Mr. Phillips' Argument for Appellees.

sioned by arrests or detention of the ship or goods insured by the authority of any prince "or public body claiming to exercise sovereign power under what pretence soever." B. 1, ch. 12, sec. 5. In the same section the author observes that the word "people" in the policy means a people or nation, not a mob. 66 By the word 'people' in the policy is not to be understood any promiscuous or lawless rabble that may be guilty of attacking or detaining the ship; it means a people -- that is, a nation in its collective and political capacity."

In Park Mar. Ins. (2 Am. ed. 1799), 78, it is said: "What the word 'people' in this clause of a policy of insurance means has lately been judicially settled."

In Mauran v. Insurance Company, 6 Wall. 1, this court confirms such construction, and discusses its bearing upon our neutrality acts.

Chancellor Kent was quoted to the effect that the stipulation of indemnity against takings at sea, arrests, restraints and detainment of all kings, princes and people, refers only to the acts of government for government purposes, whether right or wrong. 3 Com. 302, note D, 6th edition.

Other illustrations were made of governments de facto, which, for certain purposes, are recognized as if they were de jure and regularly constructed nationalities: "The court, in the case of Nesbitt v. Lushington, 4 T. R. 763, fitly described the character of the government contemplated in the clause respecting the restraints, etc., of kings, princes or people, viz., 'the ruling power of the country,' the supreme power,' 'the power of the country, whatever it might be'-not necessarily a lawful power or government, or one that had been adopted into the family of nations."

6

The court concluded that the so-called Confederate government, being in the possession of the supreme power of the district of country over which its jurisdiction extended, was a government de facto, which could make a capture within the meaning of the policy. Mauran v. Insurance Co., 6 Wall. 1, 13.

No reason exists why the word "people" should have one sense when used in a maritime policy, but a different sense as

Mr. Phillips' Argument for Appellees.

used in the statute. The one assures protection against the acts of such a "people," while the other prohibits acts. Let us suppose that in view of this settled definition accepted by this court in the case of Mauran v. Insurance Company, 6 Wall. 1, the owners of the Three Friends, being about to take a voyage to Cuba, obtained a maritime insurance upon the vessel, containing the clause as to restraints of kings, princes and people. The vessel, while on her voyage, is arrested by persons engaged "in a civil disturbance in Cuba." An action is brought against the insurers in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The question arises as to whether the restraint was by "a people " within the meaning of the instrument. The District Court decides in view of the accepted meaning of that term, that the restraint was not by "a people," and dismisses the proceeding. At the same time the Attorney General of the United States files a libel of condemnation in the same court, against the same vessel, on the ground that she had been fitted out in this country to be used in the service of the same people described in the other suit. The District Judge can only decide that he has already passed upon the meaning of the expression. He could not admit a different meaning of the same word when used in the act of Congress. In both instances the word referred to a power, or community, or government, whether right or wrong. On the one hand, there was a provision in the maritime law enabling a party to insure himself against certain maritime losses. On the other hand, there was a provision in an act of Congress which subjected a party to punishment and loss on account of certain maritime operations. The court could not give a different meaning to the term "a people," unless compelled by the association of the word with other words in the act. The question therefore is, whether the legislature meant something different in the use of the word from what was indicated by every other word associated with it. In effect, the Government contends that the rule noscitur a sociis is not applicable; that while the words "any prince, state, district, colony," are all words of government, are all words of sovereignty, all refer to powers, yet the signification of the words

Mr. Phillips' Argument for Appellees.

"any people," is different. That it does not necessarily apply to any sovereignty, or body claiming sovereignty, but may denote persons unorganized as a political entity.

This expression, "any people," cannot be disassociated from the terms which precede it any foreign prince or state, or any colony or district.

In the language of Lord Kenyon in Nesbitt v. Lushington, supra, "the meaning of the word 'people' may be discovered. here by the accompanying words, noscitur a sociis. It means, the ruling power of the country.'

It would be strange, in the light of history, if all the other terms refer to the people in their collective and political capacity, a body politic or assuming to be a body politic, while this expression, "a people," may be construed to refer in another sense to persons in their individual capacity.

