less some rule of law was prescribed for the jury that was in absolute
disregard of the right to just compensation. Ib.

9. A statute of a State, requiring every railroad corporation to stop all
regular passenger trains, running wholly within the State, at its sta-
tions at all county seats long enough to take on and discharge pas-
sengers with safety, is a reasonable exercise of the police power of the
State, and does not take property of the company without due process
of law; nor does it, as applied to a train connecting with a train of
the same company running into another State, and carrying some
interstate passengers and the United States mail, unconstitutionally
interfere with interstate commerce, or with the transportation of the
mails of the United States. Gladson v. Minnesota, 427.

10. The statute of the Territory of Utah (Compiled Laws of 1888, § 3371,
as amended in 1892) providing that "in all civil cases a verdict may
be rendered on the concurrence therein of nine or more members of
the jury," if not invalid under the Seventh Amendment to the Con-
stitution is so as violating the provision in the act of September 9,
1850, c. 51, admitting Utah as a Territory, that "the Constitution
and laws of the United States are hereby extended over and declared
to be in force in said Territory of Utah, so far as the same or any pro-
visions thereof may be applicable," and the act of April 7, 1874, c.
80, "concerning the practice in territorial courts, and appeals there-
from," which provided that no party "shall be deprived of the right
of trial by jury in cases cognizable at common law." American Pub-
lishing Co. v. Fisher, 464.

11. Litigants in common law actions in the courts of that Territory, while
it remained a Territory, had a right to trial by jury, which involved
unanimity in the verdict, and this right could not be taken away by
territorial legislation. Ib.

12. The power of a State to change the rule in respect of unanimity of
juries is not before the court in this case. Ib.

13. The matter of the territorial boundaries of a municipal corporation is
local in its nature, and, as a rule, is to be finally and absolutely de-
termined by the authorities of the State. Forsyth v. Hammond, 506.
14. The construction of the constitution and laws of a State by its courts
is, as a general rule, binding on Federal courts. Ib.

15. The legislation contained in sections 102 and 101 of the Revised Stat-
utes was originally enacted "more effectually to enforce the attend-
ance of witnesses on the summons of either House of Congress, and
to compel them to discover testimony"; and, when reasonably con-
strued, is not open to the objection that it conflicts with the provisions
of the Constitution. In re Chapman, 661.

16. Congress possesses the constitutional power to enact a statute to enforce
the attendance of witnesses, and to compel them to make disclosure
of evidence to enable the respective bodies to discharge their legisla
tive functions. Ib.

17. While Congress cannot divest itself or either of its Houses of the in-
herent power to punish for contempt, it may provide that contumacy
in a witness called to testify in a matter properly under consideration
by either House, and deliberately refusing to answer questions per-
tinent thereto, shall be a misdemeanor against the United States.
Ib.

18. A state statute providing that no dog shall be entitled to the protec-
tion of the law unless placed upon the assessment rolls, and that in a
civil action for killing a dog the owner cannot recover beyond the value
fixed by himself in the last assessment preceding the killing, is within
the police power of the State. Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton
Railroad Co., 698.

See JURISDICTION, B, 10, 11; C, 5;
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION;

RAILROAD, 1 to 6, 9;

TAX AND TAXATION, 1, 3, 5.

CONTRACT.

See ADMIRALTY, 11;
RAILROAD, 9.

CONTRACTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE AND COMMERCE.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

CONTUMACY.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 17.

CORPORATION.

See TAX AND TAXATION, 10, 11.

COURT AND JURY.

If the trial court gives the law fully and accurately, covering all the
ground necessary to advise the jury of the rights of the parties, it is
not necessary to instruct them in the very language of counsel.
Carter v. Ruddy, 493.

CRIMINAL LAW.'

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1;

HABEAS CORPUS, 3.

CUSTOMS DUTIES.

1. A foreign built vessel, purchased by a citizen of the United States, and
brought into the waters thereof, is not taxable under the tariff laws of
the United States. The Conqueror, 110.

2. Rev. Stat. § 970, which provides that "when, in any prosecution commenced on account of the seizure of any vessel, goods, wares or merchandise, made by any collector or other officer, under any act of Congress authorizing such seizure, judgment is rendered for the claimant, but it appears to the court that there was reasonable cause of seizure, the court shall cause a proper certificate thereof to be entered, and the claimant shall not, in such case, be entitled to costs, nor shall the person who made the seizure, nor the prosecutor, be liable to suit or judgment on account of such suit or prosecution: provided, That the vessel, goods, wares or merchandise be, after judgment, forthwith returned to such claimant or his agent," only affords the collector immunity against a judgment for damages in cases where proceedings against the vessel were instituted upon information filed by the United States, for a fine or forfeiture incurred by the vessel itself. Ib.

