and formal difficulties, imposed by Courts of Equity, on the conduct and estates of persons in a fiduciary situation, are highly injurious to the beneficial owners of the property, both by their tendency to render responsible and efficient persons reluctant to undertake the duties of a trustee, and also by creating defects of title, which materially I diminish the value of the trust estate. And, further, under this head are included those cases in which the remedies afforded by Courts of Equity are inadequate, as with regard to the husband's interest, in his wife's personal estate, and in affording to creditors a remedy against the choses in action of their debtors.

The second part treats particularly of these defects in the English system of law, which arise from the divisions of jurisdictions into Courts of Common Law and Equity. The author endeavors to show, that this division-so far from facilitating the administration of the laws-is a leading cause of the intricacy of their technical rules, and the chief cause of the delay and expense with which their dispensa tion is attended. To this end he traces the origin of Equity, and points out the ill-defined limits by which it is separated from the Common Law.

'Every antiquated system of laws is a strange mixture of wisdom and absurdity-in some instances perfectly agreeable to reason, in others totally at variance with the altered condition of mankind; and the defects of such a system are usually remarkable, not so much for their magnitude, as for the anomalous irregularity with which they . occur; they are, in fact, for the most part, mere matters of vague and capricious detail, which it is impossible to connect together by any enlarged and simple principles. These remarks apply in a very peculiar manner to the English system of common law.

'Now it must be borne in mind, that equity is in its very nature a supplement for the imperfections—a remedy for the evils-of the common law. The only mode, therefore, of defining the jurisdiction of equity, is by an enumeration of the common law mischiefs to which its remedies correspond. Hence it follows, that if these defects are incapable of being classed under any comprehensive definition, if they are a matter of chance and of caprice, rather than of reason-equity, which begins only where the common law ends, must be a lax and imperfectly defined system.

"This impression will be fully confirmed by an examination of the leading branches of equitable interposition. These are divisible under the following heads :-Fraud-Dower-Partition-Account-Accident and Mistake-Discovery-Specific Performance-Trusts-Perpetuation of testimony that is likely to be lost-Prevention of irreparable injury by injunction.'

The author next proceeds to show that the limits of Equity, as indi

cated by these definitions, are generally very vaguely marked; and, further, that these topics are not fit subjects of a separate jurisdiction. He then reviews some of the defects and difficulties in the law of Real Property, which are ascribable to the present division of Courts; and herein treats of trusts, uses, contingent remainders, mortgages, waste, specific performances, attendant terms, leases and rents. In this connexion Mr. Humphreys' ingenious distinction between active and passive trusts is commented on. Of the rules relating to uses, the author remarks, that they have been expanded during the course of three centuries, into a variety of distinctions, which are as useless, as they are refined and dangerous. The author then notices some of the difficulties created in miscellaneous branches of law, by the separation of jurisdictions, and herein treats of constructive trusts, account, partnership, accident, mistake, assets, injunction and perpetuation of testimony. He next notices the system of practice in Courts of Equity, ascribing its defects to the exclusion of oral testimony, and the substitution there for of the answers in writing of the parties and of the witnesses, which are productive of expense, and a worse means of eliciting truth than an oral examination. All evidence, it is said, should be taken by the judge who decides the case, rather than by trustees in Chancery, since evidence delivered before the latter cannot be properly appreciated by the Equity judges. Of a common practice in English Chancery, viz. of directing issues to Common Law Courts, often to the ruinous costs of the parties, it is observed that these issues ought to be tried by the Equity judges themselves. In this last opinion we cordially agree with the author. The practice of tossing the suitor to and fro, as he has strongly expressed it, from judge to judge, and from tribunal to tribunal, is well illustrated by the case of Morris v. Davis, of which the following sketch is given.

The plaintiff asserted his right to certain estates in the possession of the defendants, as only son and heir at law of William Morris and Mary, his wife. The defendant, Mrs. Davies, who was the daughter of William Morris and wife, claimed to be entitled as heiress at law on the ground that the plaintiff was not the son of W. Morris, but the offspring of an adulterous intercourse of Mrs. Morris with a person of the name of Austin. On this question the case depended. The cause came on in equity before Lord Eldon, on the 22d February, 1826, who, without hearing the particulars of the evidence, which was not read or opened in court, directed that, as the evidence was contradictory, the plaintiff was entitled to a trial at law. The case was transmitted in the form of an issue, to be presented to a jury at the next Shrewsbury assizes. At the trial, an immense number of witnesses were called— and the jury, under the judge's direction, found a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendants, thereupon, applied to Lord Lyndhurst (who had

in the mean time succeeded Lord Eldon) for a new trial, on the ground that the judge had misdirected the jury in point of law. Lord Lyndhurst being dissatisfied with the verdict, directed that another trial should take place, and himself prescribed the questions which he wished to be put to the jury by the judge who should try the issue. On the second trial a verdict was given for the defendants. The plaintiff, thereupon, moved for a third trial, on the ground that the attention of the jury had not been sufficiently drawn to1 one of the questions directed by Lord Lyndhurst to be put to them: and that they had not given due weight to other evidence then produced for the first time. A third issue was granted.

"The judge who tried the third issue addressed to the jury a direction similar to that which had been delivered by the judge on the first trial, and set aside by the Lord Chancellor. The jury not being able to agree in opinion were discharged, without giving any verdict!

