Syllabus. but denied, that the former had any just demand against him. But Whitney forbore to assert the rights which he now asserts, and although having abundant opportunity to do so, and having, if his present claims are just, every reason for promptness and diligence, he nevertheless slept upon his rights and made no demand upon Lawrence until disease had so far deprived the latter of his reason and faculties that he could not sufficiently comprehend any matter of business submitted to him. Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the court below rightly held that the plaintiff's laches cut him off from any relief in equity. Badger v. Badger, 2 Wall. 87, 95; Hayward v. National Bank, 96 U. S. 611, 617; Godden v. Kimmell, 99 U. S. 201; Landsdale v. Smith, 106 U. S. 391; Speidel v. IIenrici, 120 U. S. 377; Richards v. Mackall, 124 U. S. 183, 188; Mackall v. Casilear, 137 U. S. 556, 566; Hammond v. Hopkins, 143 U. S. 224, 250, 274. In this view, it is unnecessary to consider whether the plaintiff's causes of action were barred by the statute of limitation. The judgment is Affirmed. The case of Wood v. Fox, Surviving Executor of Lawrence, No. 56, on appeal from the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah, was argued with No. 68 by the same counsel, and depends upon the same facts as appear in the above case, and for the reasons stated in the opinion in that case the judgment is Affirmed. OXLEY STAVE COMPANY v. BUTLER COUNTY. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI. No. 221. Argued March 19, 1897. Decided April 19, 1897. This court cannot review the final judgment of the highest court of a State even if it denied some title, right, privilege or immunity of the unsuccessful party, unless it appear from the record that such title, right, privilege or immunity was "specially set up or claimed ” in the state court as be Opinion of the Court. longing to such party under the Constitution or some treaty, statute, commission or authority of the United States. Rev. Stat. § 709. The words "specially set up or claimed" in that section imply that if a party in a suit in a state court intends to invoke for the protection of his rights the Constitution of the United States or some treaty, statute, commission or authority of the United States, he must so declare; and unless he does so declare, "specially," that is, unmistakably, this court is without authority to reëxamine the final judgment of the state court. This statutory requirement is not met if such declaration is so general in its character that the purpose of the party to assert a Federal right is left to mere inference. THE case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Isaac II. Lionberger for plaintiffs in error. Mr. John F. Dillon and Mr. Frank M. Estes for defendant in error. Mr. Winslow S. Pierce, Mr. Harry Hubbard and Mr. Henry N. Phillips were on their briefs. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court. This writ of error brings up for review a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri reversing a judgment of the Circuit Court of the city of St. Louis, Missouri, setting aside and declaring to be null and void certain conveyances of lands in Butler County, Missouri, and quieting the title thereto of the present plaintiffs in error. It is contended on behalf of the defendants in error, who were defendants below, that, under the statutes regulating the jurisdiction of this court, we have no authority to reexamine that judgment. It appears from the petition that the lands in controversy were part of the lands granted to Missouri by the swamp-land act of September 28, 1850, 9 Stat. 519, c. 84, and were subsequently, in 1857, patented by the State to the Cairo and Fulton Railroad Company, a Missouri corporation, in payment of a subscription to the capital stock of that company by the county of Butler, Missouri, which subscription was made under the authority of the State; that in payment of certain bonds Opinion of the Court. issued by it, the railroad company, on the 23d of May, 1857, conveyed the lands in question, with other lands, to John Moore, John Wilson and A. G. Waterman, as trustees; that in 1871 Chouteau, having become the owner of the greater portion of such bonds, brought suit in the Circuit Court of Mississippi County, Missouri, for the foreclosure of the above deed of trust, in which suit there was a decree for the defendants; that such decree was reversed by the Supreme Court of Missouri, and a decree of foreclosure directed to be entered; that the lands were accordingly sold by a commissioner, Chouteau becoming the purchaser; and that afterwards, on the 19th day of November, 1886, Chouteau conveyed the same, with other lands, to the plaintiffs in error. The petition also alleged that the county of Butler, November 7, 1866, filed in the Circuit Court of Butler County its petition against the Cairo and Fulton Railroad Company and Moore, Wilson and Waterman, trustees as aforesaid, for the purpose of cancelling and setting aside the patent from the State to the Cairo and Fulton Railroad Company, as well as the deed of trust from the railroad company to Moore, Wilson and Waterman, trustees; that in that suit "service was attempted to be had by publication, the plaintiffs in said cause alleging that the said Moore, Waterman and Wilson were nonresidents of the State of Missouri; that in the said proceeding the said Cairo and