3. A collector of customs who seizes a foreign built vessel purchased by a citizen of the United States and brought by him into their waters, and holds the same on the claim that it is taxable for duties under the tariff laws, is not protected against a judgment for damages, by a certificate of probable cause. Ib.

DAMAGES.

The errors alleged were frivolous, and the writ of error was sued out for delay, for which, in affirming the judgment, ten per cent damages are allowed under clause 2 of Rule 23. Nelson v. Flint, 276. See RAILROAD, 11.

DECEASED PERSONS' ESTATES.

See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

DEED.

See JURISDICTION, A, 1.

DEMURRAGE.

See ADMIRALTY, 4 to 7.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

1. In the District of Columbia a non-resident minor, having an interest in real estate situated therein, may, by the appointment of a guardian ad litem by the proper court, and without service of personal process upon him, be subjected to a decree providing for the sale of the land for the payment of the debts of the decedent owner, and partitioning the surplus, if any, after such payment. Manson v. Duncanson, 533.

2. Such a decree, if made by a court with full jurisdiction of the subject-
matter and having the proper parties before it, cannot be attacked by
one of those parties in a collateral proceeding. Ib.

3. Whether the decedent owner in such case had any interest in the
land petitioned to be sold was a question to be decided by the court
in which the cause was pending, and if error was committed in its
disposition of that question, the remedy was by appeal, or by a bill of
review, if duly filed. Ib.

EJECTMENT.

1. A single verdict and judgment in ejectment, when not conclusive under
the laws aud in the courts of a State, is no bar to a second action of
ejectment in the courts of the United States. Barber v. Pittsburgh,
Fort Wayne & Chicago Railway Co., 83.

2. It is well settled that an action of ejectment cannot be maintained in
the courts of the United States on a merely equitable title; and there
is nothing in this case to exempt it from the rule that a patent is
necessary to convey legal title. Carter v. Ruddy, 493.

3. When a tract of land is held as a separate and distinct tract, with
boundaries designated so that they may be known, the possession by
the owner or his tenants of a part operates as a possession of all; but
if the tract is cut up into distinct lots, marked and treated as distinct
tracts, the claimant to all must show possession of all. Ib.

EQUITY.

Equity will sometimes refuse relief where a shorter time than that pre-
scribed by the statute of limitations has elapsed without suit. It
ought always to do so where, as in this case, the delay in the assertion
of rights is not adequately explained, and such circumstances have
intervened in the condition of the adverse party as to render it unjust
to him or to his estate that a court of equity should assist the plaintiff.
In this case the plaintiff, seeking the aid of equity, forbore for an
unreasonably long time to assert his rights, and made no demand
upon his adversary until disease had so far deprived the latter of his
reason and faculties that he could not comprehend any matter of
business submitted to him. His right to ask the aid of a court of
equity was held to have been lost under the peculiar circumstances
of the case.
Whitney v. Fox, 637.

ESTOPPEL.

See RAILROAD, 9.

EVIDENCE.

1. Conversations between two makers of a note, in the absence of the
payee, and without his knowledge, are not binding upon him, and

are not admissible in evidence against him in an action to recover on the note. Nelson v. Flint, 276.

2. A party cannot, by merely filing with the clerk an affidavit not incorporated in any bill of exceptions, bring into the record evidence of what took place at the trial.

Ib.

See ADMIRALTY, 5, 6, 7;

SIGNAL SERVICE, 7;
WILL, 6.

FINDINGS OF FACTS.

See PRACTICE.

GUARDIAN AND WARD.

See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

HABEAS CORPUS.

1. Iasigi, Consul General of Turkey in Boston, was arrested in New York, February 14, 1897, on a warrant issued by a magistrate of the latter city, to await the warrant of the governor of New York on the requisition of the governor of Massachusetts for his surrender as a fugitive from justice in that State, where he was charged with having committed the crime of embezzlement. On the 18th of February he applied to the District Court of the United States for a writ of habeas corpus, on the ground that the proceedings before the city magistrate were without authority or jurisdiction, because of his consular office. The writ was issued and a hearing had March 12. The District Court dismissed the writ, and remanded the prisoner, from which judgment an appeal was taken. On the 19th of March the State Department was informed that Iasigi had been removed from his consular office by the Turkish government on the 9th of that month. Held, that the order of the District Court remanding him to custody was not erroneous. Iasigi v. Van De Carr, 391.

2. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, followed to the point that the object of a writ of habeas corpus is to ascertain whether the prisoner applying for it can be legally detained in custody; and if sufficient ground for his detention be shown, he is not to be discharged for defects in the original arrest or commitment. Ib.

3. When a state court has jurisdiction of an indictment for murder, and the laws of the State divide that offence into three degrees, and make it the province of the jury to determine under which degree the case falls, the conviction of the accused of murder in the first degree and sentence accordingly, without a finding as to which degree he was guilty of, though erroneous, is not a jurisdictional defect, remediable by writ of habeas corpus. In re Eckart, 481.