a member of parliament-no, they made him their representative, as they were competent to do, for a variety of purposes. Were not the delegates of 1793, who took up the great case of reform, and to whom definite duties were entrusted-were not they representatives? Sir Charles Wolseley was called "legislatorial attorney." Were members of parliament so denominated? If they were, it was a very new designation. They did not elect him to a seat in the House, but merely appointed him to ask for that which they conceived to be their due. The learned Serjeant had informed him, that a conspiracy to affect "a legal purpose" was odious in the eye of the law. A conspiracy against the state was undoubtedly a crime, because it threatened mischief to the state; but to conspire to serve the state could not be criminal. To constitute a conspiracy, it should have a tendency to oppose or subvert some law, with the knowledge of the persons concerned. That was the legal and rational acceptation of the word. If men united together to do acts mischievous and prejudicial to others, that constituted conspiracy; and therefore he inferred, that such an offence could not, from the evidence, be fairly imputed to the defendants. He proceeded to expatiate on the mottos that were inscribed on the flags. The first was, "Major Cartwright, and the Bill of Rights and Liberties." After paying a high compliment to the Major's character, he argued, that any man had a right, if he pleased, to inscribe his name on the collar of his dog, or to paint it on his door; and he conceived, when the learned Serjeant adverted to the Major's Bill of Rights, that he ought to have pointed out some defect in ithe ought to have shewn that it contained some poisonous principle that rendered it dangerous. The next in scription was, "The Sovereignty of the People." Did not the learned Serjeant know that this was the standing toast of the Whigs? Had he not heard that it was proposed at their dinners, even antecedently to the health of the King? If the people were the source of power-if they were the basis of authority-if they were so recognised by the greatest characters this country ever produced, why should it be considered improper for them to re-echo the sentiments of their leaders, and to inscribe it on a banner? The English people had frequently exercised the rights of sovereignty. Who gave to King William the Crown? who placed the dynasty of the Brunswick Family on the throne? who fought their battles, and supported their claims ? -The people. Did they not act, on those occasions, not only as the possessors of sovereign authority, but as the dispensers of power? The third inscription was, "Sir C. Wolesley, and no Corn-Laws." What was there improper in this inscription? Was it not known that the manufacturing interest, and various other interests, disliked that measure? It did not follow that those who marched under this banner would go to the House of Commons, and compel them to repeal this law. No such thing; but, whether they were right or wrong, they were justified in expressing their dissatisfaction at the measure. The last inscription was, "T. J. Wooler, and the Liberty of the Press." In descanting on this motto, Mr Wooler strenuously repelled the insinuation that he was one of those who abused the liberty of the press. If the Attorney-General were present, and denied the truth of this statement, he would say, that he wrote his own unworthiness. If he had abused the liberty of the press, he was not concealed, but was amenable to the law. Two prosecutions had been instituted against him; on one he received a verdict of acquittal, and on the other a special verdict was returned, which was much more gratifying to his feelings. That verdict was, "Guilty, if truth be a libel by the law of the land." Guilty of telling the truth! Could any thing more honourable be said of him? could a more flattering epitaph be placed on his tomb-stone? He was, before the public, a mark too conspicuous to be neglected or overlooked if he abused the liberty of the press. He wrote strongly, because he felt strongly ; but he would cease to write, if any in dividual could convict him of dealing in private slander, or of publishing opinions which he did not conscientiously hold. The Jury were now about to try a right which they might themselves be shortly called on to exercise. He besought them to recollect that they were the guardians of the rights and privileges of Englishmen, and that on their verdict depended the security of all they held dear. Mr C. Pearson read an address by Major Cartwright in his own defence, which occupied four hours and a half. Mr Lewis spoke in his own defence. Mr Vaughan replied. The Lord Chief Baron summed up, and charged the Jury, who, after retiring for twenty minutes, brought in a verdict of Guilty, against all the defendants. Bills of exceptions were taken against the manner in which the Jury had been struck, and were argued in the Court of King's Bench; but as the decision upon them was not given during the present year, we shall reserve till next Volume our report of the proceedings. TRIAL OF THE SCOTTISH INSURGENTS MADE PRISONERS AT BONNYMUIR. STIRLING, 23d June, 1820. As cases of treason are tried by English law, and cannot be brought before the ordinary Scottish Courts, a Special Commission was appointed by the crown, consisting of all the members of the Scottish Court of Justi ciary, with the addition of Sir Samuel Shepherd, Chief Baron of Exchequer, and Mr Adam, Lord Commissioner of the Jury Court. According to English law, it