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legislation is or is not repugnant or contrary' to it, or in other words, whether it is therein forbidden. In the second place, however, admitting it to be unconstitutional to pass a law, which confers upon one citizen privileges and advantages, which are denied to all others in like circumstances,' or which subjects one citizen to losses, damages, suits or actions, from which all others under like circumstances are exempted;' the question immediately arises, who is to determine, and if the judiciary, how is it to be determined, whether, in the given case, the privileges conferred are denied to all others in like circumstances? It cannot be determined by the mere fact, that the privilege is limited to one person expressly by name; for there may be no other persons in like circumstances; or if there be any such persons, they may not desire to have the privilege conferred on them; or the privilege may be of such a nature, that it cannot be conferred but upon one person; and in either case, the conferring a privilege upon one can be no injury to any other person. In the particular case of Holden v. James, it did not appear, that any other person was in the same situation or in like circumstances with the plaintiff, upon whom the privilege was conferred, or in the same situation or like circumstances with the defendant, who was subjected to a suit for what seems to have been a just debt. The resolve states that it was passed for reasons set forth in Holden's petition; but what these reasons were did not and could not appear to the court. And we do not see any thing in the resolve itself, which would authorize the court to say, that the privileges conferred by it were or would be denied to other persons in like circumstances with Holden, or that suits like that to which it subjected James, were or would be exclusively confined to him. For aught that appears, the legislature may have been ready and willing to pass similar resolves in favor of all persons, who should be in like circumstances, and make a similar request, with Holden.

It was remarked, at the commencement of this article, that we considered the power of suspending the laws as of infinite importance to the citizens; and the instances, above quoted, of legislative action of this kind, cannot fail, we think, to impress upon the minds of our readers the truth of the assertion. Those instances occurred, it is true, in times of revolution and

civil insurrection, and some of them were doubtless made necessary by the distracted and fluctuating state of the social organization. But they occurred, too, in times when the principles of government were much discussed and very generally if not profoundly understood; when the people, in the strength of their own convictions of political right, had just disclaimed the authority of their ancient rulers; and when they were at once defending, by force of arms, their right to selfgovernment, and were also solemnly deliberating upon and settling the terms of their social compact. In times of peace and social order, there may not be frequent occasion for the exercise of the suspending power; but it should not be forgotten, that there are disorders of the social state incident to times of prosperity as well as of adversity, and that a denial of the power, when its exercise may be of little importance, is to establish a precedent for its denial, when the highest interests of the citizens are involved. The power to suspend a law in a particular case seems to be the result of the unavoidable imperfection of all human legislation. The legislature, when passing a general statute, may not foresee all the exceptions, which ought to be made to its provisions; and when, in consequence of such want of foresight, a case of individual hardship arises, which calls for an exception, that must be a very imperfect government which has not the power of relief- -a power which, according to Aristotle's definition of equity, shall be the correction of that wherein the law, by reason of its universality, is deficient.

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ART. X.-ADVICE TO A YOUNG LAWYER.

WHENE'ER you speak, remember every cause
Stands not on eloquence, but stands on laws.
Pregnant in matter, in expression brief,
Let every sentence stand in bold relief;
On trifling points nor time nor talents waste;
A sad offence to learning and to taste;

Nor deal with pompous phrases; nor e'er suppose
Poetic flights belong to reasoning prose.
Loose declamation may deceive the crowd,
And seem more striking as it grows more loud;
But sober sense rejects it with disdain,

As nought but empty noise, and weak as vain.
The froth of words, the schoolboy's vain parade
Of books and cases all his stock in trade-

-

-

The pert conceits, the cunning tricks and play
Of low attorneys, strung in long array;
The unseemly jest, the petulant reply,

That chatters on, and cares not how, or why,

Studious avoid unworthy themes to scan,
They sink the speaker, and disgrace the man.
Like the false lights, by flying shadows cast,
Scarce seen, when present, and forgot, when past.
Begin with dignity; expound with grace
Each ground of reasoning in its time and place;
Let order reign throughout-each topic touch,
Nor urge its power too little, or too much.
Give each strong thought its most attractive view,
In diction clear, and yet severely true.
And, as the arguments in splendor grow,
Let each reflect its light on all below.
When to the close arrived, make no delays
By petty flourishes, or verbal plays,

But sum the whole in one deep, solemn strain,
Like a strong current hastening to the main.

A Discourse pronounced at the Inauguration of the Author, as Royall Professor of Law, in Harvard University, August 26, 1834. By SIMON GREENLEAF. Cambridge. James Munroe & Co. 1834.

WE are reminded, by the appearance of this discourse, of a determination, we had formed sometime ago, to prepare notices of the different law schools, which exist in the United States. We are anxious to contribute, as much as we may, to the advancement of legal education, and, as a means for this end, to the spread of a knowledge among the profession, throughout the country, of the institutions which have been established with this view. We have not time, at present, to discuss generally the advantages offered by these institutions, and to compare them with the feeble lights, afforded to students a quarter of a century ago, when the priceless time of legal pupilage was sacrificed and lost, so far as a knowledge of the principles of the profession and of the science of the law was concerned, in a devotion to the daily routine of duties in an office, to the copying of contracts, the making of writs, and the drawing of deeds--the mere handicraft of the profession — without finding opportunity for study, or an instructer to render more than nominal assistance. This subject has been treated by President QUINCY, in his address at the dedication of Dane Law College, which is to be found in the pages of this journal, with a truth and power, which leave little to be desired.

On the present occasion, we shall confine ourselves to an historical sketch of the establishment and progress of the Law School, at Cambridge, and to a simple statement of the advantages there afforded for obtaining a legal education. The stand which this school holds yielding to none in the country in importance, if it does not take the foremost place — together with its nearness to our metropolis, almost within our daily walks, are sufficient considerations for noticing it first among those of its kind.

It may not be known to all our readers at a distance, that this Institution is a branch of the University, at Cambridge. It needs hardly be added, that it was not embraced in the original design of the University; and that it was ingrafted upon the ancient stock at quite a late period:

Talis erat species auri frondentis opaca

Ilice.

The of so

The foundations of the University were first laid at a time, when the law was not treated, even in England, as a part of academic instruction. It was a few years after the first settlement of the country, while the whole face of the soil wore the harsh features of rude, uncultivated nature, that the forefathers of New England turned their earnest attention to preparing a place, for the education of that ministry, to enjoy whose precepts they had left so much comfort far away in their early homes, and exposed themselves to so much peril and privation in their newly chosen seats. The University at Cambridge, was established for the clergy, as the legend still borne upon its seal, attests Christo et Ecclesia. No other profession was thought of. beneficent science of medicine the parent, in our day, much good had not then struggled, from amidst the false knowledge, and superstition, and vain pretension with which it was its early lot to be incumbered, into its present undisputed high place among liberal pursuits. Of the law, we have already observed, that at this time even in England, it was not recognised as a proper study for the University. The inns of court, were considered as the colleges of the law, and in these ancient retreats was confined entirely the study of this profession. Perhaps, a partial reason for this may be found in the well-known dissentions which existed between the civilians, (among whom we include the canonists and priests, who had the government of the Universities,) and the cultivators of the common law dissentions which gave occasion for the ever-memorable declaration of the barons, Nolumus leges Anglia mutari. The common law, which was so passionately pursued by its own disciples, the Catesbys, and Slingsbys, and Thorpes, of the year books, was discarded as a study by all others. The uncouth dialect which they used, and the highly technical forms, in which they so much delighted, contributed to preserve alive the prejudices against them. Sir Henry Spelman's faintness