; this has permanency, uniformity, and univerfality, and therefore is properly a rule. It is alfo called a rule, to diftinguish it from advice or counsel, which we are at liberty to follow or not, as we fee proper, and to judge upon the reafonablenefs or unreasonableness of the thing advised: whereas our obedience to the law depends not upon our approbation, but upon the maker's will. Counfel is only matter of perfuafion, law is matter of injunction; counfel acts only upon the willing, law upon the unwilling alfo.

d Int. 1. a. 1.

IT

Ir is alfo called a rule, to diftinguish it from a compact or agreement; for a compact is a promife proceeding from us, law is a command directed to us. The language of a compact is, ❝ will, or will not, do this ;" that of a law is, "thou fhalt, or "fhalt not, do it." It is true there is an obligation which a compact carries with it, equal in point of confcience to that of a law; but then the original of the obligation is different. In compacts, we ourselves determine and promise what shall be done, before we are obliged to do it; in laws, we are obliged to act, without ourselves determining or promifing any thing at all, Upon these accounts law is defined to be "a rule."

MUNICIPAL law is alío" a rule of civil conduct." This dif tinguishes municipal law from the natural, or revealed; the former of which is the rule of moral conduct, and the latter not only the rule of moral conduct, but also the rule of faith. These regard man as a creature, and point out his duty to God, to himfelf, and to his neighbour, confidered in the light of an individual. But municipal or civil law regards him also as a citizen, and bound to other duties towards his neighbour, than thofe of mere nature and religion: duties, which he has engaged in by enjoying the benefits of the common union; and which amount to no more, than that he do contribute, on his part, to the subfiftence and peace of the fociety.

It is likewise " a rule prefcribed." Because a bare refolution, confined in the breaft of the legislator, without manifefting itself by fome external fign, can never be properly a law. It is requifite that this refolution be notified to the people who are to obey it. But the manner in which this notification is to be made, is matter of very great indifference. It may be notified by universal tradition and long practice, which fuppofes a previous publication, and is the cafe of the common law of England. It may be notified, viva voce, by officers appointed for that purpose, as is done with regard to proclamations, and fuch acts of parliament