was necessary, that the indictment should be submitted to a Grand Jury; and as this body, as well as trial for treason, was new to Scotland, the LORD PRESIDENT, on the Jury being impanelled, delivered to them a CHARGE, illustrative of their duties, and of the law of treason. The following are the principal heads : Trials for treason have been of very rare occurrence in this country. Not that we have been without materials in Scotland; for the two rebellions in 1715 and 1745 furnished a numerous list of traitors; but, by special statutes, the trials then all took place in England. The cases of Watt and Downie, in 1794, are, I believe, the only trials for treason which have taken place in Scotland since the Union. - You know, Gentlemen, that, by the treaty of Union between this country and England, in 1707, it was most anxiously stipulated and provided, on the part of Scotland, that our municipal laws should be preserved entire. But, at the same time, as we were thereafter to become one people, united under the same legislature, governed by the same sovereign,-receiving from him the same protection, and, therefore, owing to him the same allegiance, it was foreseen, that some provision must be made for regulating that allegiance, and for punishing the breach of it. It was therefore declared, by the same article of the treaty of Union which saved our civil institutions entire," That the laws which Concern public right, policy, and civil government, may be made the same throughout the whole united king dom." In regard to the law of treason, this might have been done in three ways either by compounding and digesting the treason-laws of both countries into a new code, to be com mon to both; or, by declaring, that the treason-law of Scotland should be the law of the united kingdom; or, that the treason-law of England should also govern Scotland. The last mode was adopted, and wisely adopted; and, therefore, immediately after the Union, the act of 7th Queen Anne, cap. 21. was passed, by which it was enacted in substance, that the law of England, in regard both to the crime of treason, and misprision of treason, and to the form of trial for them, should, in future, be the law of Scotland as to treason, or misprision of treason, committed against the common sovereign. Gentlemen, as to the form of trial, Scotland did not gain much by this change, for we already had a most admirable form of trial; by which every prisoner, accused of ordinary crimes, has as great advantages as the law of England indulges to persons accused of high treason. By the law of Scotland, you know, that every prisoner must have a copy of his indictment, with a list of the jury and witnesses, fifteen days before his trial; and he is entitled to counsel to assist him in his defence, both on the fact and the law. By the law of England, it is only in the case of treason that a prisoner is entitled to a copy of his indictment, and a list of the jury and witnesses, and that, too, only ten days before his trial; and it is a curious circumstance, that this indulgence, which we, in Scotland, consider as essential to a fair trial, one of the ablest, and most upright, humane, and constitutional Judges that ever sat on the bench in England, considers as of very doubtful expediency. But then, Gentlemen, by the law of England it is farther provided, that no man shall be indicted for the crime of treason, except on a bill found against him by a Grand Jury; and that the prisoner, when afterwards put on his trial, shall have right to challenge a certain number of the Jury, without assigning any reason for it ;-privile ges, these, of no great moment in the case of ordinary crimes between man and man, but which may be considered as of considerable importance, in the case of crimes committed in breach of the allegiance due from the subject to the sovereign." The learned judge, after illustrating, according to the statute of Edward III. the first branch; which consists in compassing or imagining the death of the King, proceeded to the second, which had the most direct bearing on the subject in question. By the act of Edward the Third, it is declared to be treason, “ If a man do levy war against our Lord the King in this realm." This has been considerably extended by the late act, already mentioned, of the thirty-sixth, George the Third, by which it is declared to be treason, "To compass, imagine, invent, devise, or intend to levy war against the King, within this realm, in order, by force or constraint, to compel him to change his measures and counsels, or in order to put any force or constraint upon, or overawe both or either House of Parliament." By these acts you will perceive, 1mo, That it is not only treason actually to levy war against the King; but, 2do, Also, as in the case of his life, it is treason even to compass or imagine, invent, devise, or intend the levying of war against him, provided the object be, either to compel the King to change his measures, or to overawe or constrain either House of Parliament. It is only necessary, therefore, to consider what is to be held a levying of war, the actual raising of which, under the act of Edward the Third, or the compassing and imagining it, under the act of George the Third, will constitute treason. Now, all our writers and lawyers agree, that, in order to constitute this species of treason, it is not necessary that the people so levying war should appear in the shape of regular troops, divided into battalions, and regularly clothed, armed, and disciplined. Rebellion and insurrection, from the