Fulton Railroad Company were brought in, as was pretended, by personal service; but your complainants herein here aver, charge and show the fact to be that the service in said cause, the pretended appearance of the defendants by their attorney and in their own proper persons, was, in fact, a fraud and deception imposed upon the Circuit Court trying said cause; that in truth and in fact the said Waterman, previous to the bringing of said action in said Circuit Court, and said Moore, soon after the bringing of said action and before service upon him therein had been obtained, had departed this life, and their successors in said trust and as trustees had been appointed in pursuance to the provisions of the said deed of trust; that in consequence of their said deaths and the appointment of their successors as such trustees, as aforesaid, no service Opinion of the Court. was had in said cause, the new trustees were not made parties, were not served with process and had no notice of proceedings, although necessary and proper parties. The other defendant in said cause, viz., the said Cairo and Fulton Railroad Company, was not a necessary or proper party, as by the foreclosure of the state lien on said railroad under what is known as the sell-out act and the purchase of said railroad under said sale the said company, before the commencement of said suit, was dissolved and had ceased to exist and could not legally be made a party to said proceedings; that the only party defendant to said proceedings that was in fact present or pretending to make a defence in said action was Green L. Poplin, who had at one time been the president of the said railroad company, but long previous to the bringing of said suit had ceased to be connected with the said Cairo and Fulton Railroad Company in any capacity whatever, but was in fact acting in collusion with the attorneys and agents of said Butler County to aid said Butler County and its attorneys to avoid and disregard their said contract with the Cairo and Fulton Railroad Company. And these complainants aver and charge the fact to be that notwithstanding the fact that the said Circuit Court proceeded to find the issues in said case for the said county of Butler, and to decree that the said deed from the State of Missouri to the Cairo and Fulton Railroad Company and the deed of trust from said railroad company to the said Moore, Waterman and Wilson be cancelled, set aside and for naught held, and that the interest of the defendants therein be divested out of them and invested in said county of Butler, that all said pretended proceedings were null, void and of no effect whatever on account of the collusion of the parties thereto, and because the parties holding the title under said deed of trust in trust for the holders of the bonds of the said Cairo and Fulton Railroad Company were not parties to said suit and did not appear thereto, either in person or by attorneys. And because neither the said bondholders nor their assigns were in court by service of process or otherwise." It was further alleged that in the year 1863 a number of judgments were obtained in the Circuit Courts of Mississippi Opinion of the Court. County, Missouri, against the railroad company, and part of the lands in controversy were sold under execution, various persons becoming the purchasers and receiving conveyances. The petition sets out various sales of lands embraced in the above deed of trust, and makes defendants numerous parties who were in possession claiming title, including the St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Railroad Company. The petition avers that in the several suits in the Butler Circuit Court the railroad company "was the only defendant; neither said trustee or the bondholders were made parties to said suits, neither did they in any way have notice thereof or appear therein by attorney or otherwise, and whatever rights said judgment creditors acquired by reason of their said several judgments, and whatever title the said purchaser at said sheriff's sale made under said judgments acquired, were subject and subservient to the said first deed and the rights of the bondholders of said Cairo and Fulton Railroad Company. The purchasers at said foreclosure proceeding under the decree of the Supreme Court took a paramount and superior title to all said parties and purchasers at said sheriff's sale; that the said sheriff's deeds made to the purchasers at said execution sales conveyed no title to the said purchaser as against the prior lien of the said trustees under said trust deed," etc. In the court of original jurisdiction the issues were found for the plaintiffs. Some of the defendants moved to set aside the finding and judgment upon these general grounds: Because the court erred in admitting improper, illegal, irrelevant and incompetent evidence and in rejecting proper, legal, relevant and competent evidence; in refusing to sustain defendants' demurrer to the plaintiffs' evidence offered at the close of plaintiffs' case; in finding the issues in favor of the plaintiffs and in rendering a decree in their favor; and because the decree was against the weight of the evidence. The motion for a new trial was overruled, and the cause was carried to the Supreme Court of Missouri upon the appeal of the county of Butler and others. By the latter court the judgment was reversed, and the cause remanded to the Circuit Court of the city of St. |