What, in 1817, was "the actual situation of the world," to use the language of Chief Justice Marshall? It was the situation of America, and especially of South America, which, by provinces, countries, districts, peoples, was in a state of recognized public war against Spain. The act of 1794 applied only to princes or states, and did not contemplate these new belligerent powers, and therefore, in 1817, it was found necessary to adapt the law to the actual situation of the world. I only dwell upon belligerency for the purpose of signifying a designated sovereignty or asserted government not yet recognized as independent or admitted as such into the family of nations. It is stated by the Attorney General that before this act of 1817 the word "state" referred to such powers as those of South America, and that it could not have been intended. that Congress inserted the words "a people," unless they had meant something else than a state, unless they referred to a collection of persons. The Attorney General says something in addition to that was intended by the use of the word "people," and claims that the act of 1794 covered belligerents. I submit that this was not the interpretation of the act of 1794. Chief Justice Marshall, on the circuit, disclaimed that the words "prince or state" covered the case of one of the recognized South American belligerents. I refer to

Mr. Phillips' Argument for Appellees.

the case of The Santissima Trinidad. Chief Justice Marshall remarked as follows:

"However serious may be the doubt, whether a section of a nation struggling for its independence may come within the prohibitions of the act [1794], there can be no doubt that such a people come within the more ample provisions of the law of nations. Whether Buenos Ayres be a state or not, if she is in a condition to make war and to claim the character and rights of a belligerent, she is bound to respect the laws of war; and the government which concedes her those rights is bound to maintain its own neutrality, unless it means to become a party to the war, as entirely as if she were an acknowledged state. She has no more right to recruit her navy within the United States than Spain would have, and this government is as much bound to restrain her from using our strength in the war as to restrain her enemy." 1 Brock. 488; 7 Wheat. 283. The libel in this case was filed in 1817. The meaning of the words "foreign prince or state was announced in Gelston v. Hoyt. 3 Wheat. 323.

In that case the evidence was that the ship was fitted out and armed with intent that she should be employed in the service of that part of the island of San Domingo which was then under the government of Pétion, to commit hostilities. upon the subjects of that part of the island of San Domingo which was then under the government of Christophe.

The court held that neither of these allegations could be supported, inasmuch as the government of the United States had never recognized either of these governments as "a foreign prince or state."

They had not been recognized either as belligerents or as independent communities. On the contrary, our Government had acknowledged they were parts of the French possessions, and had regulated, as requested by France, our trade therewith.

In United States v. Palmer, the Circuit Court of the United States for the First Circuit, consisting of Judges Story and Davis, divided in opinion upon certain questions, which they certified here. Some of these were as follows:

Mr. Phillips' Argument for Appellees.

"5th. Whether any revolted colony, district or people, which have thrown off their allegiance to their mother country, but have never been acknowledged by the United States as a sovereign independent nation or power, have authority to issue commissions to make captures on the high seas of the persons, property and vessels of the subjects of the mother country who retain their allegiance.

"6th. Whether an act which would be deemed a robbery on the high seas, if done without a lawful commission, is protected from being considered as a robbery on the high seas when the same act is done under a commission or the color of a commission from any foreign colony, district or people which have revolted from their native allegiance, and have declared themselves independent and sovereign, and have assumed to exercise the powers and authorities of an independent and sovereign government, but have never been acknowledged or recognized as an independent or sovereign government or nation by the United States or by any other foreign state, prince or sovereignty."

"10th. Whether any colony, district or people, who have revolted from their native allegiance and have assumed upon themselves the exercise of independent and sovereign power, can be deemed in any court in the United States an independent or sovereign nation or government until they have been acknowledged as such by the government of the United States; and whether such acknowledgment can be proved in a court of the United States otherwise than by some act or statute or resolution of the Congress of the United States, or by some public proclamation or other public act of the executive authority of the United States directly containing or announcing such acknowledgment, or by publicly receiving and acknowledging an ambassador or other public minister from such colony, district or people; and whether such acknowledgment can be proved by mere inference from the private acts or private instructions of the executive of the United States, when no public acknowledgment has ever been made, and whether the courts of the United States are bound judicially to take notice of the existing relations of the