very nature of the case, can seldom assume such appearance at first, though a little success may soon enable them to assume all the array and discipline of regular armies. Of this we had a memorable example in our rebellion in 1745. When Prince Charles, commonly called the Pretender, landed in the west, he was for some time joined only by a few half-armed and half-naked Highlanders; and yet there can be no doubt, that he and his associates were as much guilty of treason the Therefore, Gentlemen, however ill arranged, however ill disciplined or armed the people may be, there is no doubt that every rising or insurrection, for the purpose of effecting, by force or numbers, any innovation of a public nature, or to redress any public grievance, real or imaginary, things which can only be lawfully and constitutionally accomplished by the King's authority, or that of Parliament, is treason, as an actual levying of war; and consequently to compass or imagine such a rising or insurrection for such purposes, will be to compass and imagine the levying of war against the King under the late statute." What overt acts will be sufficient to indicate such traitorous intention to levy war, it is almost impossible to define, for they may be infinitely various. But in cases where the insurrection has not actually broke out, the overt acts most likely to happen, are meetings and consultations about the intended insurrection, and the means of promoting it-instigating or overawing others to join, by private threats and arguments, or by open proclamation-associations and agreements for that purpose-making or providing arms or ammunition of whatever kind, intended to be used in the insurrection. All these, and similar matters, are held to be competent overt acts, to prove the compassing and imagining the levying of the war to which they apply. Gentlemen, it may be useful to say a few words on the distinction between levying war against the King, and committing a riot. The distinction seems to consist in this, although they may often run very nearly into each other. Where the rising or tumult is merely to accomplish some private purpose, interesting only to those engaged in it, and not resisting or calling in question the King's authority or prerogative, then the tumult, however numerous or outrageous the mob may be, is held only to be a riot; for example, suppose a mob to rise, and even by force of arms to break into a particular prison, and rescue certain persons therein confined; or to oblige the magistrates to set them at liberty; or to lower the price of provisions in a certain market; or to tear down certain inclosures, which they conceive to encroach on the town's common. All such acts, though severely punishable, and though they may be resisted by force, do not amount to treason. Nothing is pointed against either the person or authority of the King. For this reason, after the most mature consideration, the outrageous proceedings of the mob of Edinburgh, in the affair of Porteous, were held not to amount to treason, and the few persons who were tried, were tried only as for riot; because, although there was in that case an interference with the royal prerogative of mercy, yet, as it was only directed against the exercise of it in that individual case, and did not in any degree go to impeach or resist his Majesty's general exercise of it in other cases, it was determined to proceed against those accused only as for riot, and not as for treason. But, Gentlemen, wherever the rising or insurrection has for its object a general purpose, not confined to the peculiar views and interests of the persons concerned in it, but common to the whole community, and striking directly against the King's authority, or that of Parliament, then it assumes the character of treason. For example, if mobs were to rise in different parts of the country, to throw open all inclosures, and to resist the execution of the law regarding inclosures wheresoever attempted; to pull down all prisons or courts of justice; to resist all revenue officers in the collecting of all or any of the taxes; in short, all risings to accomplish a general purpose, or to hinder a general measure, which by law can only be authorised or prohibited by authority of the King or Parliament, amount to levying of war against the King, and have always been tried and punished as treason. It is, therefore, not the numbers concerned, nor the force employed by the people rising in arms, but the object which they have in view that determines the character of the crime, and will make it either riot or treason, according as that object is of a public and general, or private and local nature. Gentlemen, it is also proper that I should take notice of one species of overt act, which has created more difficulty than any other, and as to which, in former times, some decisions were given which are now universally held to be against law-I mean, Words and Writings. As to these the law seems now to be settled, that mere words spoken, however wicked and abominable, if they do not relate to any act or design then actually on foot against the life of the King, or the levying of war against him, and in the contemplation of the speaker, do not amount to treason, though they may be otherwise severely punished; for example, if a man were openly to declare in so many words, that the King ought to be killed, and that it would be meritorious to do so. This would be a great crime and severely punishable, but it would not be treason, unless it were proved that the man had in contemplation some |