'The plaintiff then applied to Lord Lyndhurst for a fourth trial, when, after various discussions, it was proposed by his Lordship that he should, with the consent of the parties, take upon himself the decision of the case without any further trial. This arrangement was agreed to, and on the 1st of February, 1830, he gave his decision in favor of the defendants! 2

'It will be perceived that in the foregoing case there were in fact seven trials!—three before juries, and four before the Chancellor)— that six of these were caused solely by the technical inability of the equity judges to try questions depending on oral evidence-that all the expensive investigations that ensued were not only a direct result of this defect in our equity system-but that they furnish an instructive example of the utter inefficiency of all substitutes for that power -which every judge ought to possess-of investigating for himself the testimony on which his decisions are founded.'

In the third part, the author lays down the remedies for the evils attendant on the present jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery-proposing the combination of the powers of Common Law and Equity in one jurisdiction, the judges to admit equitable claims and defences as fully as such as are cognizable at common law, and to embrace, in their decisions, all the legal and equitable principles involved in every case submitted to their consideration. And these suggested changes Mr. Johnes deems warranted by experience; referring, of course, to the judicial arrangements of Pennsylvania. He observes that the leading principles of his work had been developed before his attention was drawn by Professor Amos to the treatise of the late Mr.

1 The question was whether they believed the testimony of a witness named Mary Evans?

2 This case has since been taken by appeal to the House of Lords!

Laussat on Equity in Pennsylvania, and that the reader may easily conceive the intense interest and delight, which the first perusal of such a work-and under such circumstances was calculated to inspire. It will be observed, that while the object of these pages is to show the expediency of putting an end to an existing separation of jurisdictions, the purpose of Mr. Laussat's work is to show the inexpediency of introducing such separation into a country, where it does not exist. Of course, similar arguments are applicable in both cases.' It is singular, that this work, of which the author speaks with such enthusiasm, and which has been often cited with great respect in England, is hardly known to the profession in our country, out of Pennsylvania.

Suggestions are made by the author for the remedy of evils growing out of the jurisdiction of charity and of lunatics. The former, it is said, should be fused into a general fund for education, and in this way, the real objects of the authors of these donations would in most cases be more effectually consulted and the spirit of their patriotic intentions more strictly fulfilled, than under the present law, when the funds are exposed to the corruption, carelessness and ignorance of existing trustees, and often to an exhausting litigation. Lunacy, it is said, is a question of a purely medical nature, and it is highly desirable, for many reasons, that this branch of its jurisdiction should be withdrawn from the Court of Chancery and vested in a tribunal over which a judge of medical education might preside.

The work is concluded by a short and very sensible chapter on Codification.

However we may hesitate in subscribing to what the author calls the fundamental proposition of his volume, viz. the expediency of a union of the two jurisdictions of equity and law, still we cannot refrain from coinciding with him in many of his views. It is undeniable that many difficulties arise from the separation, and from the ill-defined limits of equity and law. And it is highly important that these should be investigated, and the relations between the two courts so adjusted as that they shall be felt as little as possible. No cause, for instance, should pass from one court to another court, and back again-from Chancery to Law, and from Law to Chancery. Many reforms might be made, that would remove some of Mr. Johnes' grounds of complaint, without resorting to his gigantic plan of change-the heaving together of two mighty and complex judicatures, seated so wide asunder, and planted each so firmly on its peculiar basis of principles.

This work is dedicated in the following words; To Andrew Amos, Esq. Professor of English Law at the University of London, this work is inscribed as a mark of respect to the Professor and of gratitude to the Institution.' We understand that the author was a pupil of Pro

fessor Amos, and was a member of his class in the first session of the London University. His name appears in the list of gentlemen called to the bar in Hilary term last. He must, therefore, be of such an age as to give us grounds to expect from him further labors in the cause of the profession he has espoused.

Principles of Government--a Treatise on Free Institutions, including the Constitution of the United States, By Nathaniel ChipMAN, LL. D. Burlington. Edward Smith-(Successor to Chauncey Goodrich.) 1833.

The

This work consists of seven books, with an Appendix. The first six books treat of the social Nature of Man, his natural, political and civil rights and liberties-the Law of Nature, and of Nations. seventh book contains a brief outline of the Government of the United States. The Appendix contains the articles of the old Confederation, and four letters from Mr. Madison. The first, to Mr. Ingersoll, in favor of the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States, and against a substitute for it. The second and third, to Mr. Cabell, in favor of the constitutional power to lay a Tariff on foreign importations for the encouragement of domestic manufactures, with a specification of the cases proper for its exercise. The fourth, to Mr. E. Everett, against 'Nullification,' showing that the proceedings of the Virginia Legislature, in '98, and '99, have been misconceived by those who have appealed to them in support of it. The work is designed for an elementary treatise on that form of government which has been adopt. ed in the United States, and as such it may be consulted with profit. The following passage contains Mr. Chipman's 'idea' of the prin ciples of Government.

"In the Science of Government, there are the principles of construc tion, by which the government is constituted and organised; the principles of operation, by which its activity and efficiency are produced. There are also the passive principles arising out of the susceptibilities of man, through which he becomes subject to all the variety of pas sions and emotions, that are excited by means of impressions made on his mind, by a multiplicity of agents and objects both corporeal and mental. To these the operative principles are adapted to produce the end intended,-obedience to the laws. These principles, however, are, or ought to be, directed by ulterior principles, to be sought in the social nature of man, and by those laws established by the author of nature, in his formation, designed to promote the general happiness.' P. 4.